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This thesis presents two prescriptive models for approaching challenges to special 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
A.   MODELING HOW SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES SUCCEED IN 
PERSONNEL RECOVERY   
According to Joint Military Doctrine for Urban Operations (JP 3-06), the U.S. 
will conduct many military operations in urban areas in the future.  These operations will 
occur in both high and low intensity environments across the full spectrum of military 
operations.  This will present unique challenges for U.S. military forces, especially when 
conducting personnel recovery (PR) operations in support of isolated personnel (IP).  The 
first draft revision of Joint Doctrine for Personnel Recovery (JP 3-50) states that, 
“preserving the lives of those participating in a U.S.-sponsored activity or mission is one 
of the highest priorities of the Department of Defense” (2003, p. I-1).  This thesis will 
address this priority by developing two models of PR for Special Operations Forces 
(SOF) operating in urban environments. 
It is necessary to develop Special Operations Forces (SOF) PR models because no 
doctrine currently exists which specifically addresses PR missions in urban 
environments.  Current U.S. doctrine bases the principles for the conduct of both 
conventional and special operations missions on two active participants—friendly and 
enemy forces.  Carl von Clauzewitz’s principles of war, commonly accepted in both 
conventional and special operations doctrinal manuals, do not adequately account for 
operations where the desired effect is other than the destruction of opposing forces.  
Likewise, William H. McRaven’s principles of special operations do not take into 
account the friendly, participative, third party dimension of the mission.  
In the destruction or capture of an enemy target, the relationship is two-
dimensional—friendly forces attempt to achieve a goal, while enemy forces endeavor to 
avert it.  In the case of the overt rescue of friendly forces captured by the enemy, such as 
in a hostage rescue scenario, friendly forces again attempt to accomplish their goal, while 
the enemy tries to disrupt the successful rescue.  Under enemy control, a hostage has 
minimal ability to participate or assist in his or her recovery.  An IP, however, presents an 
active third dimension to the recovery scenario.  Adversaries will likely challenge  
1 
friendly forces attempting an overt recovery, but there is also an IP actively participating 
in the events of the mission, whose actions directly affect the probability of mission 
success.   
Additionally, in the case of clandestine, covert, or unconventional warfare (UW) 
operations conducted by SOF-trained surrogate forces, Clauzewitz’s and McRaven’s 
principles have little applicability.  The military does not adequately address these 
missions in any of its doctrinal manuals, thus there is little available for planners or 
mission executors to use in the conduct of similar operations.  Even the five principles for 
success in the conduct of UW combat operations, as stated in Special Forces 
Unconventional Warfare Operations (FM 3-05.201), focus on unconcealed military 
operations conducted with guerrilla forces (2003, p. 3-43).  There are no published 
principles, theories, models, or paradigms for establishing and maintaining a surrogate 
network, specifically trained to support PR operations in threat environments deemed too 
risky for typical and observable recovery methods. 
Existing theories discuss mission success in terms of a direct action force’s 
“superiority” relative to the enemy, but do not consider the third variable of the IP.  This 
thesis proposes that relative superiority, and the broader concept of situational 
superiority (discussed in detail in section D below), are both required in order to ensure 
successful PR operations.1  Situational superiority (SS) is nothing more than capabilities 
of commanders and their staff, the recovery force, and the IP all coming together at the 
right place in time and space in order to bring about the desired effect in the targeted area.  
Friendly forces can only achieve SS when the recovery assets and the IP have sufficiently 
exploited their operational environment and reduced the enemy’s capacity to respond to 
the recovery attempt.  While SS is a necessary precondition for successful PR operations, 
this does not imply that it is a sufficient condition for success.  Several uncontrollable 
variables, such as luck, weather conditions, and things generally associated with the 
frictions of war, could also have an impact on the success or failure of a PR mission.   
 
                                                 
1 The term situational superiority in this paper is derived directly from the first draft revision of Joint 
Doctrine for Personnel Recovery, (JP 3-50).  While the term was directly adopted, the concept and means 
to attain situational superiority differs greatly from the joint publication’s application of Clausewitz’s 
principles of warfare. 
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B.   THE SCOPE OF THE THESIS 
In order to develop succinct and precise models for SOF PR, the authors chose to 
limit the scope of study to the urban environment.  Because it is a uniquely difficult and 
extraordinarily demanding environment, that the U.S. military has had little experience 
and even less success in exploiting, it would arguably suffice for less demanding 
environments.  Therefore, a detailed study of this particular environment is important.  
For the purposes of this thesis, urban environments will include any built-up populated 
area.  The urban setting offers a unique environment, and presents significant challenges 
to SOF in the conduct of PR operations.  Additionally, special operations for the purposes 
of this study will be limited to those missions that meet the definition of a special 
operation as proposed by McRaven.2  However, unlike McRaven’s research, this study 
focuses primarily on two special operations PR missions involving IP—those conducted 
as high-risk overt or direct action (DA) missions, and those conducted as clandestine 
nonconventional assisted recovery (NAR) missions.3  JP 3-50 (2003) describes these 
operations as follows: 
DA operations are short-duration strikes and other small-scale offensive 
actions by SOF or [special operations]-capable units to seize, destroy, 
capture, recover, or inflict damage on designated personnel or materiel.  
One of the activities that fall within the DA mission area is SOF recovery 
operations (p. G-2). 
NAR operations are performed by special operations forces or other 
government agencies [OGAs] that are specifically organized, trained, and 
equipped to recover isolated personnel using uniquely developed recovery 
mechanisms (2003, p. GL-19). 
Since friendly forces do not typically conceal DA PR operations, from this point on, all 
discussion of DA PR missions will refer to overt recovery operations to emphasize the 
diametrical opposition of DA and clandestine PR operations.4 
                                                 
2 McRaven (1996) asserts that “a special operation is conducted by forces specially trained, equipped, 
and supported for a specific target whose destruction, elimination, or rescue (in the case of hostages), is a 
political or military imperative” (p. 2). 
3 Doctrine also defines unconventional assisted recovery (UAR) as NAR operations carried out 
exclusively by SOF.  Although this thesis is written specifically to apply to SOF, UAR is a subset of NAR, 
therefore the thesis will only refer to the term NAR to alleviate confusion. 
4 By doctrine, “NAR operations may be covert or clandestine” (FM 3-05.231, 2003, p. 1-16).  In 
special operations, an activity may be both covert and clandestine and may focus equally on operational 
considerations and intelligence-related activities (JP 1-02, 2003, p. 89). 
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Within the context of NAR, there are both planned and unplanned assisted 
recoveries.  Unplanned assisted recoveries can occur when members of the general 
population in an enemy-held area assist an evader in returning to friendly control 
(McCrann, 1999, pp. 2-11).  Opportunists, accidental contacts, or good Samaritans 
illustrate these types of people.  Since there is no deliberate planning involved with 
regard to unplanned recoveries, this thesis will not consider them; this study is limited to 
planned assisted recoveries.    
C.   WHY IS SOF PR UNIQUE?  
The term special operations itself implies that these operations are unique and 
offer distinctive capabilities in support of PR operations.  These unique capabilities allow 
SOF to conduct high-risk DA operations in denied areas with a higher probability of 
success than conventional forces against an enemy force that is usually stronger 
numerically and in firepower. Therefore, when personnel are isolated in extremely high-
risk areas, SOF may provide the best opportunities for successful personnel recovery.  
The most distinctive capability that SOF brings to the entire PR spectrum is that they are 
the only military force capable of conducting NAR operations.  NAR is a subset of UW 
operations—a capability resting exclusively with SOF.  In short, SOF is unique because it 
can provide capabilities that are distinctive, forces that are uniquely proficient, or both 
(for further analysis of the role of SOF in PR, see Appendix A). 
D. SITUATIONAL SUPERIORITY   
As is depicted in Figure 1, a successful PR architecture rests upon a foundation 
capable of supporting the mission.  Effective policy, sound doctrine, timely PR support 
products, superior equipment, adequate education, and realistic targeted training establish 
this foundation.  Built upon the infrastructure is preparation of commanders and their 
staffs, the recovery force (RF), and those individuals at risk of becoming isolated before a 
crisis.   Command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence (C4I), the area 
overlapped by these three groups, ties it all together, and holistically gives U.S. forces the 
capability to accomplish the two unifying enabling objectives that all commanders and 
their staffs, RF, and IP attempt to accomplish in the conduct of PR.  First, they desire to 
gain and maintain situational awareness (SA), or battlespace awareness, in an area of  
4 
interest.  Second, they desire to gain and maintain SS.  An important consideration is that 
military and operational forces attain these enabling objectives differently during PR 
missions. 
To achieve SS is to gain and maintain the desired effect in an area of influence for 
a specific period.  As it pertains to PR, SS is nothing more than the combined battlespace 
exploitation of the three groups involved in PR.  SS is the cumulative and combined 
product of commanders and their staffs, the RF, and IP gaining relative superiority (RS) 
within their own spheres of influence.  The authors will thoroughly discuss RS in 
Chapters II and VI, but it is an advantage that a smaller attacking force can gain over a 












Figure 1.   Relationship Between the Essential Elements of Success for Personnel Recovery.  
(From PR Doctrine Briefing, personal communication, COL Mark Bracich, 
Director of Policy, Doctrine, and Training for the Joint Personnel Recovery 
Agency, July 25, 2003). 
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successful accomplishment of the five PR tasks of report, locate, support, recover, and 
return, while simultaneously allowing an IP to survive and evade long enough to be 
recovered prior to capture.  Written as an equation, the formula for SS is: 
 
SS = RS Commanders & Staffs  +  RS Recovery Force  +  RS Isolated Personnel 
 
The recovery forces used in the conduct of overt missions typically have no 
bearing or impact on NAR operations.  Simply changing the name of the recovery force 
variable gives the formula for SS in a NAR operation, and is similarly represented as: 
 
SS = RS Commanders & Staffs  +  RS Recovery Mechanism  +  RS Isolated Personnel 
 
This thesis will not address RS Commanders and Staffs, thus it will not address all facets 
of SS.  As the initial research into this model of SS, this thesis will address RS for both 
types of RF—overt (DA) and clandestine (NAR).  As represented in Figure 1, the 
relationship between overt recovery forces and NAR mechanisms is limited to the fact 
that they are interchangeable methods of recovering an IP; they both perform the same 
function, albeit through very different means.  Since there is already an applicable model 
for DA operations for SOF, the research in this area will focus on integrating RS for both 
the IP and the RF into a more specific PR model.  There currently exists no model 
applicable to NAR operations, so research in that area will focus on developing and 
testing a RS model for the IP and the NAR RF or recovery mechanism (RM). 
6 
RS is different for each of the three key actors in personnel recovery.  The authors 
argue that it is achievable only by applying specific principles thoroughly discussed in 
Chapters II and VI.  The absence of any of the interdependent principles needed to 
achieve RS, through ignorance, neglect, or necessity, will result in some degree of failure 
for that actor which could affect the overall success of the recovery operation.  This thesis 
claims that with RS it is possible to overcome overwhelming numerical odds for a 
specific period.  These different sets of principles are only effective for the RF or IP 
when all of the principles are properly integrated; it is this interdependence of these 
variables that reinforces the notion that each of the principles is equally important and 
mutually supportive.  Detailed discussion of the principles that govern successful 
recovery operations are at the beginning of each case study section. 
These principles should not be considered a holistic solution to the pursuit of PR..  
James Schneider states that, “the principles of war are heuristic devices:  rules of thumb 
that offer a quick entry into the solution of a problem” (as cited in Leonhard, 2000, p. ix).  
PR planners and executors should apply the principles proposed in this thesis in a fashion 
similar to the principles of war; since PR, as the authors argue, is the conduct of warfare.  
The application of principles and subsequent measures of RS are not quantitative 
measurements of how to conduct successful PR missions.  The authors do not intend the 
thesis to mirror British mathematician Fredrick Lanchester’s highly debated, yet widely 
applied, mathematical theory of warfare.  Rather, the authors designed the thesis to 
provide military PR planners with a starting point for considering factors that could 
significantly affect the success or failure of their operations. 
E. CASE STUDIES 
To further explain how RS affects the outcome of PR operations, this thesis 
presents seven historical case studies with follow-on analyses.  Due to the limited number 
of both clandestine and overt personnel recoveries conducted in urban terrain, the pool of 
available cases was extremely limited.  All three overt recovery cases came from 
Mogadishu, Somalia in 1993.  One detailed case study was Task Force Ranger’s organic 
recovery attempt conducted 3-4 October 1993 during Operation GOTHIC SERPENT.  
There is also a detailed case study of the recovery of a UH-60 crew shot down on 25 
September 1993 in Mogadishu Somalia, and the Tiger Company’s recovery of the Quick 
Reaction Force “Lost Platoon” in Mogadishu, Somalia on 4 October 1993.   
In all overt case studies, the authors conducted interviews with most key 
participants and decision-makers, and all leaders personally involved with the recovery.  
Citations from interviews with various agencies involved in the most recent NAR 
operations are also included.  Much of the information regarding NAR operations is 
classified. However, enough information is available through open source historical case 
studies, and unclassified data on recent conflicts to adequately support the authors’  
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hypothesis.  The thesis uses a case study of NAR from the French theater of operations 
during World War II, a case study from the Korean War and one from Operation IRAQI 
FREEDOM.   
The next seven chapters will present the hypothesis and case studies briefly 
mentioned above in greater detail.  Chapter II introduces the overt recovery model.  
Following this, Chapters III through V each discuss three different PR cases that occurred 
in Mogadishu, Somalia in 1993.  Then, Chapter VI introduces the NAR model.  Chapters 
VII and VIII follow this, and include a case study from WWII, Korea, and Iraq, 
respectively.  Chapter IX then offers the conclusions and recommendations of the study.  
The analysis contained in this thesis will show that RS of IP and both types of RF, while 
non-quantitative and somewhat theoretical, do exist and can be an effective tool for 
















II. MODELING OVERT URBAN PERSONNEL RECOVERY 
OPERATIONS 
A. RELATIVE SUPERIORITY AND THE PRINCIPLES NECESSARY FOR 
THE OVERT RECOVERY FORCE’S SUCCESSFUL OPERATIONS 
1. Relative Superiority 
In his model and theory of special operations William H. McRaven (1996) defines 
RS as a condition existing when a generally smaller attacking force gains a decisive 
advantage over a larger or well-defended enemy.  He asserts there are three basic 
properties of RS.  First, the attacking force usually achieves RS within five minutes of the 
initial engagement—when the attacking force achieves a decisive advantage at a pivotal 
moment.  Second, in order to guarantee victory, an attacking force must sustain RS after 
achieving it.  Finally, it is difficult to regain RS once it is lost.  The key to successful 
special operations missions is to achieve RS early in the engagement because “the longer 
an engagement continues, the more likely the outcome will be affected by the will of the 
enemy, chance, and uncertainty, the factors that comprise the frictions of war” (pp. 4-6). 
McRaven (1996) also uses a graph to show how and when each special operations 
force achieves RS (see Figure 2).  This graph effectively illustrates “how special 
operations forces, with their cutting-edge technology, access to national-level 
intelligence, high-quality training, and elite troops, are able to minimize the frictions of 
war to achieve relative superiority.”  The graph also “provides a visual demonstration of 
the three properties of RS: the pivotal moment can be seen as a dramatic rise in the 
probability of mission completion; sustaining RS is a gradual rise from the pivotal 
moment to mission completion; and a decisive drop in the probability of mission 
completion shows a loss of relative superiority”5 (pp. 6-7). 
 
                                                 
5 According to McRaven (1996), the intersection of the X-axis (time) and the Y-axis (probability of 
mission completion) is the point of vulnerability (PV).  “The PV is defined as the point in a mission when 
the attacking force reaches the enemy’s first line of defenses. …The area of vulnerability (AV) is a function 
of mission completion over time.  The longer it takes to gain relative superiority, the larger the area of 
vulnerability, and hence the greater the impact of the frictions of war. …the special operations forces 
succeeds because its inherent advantages allow it to reduce the AV, and hence the frictions of war to a 
manageable level” (pp. 7-8). 
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 Figure 2.   Sample RS Graph for DA Recovery Forces.  (From McRaven, 1996, p. 7). 
 
According to McRaven, “six principles of special operations ... simplicity, 
security, repetition, surprise, speed and purpose … dominate every successful mission.”  
He further asserts that, “gaining relative superiority requires proper integration of all six 
principles … [and] the practitioner of special operations must take account of the 
principles in the three phases of an operation: planning, preparation, and execution.”  The 
principles are interdependent and rely on each other for mutual support in what he refers 
to as a synergistic nature.  When depicted graphically (see Figure 3), the model reflects 
the theory of special operations and “represents the idea that special operations forces 
succeed, in spite of their numerical inferiority, when they are able to gain RS through the 
use of a simple plan, carefully concealed, repeatedly and realistically rehearsed, and 
executed with surprise, speed, and purpose.  Failure results when the frictions of war 
overcome the moral factors.”  Although gaining RS over the enemy is essential to 
success, it is not a guarantee.  The success of the mission, like the inverted pyramid, 
precariously balances on a slender apex.  Courage, intellect, boldness, and perseverance 
are some of the moral factors that have to support the pyramid, preventing frictions of 
war from toppling it and causing defeat (pp. 8-11). 
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Figure 3.   McRaven’s Special Operations Model.  (After McRaven, 1996, p. 11). 
 
2. The Principles of Special Operations Defined and Refined 
a. Simplicity 
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  McRaven (1996) explains that “simplicity is the most crucial, and yet 
sometimes the most difficult, principle with which to comply” and that “there are three 
elements of simplicity critical to success: limiting the number of objectives, good 
intelligence, and innovation.”  He believes that “it is essential to limit the number of 
tactical objectives to only those that are vital. … Limiting the objectives to only what is 
essential focuses the training, limits the number of personnel required, reduces the time 
on target, and decreases the number of “‘moving parts.’”  He insists that good 
intelligence “simplifies a plan by reducing the unknown factors and the number of 
variables that must be considered. … There will, however, always be gaps in the 
intelligence … [forcing the planners to build] their plans around what [is] reasonable to 
expect.”  Further, he states that “innovation simplifies a plan by helping to avoid or 
eliminate obstacles that would otherwise compromise surprise and/or complicate the 
rapid execution of the mission” and that “innovation is normally manifested in new 
technology, but it is also the application of unconventional tactics. … Either new 
technology or innovative tactics [must] assist the assault element in reaching the 
objective and then quickly and effectively eliminating the enemy” (pp. 11-14).  The 
authors have adopted the definition of simplicity in full for the SOF-specific overt urban 
PR model. 
b. Security 
In general terms, McRaven (1996) says, “the purpose of tight security is to 
prevent the enemy from gaining an advantage through foreknowledge of the impending 
attack.”  Due to the nature of special operations, “it is not so much the impending mission 
that must be concealed as the timing and, to a lesser degree, the means of insertion.”  
Security on the part of the attackers, “prevent[s] the enemy from knowing the time, and 
in some cases, the method of the attack, although it [does] not prevent the enemy from 
preparing for an assault.”  Furthermore, McRaven argues that, “security should be as tight 
as possible, without unduly impeding the preparation or execution of operations,” and is 
important in achieving RS “because it prevents the enemy from gaining an unexpected 
advantage.”  A prevailing reason for the success of special operations is the ability of the 
attacking force to know what defenses the enemy has prepared.  A failed security effort 
could result in the enemy preparing a surprise of his own and subsequently preempting 
the attack or reducing the speed on target, both of which would dramatically reduce the 
possibility of achieving relative superiority” (pp. 14-15).  Additionally, greater firepower 
available to SOF preserves and enhances the security of these smaller, more vulnerable, 
units.  The authors have adopted the definition of security in full for the SOF-specific 
overt urban PR model. 
c. Repetition 
Addressing repetition, McRaven (1996) states, “in the preparation phase, 
repetition, like routine, is indispensable in eliminating the barriers to success” and that 
“certain combat units, such as counterterrorist [CT] teams … perform standard mission 
profiles as a matter of routine.  This routine hones those tactical skills to a degree that 
allows quick reaction to a threat, provided that threat fits within the standard scenario for 
which the unit has been practicing.”  Additionally, he believes that, “repetition hones 
individual and unit skills, while full-dress rehearsals unmask weaknesses in the plan,” 
and that “both are essential to success on the battlefield” (pp. 15-16).  For the purposes of 
PR, this definition will require modification.  McRaven intended this principle to address 
rehearsals for a specific objective known ahead of time.  In the case of the IP evading 
capture in the urban environment, extensive mission-specific rehearsals are impractical 
given the desire to affect recovery prior to capture.  For the purposes of these analyses, 
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the authors will amend the definition of the principle of repetition to emphasize the unit’s 
routine and standard operation procedures (SOPs).  Rehearsals are just as essential for 
successful PR missions, but are not mission-specific and generally take place during joint 
and unit exercises. 
d. Surprise 
According to McRaven (1996), “special operations forces do not generally 
have the luxury of attacking the enemy when or where he is unprepared.”  Such forces 
must typically attack in spite of enemy preparations.  Therefore, in McRaven’s opinion, 
surprise means simply catching the enemy off guard.  “In a special operation surprise is 
gained through deception, timing, and taking advantage of the enemy’s vulnerabilities” 
(p. 17).  For use with PR, this definition also requires further refinement to account for 
the increased lethality and precision of technologically advanced warfighting systems 
now available to smaller forces.  This significant increase in firepower available for the 
conduct of special operations was not previously considered in McRaven’s cases, which 
all occurred prior to 1976.  With more abundant and accurate firepower immediately 
available to special operations units, there is a significant increase in an adversary’s 
vulnerabilities that recovery forces can exploit to achieve surprise—with even smaller 
forces.  It is important to clarify that enhanced firepower, possessed by increasingly 
smaller forces, will not generally equal or exceed that of the adversary. Instead, SOF can 
achieve surprise because their firepower exceeds that which the enemy expects from such 
small forces.  Therefore, firepower, in the hands of a numerically inferior force, can 
consistently surprise an opponent who directly correlates unit size with firepower. 
e. Speed 
According to McRaven (1996), the principle of speed in a special 
operations mission is critical because “any delay will expand [the] area of vulnerability 
and decrease [the] opportunity to achieve relative superiority … [because] in special 
operations the enemy is in a defensive position and his only desire is to counter [the] 
attack.”  Therefore, McRaven’s theory assumes that the enemy’s will to resist is 
understood, and his ability to react a constant.  This ability to react makes it essential, “to 
move as quickly as possible regardless of the enemy’s reaction,” and that  
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Relative superiority can be gained, despite the efforts of the enemy, 
primarily because the attacking force moves with such speed that the 
enemy’s reaction is not an overriding factor. … In order to gain surprise 
and speed, special forces are generally small and lightly armed, and 
therefore they are unable to sustain action against a conventional enemy 
for long periods of time (pp. 19-21).   
With more strength now available to smaller units, as discussed in the preceding 
paragraph, there should be a relative increase in the duration that a SOF recovery force 
can operate without sacrificing the principle of speed.  With only this clarification, the 
authors will adopt the definition of speed in full for the SOF-specific overt urban PR 
model.  As discussed in the previous paragraph, the gains realized with increased 
firepower allows for some sacrifice of the principle of speed.  The addition of firepower 
does not mean that conventional forces can be more “SOF-like.”  Rather, it simply gives 
SOF the ability to conduct successful missions with increasingly smaller units. 
f. Purpose 
According to McRaven (1996), “purpose is understanding and then 
executing the prime objective of the mission regardless of emerging obstacles or 
opportunities.”  He concludes that there are two aspects to the principle.  First, “the 
purpose must be clearly defined by the mission statement. … The mission statement 
should be crafted to ensure that in the heat of battle, no matter what else happens, the 
individual soldier understands the primary objective.”  The second aspect of purpose is 
personal commitment to the extent that “the men must be inspired with a sense of 
personal dedication that knows no limitations” (pp. 21-23).  The authors will adopt the 
definition of purpose in full for the SOF-specific overt urban PR model. 
B. RELATIVE SUPERIORITY AND THE PRINCIPLES NECESSARY FOR 
THE ISOLATED PERSONNEL’S SUCCESS 
1. Relative Superiority 
 Almost by definition, and IP faces a numerically superior force.  If the IP is to 
prevail, he or she must establish RS over this force.  The authors define RS Isolated Personnel 
as a condition that exists when a person who is isolated in an uncertain or hostile 
operational environment gains a decisive advantage over any/all element(s) in pursuit, 
virtually disappearing into the urban landscape.  The authors can represent RS Isolated 
Personnel as in the graph in Figure 4; conceptually, this illustrates the revised properties of 
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RS Isolated Personnel.  The pivotal moment where the IP achieve RS Isolated Personnel, shown as 
the vertical rise in the probability of mission completion.  From the point where IP 
achieve RS Isolated Personnel, the graphical representation shows sustaining RS Isolated Personnel 
as a gradual increase in the probability of mission completion.  Any loss of RS Isolated 
Personnel, such as recognition by local inhabitants and reported to the authorities, would 
show a drop in the probability of mission completion.  Capture is the ultimate loss of RS 
Isolated Personnel and is a recovery mission failure in most scenarios; the authors only intend 
that this model apply to the evading IP (who has not yet been captured). 
 
Mission Complete
Linked up with RM/RT or friendly forces (unassisted or opportune); no longer 
responsible for their own recovery; their fate no longer in their own hands
Time (X-axis)













Relative Superiority (RS) Achieved
Evader absorbed into environment 







Figure 4.   Sample RS Isolated Personnel Graph. 
 
The authors do not believe that McRaven’s six principles of RS apply to the IP 
because the IP is not an attacking but an evading “force.”  Therefore, it is necessary to 
identify IP-specific principles.  Based on an analysis of the relatively few case studies 
involving SOF recovery forces in both overt and clandestine urban recovery operations, 
the authors argue that the four variables critical to gaining RS Isolated Personnel are 
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communication, adaptability, exploitation, and the Gonzales principle.  These variables 
dictate the degree of success for every PR operation.  As with McRaven’s principles, the 
four IP-specific principles that establish RS are equally important and mutually 
supportive. 
2. The Principles of Success for Isolated Personnel 
a. Communication 
There are two critical elements to successful communication for the 
evader.  First, the evader must be able to convey his location to friendly forces by use of a 
radio or other means such as ground-to-air signaling.  In the urban environment, anything 
other than radio communication will be difficult at best, especially if done at any time 
other than during hours of limited visibility.  A SOF recovery force will not launch a 
recovery mission without first knowing the location of the evader, though NAR forces 
may be activated to provide this location to the recovery forces.  Second, evaders need 
the ability to positively identify or authenticate themselves to the recovery force.  
Because of the degree of vulnerability during recovery operations, recovery forces will 
normally verify an IP’s identity before conducting the recovery (JP 3-50, p. VI-42).  
Additionally, NAR forces typically do not initiate linkup during the contact process.   It is 
a much more dangerous task for the NAR forces to initiate contact with an IP who does 
not know what to expect, as in the case of an IP who has not been instructed on how, 
where, or when to enter the recovery mechanism (RM), and lacks radio communications 
to receive such instructions. 
b. Exploitation 
The principle of exploitation consists of those things an evader does to 
alter his environment to gain an advantage over his/her would-be captors.  When 
analyzing key aspects of this principle, two observations emerged.  First, the evader must 
make the most of what is available by being both opportunistic and resourceful in order 
to put time and space between themselves and those who would like to pursue.  The 
principle of exploitation is an active practice, and requires the IP to expose himself by 
taking action that has a higher level of risk.  Generally, it takes some time for military or 
police forces to get to the scene of an incident; this time must be productive for the 
evader.  Second, the evader must be able to walk a fine line between a gambler and 
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someone who takes carefully calculated risks, often acting in a manner that the enemy 
would consider unpredictable.  In the absence of an unpredictable action, the shock value 
of bold and audacious behavior may be sufficient to gain an advantage in time and space 
against a hesitant or uncommitted adversary or civilian inhabitants.  Diverting attention 
immediately upon becoming an IP, and the use of tactical deception such as ruses, may 
be other methods of exploiting opportunities in order to gain an advantage. 
c. Adaptability 
The first of the two facets of adaptability needed by the urban evader 
involves assuming a chameleon-like quality of being able to blend in with ones 
environment.  Adaptability is a more passive practice, and differs from exploitation in 
that the IP adjusts to the environment instead of trying to change it.  Camouflage, in the 
sense of being anonymous or invisible though clearly out of place, is as essential as speed 
is to most offensive military operations.  There is great talent in being able to hide in 
plain sight or right under the nose of one’s enemy, and in the urban environment, an 
inability to do this immediately will almost certainly lead to capture.  The second closely 
related facet of adaptability involves the evader fitting in with the patterns of normalcy; 
evaders can only achieve this with knowledge gained from area, cultural, and linguistic 
familiarization.  If there are nightly curfews in an area, or on occasions when local 
religious practices prohibit leaving one’s home after dark, then evading at night would 
only bring unwanted attention.  The evader must temporarily adopt the customs and 
idiosyncrasies of the locals; anything else would be out of place. 
d. The Gonzales Principle6 
In general terms, the Gonzales principle is a “composed” warrior mindset 
that develops, during times of peace through realistic training supported by senior 
leadership.  It is only when the evader is placed in a situation requiring self-preservation 
that this mindset can become a tool for survival.  This principle has two essential 
                                                 
6 The authors derived the term Gonzales principle from the ideas contained in Laurence Gonzales’ 
(2003) Book Deep Survival.  The principle involves a balance of skill and emotional control when in the 
midst of a survival emergency.  Manifestation of this principle involves a person perceiving a situation 
clearly, planning, and then taking, the correct action.  Another characteristic of this principle is self-control.  
Exercising this element properly will often decide the outcome of a survival emergency.  Training is critical 
to exercising self-control over the instinctive emotions that manifest themselves in persons in stressful 
situations.  Gonzales, in his appendix, sums up these elements in twelve points concerning how survivors 
think and behave in the clutch of mortal danger.   
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elements critical to success for an IP: critical thinking skills and continuous realistic 
training.  While the other IP-specific principles are action based, the critical thinking 
facet of the Gonzales principle more closely relates to the process of deciding how, when, 
and where to apply the other principles.  The ability to quickly assess and appraise a 
crisis, evaluate alternatives, and decide on an appropriate solution only gets better with 
rehearsals and training.  Rapid crisis decision-making executed poorly, such as risking 
movement or contact at the wrong place or time, can mean the difference between 
evading and capture.  
The second element of the Gonzales principle is survival, evasion, 
resistance, and escape (SERE) training, including initial training, subsequent refresher 
training, and advanced education.  The potential evader must have an ingrained sense of 
duty to become the “street smart” evader before combat.  This sense of duty can only 
exist in an institutional environment conducive to the production of smart evaders, with 
unit commanders ensuring opportunities are available for such education and training, 
and with individuals who realize the necessity to accept and maximize those training 
occasions. 
C. CONSTRUCTING THE SOF-SPECIFIC OVERT URBAN MODEL FOR 
PERSONNEL RECOVERY  
Figure 5 shows the relationship of McRaven’s principles of special operations and 
the four IP-specific principles.  The special operations model (DA recovery force) is the 
inverted pyramid, and functions just as it does when used as a stand-alone model. In PR, 
however, there is an additional element. The IP’s survival precariously balances on the 
pyramid’s inverted “base,” steadied by the presence of the four IP-specific principles.  If 
any one of these IP-specific principles is wanting, then the evader’s survival could be in 
jeopardy.  Successful application of the four IP-specific principles reduces the area of 
vulnerability and frictions of war to a manageable level, but there are still factors in war 
over which the IP has little or no control.  The principles are necessary but not sufficient 
to guarantee success; missing from the model is the lack of control of these other factors 
that could affect the IP’s ability to achieve RS Isolated Personnel.  An IP could do everything 
perfectly, but fail to successfully evade because the recovery force poorly executed the 
mission, resulting in the pyramid toppling over.  Since the evader’s fate rests on the 
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inverted pyramid, if the frictions of war cause the pyramid to topple, gravity will cause 
the ball representing the evader’s survival to roll off the pyramid. 
The SOF-specific overt urban PR model graphically represents the idea that SOF 
DA recovery forces succeed in achieving situational superiority, in spite of their 
numerical inferiority, when two things occur: 1) the DA recovery force is able to gain RS 
through the use of a simple plan, carefully concealed, repeatedly and realistically 
rehearsed, and executed with surprise, speed, and purpose, and 2) the IP with a composed 
warrior mindset (from applying the Gonzales principle) is able to gain his/her own RS 
through exploiting opportunities in order to adapt to the urban environment long enough 
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Figure 5.   Authors’ SOF-specific overt urban PR model. 
 
D. CASE STUDY METHODOLOGY 
To test the specific theory of SOF-specific overt urban PR model for overt 
personnel recovery missions, this thesis will present three historical cases from U.S. 
operations in Somalia and provide an analysis of each.  The authors selected these 
particular cases because of the abundance of open and classified source data relating to 
them, and because of the extremely limited number of overt urban recovery cases 
available. While there are several other operations that may seem relevant, the majority 
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of those cases involve hostage recovery after the enemy had already captured the IP.  In 
addition, little open-source information is available on the more recent cases.   
The TF Ranger case in Chapter IV represents a PR event executed by SOF.  
McRaven (1996) based his model and theory of special operations on his refined 
definition of a special operation.7  While the cases in Chapters III and V were conducted 
by conventional light infantry forces, they satisfy the refined definition of a special 
operation as discussed earlier; specially trained, equipped, and supported forces 
conducted the mission on a target whose rescue was a political or military imperative.8   
The analyses will be sufficiently detailed to provide a practical and powerful 
model that is simple, yet universally applicable. When examining the urban environment 
throughout these case studies, the analyses suggest that it is the degree of relative 
superiority (RS), which combines RS Recovery Forces and RS Isolated Personnel, that results in an 










                                                 
7 This definition has not been widely accepted within the DoD, but it is both acceptable and reasonable 
as a part of the only special operations model available.  McRaven (1996) asserts that, “a special operation 
is conducted by forces specially trained, equipped, and supported for a specific target whose destruction, 
elimination, or rescue (in the case of hostages), is a political or military imperative” (p. 2).  Additionally, 
the tactical-level DA or “strike” missions he analyzed were “always of a strategic or operational nature and 
had the advantage of virtually unlimited resources and national-level intelligence” (p. 3).  Fitting perfectly 
within the confines of these broad categorizations, TF Ranger’s 3-4 October raid and ensuing immediate 
PR operation are extremely well suited for evaluation using his model and theory of special operations, 
especially given that TF Ranger was “a special operations force with inferior numbers and the disadvantage 
of attacking the stronger form of warfare [defense]”…paradoxically attempting to “…gain superiority over 
the enemy” (p. 4).  
8 In both of these cases, the Quick Recovery Company (QRC) had extensively trained in Mogadishu 
for this very scenario; it had been in Somalia for weeks, and had trained specifically for the “rescue” of 
engaged, distressed, or trapped UN Operations Somalia II (UNOSOM II) forces.  TF 2-14 augmented the 
QRC’s task organization with medical specialists instead of just the more commonly assigned mortar and 
anti-tank squads–specifically for the purpose of sustaining the lives of those being rescued. 
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III. THE SHOOT DOWN OF “COURAGE 53” 
A. OVERVIEW AND INTRODUCTION 
This chapter is a detailed case study of an overt, direct action (DA)-type personnel 
recovery (PR) mission conducted by Task Force (TF) 2-14.  The operation was to recover 
a UH-60 crew shot down on 25 September 1993 in Mogadishu Somalia.  The case begins 
with some of the background and historical context before beginning the detailed case 
study.  Following the case study is an analysis of relative superiority (RS) for both the IP 
(RS Isolated Personnel) and the recovery force (RS Recovery Forces), in accordance with the SOF-
specific overt urban PR model.  Following this is an evaluation of how each of the overt 
recovery force’s six principles, and the four IP-specific recovery principles affected the 
respective participant’s level of RS. 
On 4 May 1993, UN Operations Somalia II (UNOSOM II) assumed responsibility 
for operations in Somalia under the name Operation CONTINUED HOPE.  When 
UNOSOM II assumed responsibility for Somalia operations, the U.S. “left approximately 
6,000 of its soldiers to ensure that the UN operations could continue without interruption” 
(Ferry, 1994, p. 23).  These QRF forces were the only U.S. combat forces in country, and 
in September of 1993, were comprised of “one light infantry battalion [Task Force 2-14, 
from the 2d Battalion, 14th Infantry, 10th Mountain Division (Light)], [one aviation task 
force, TF 2-25 or TF Raven, consisting of] one attack [company consisting of AH-1F 
Cobras and OH-58 Light Observation Helicopters (LOHs)] and one assault helicopter 
company [manned by Team Courage pilots from Company B, 9th Battalion, 101st 
Aviation Regiment, 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault)], and a brigade headquarters 
[the QRF or Falcon Brigade headquarters from the 10th Aviation Brigade, 10th Mountain 
Division]” (p. 23).  On Friday, 24 September 1993, while staged out of the University 
Compound, Company C “Tiger Company” of TF 2-14 had the responsibility of providing 
the Quick Reaction Company (QRC) to the UN’s QRF manned by U.S. forces assigned 
to the Falcon Brigade of the 10th Mountain Division.  The QRC had to be able to react to 
a crisis situation within thirty minutes of notification.  The other two rifle companies had 
up to an hour to prepare to react and launch to a quick reaction mission (Ferry, 1994). 
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B. DETAILED CASE STUDY 
Early on the morning of 25 September 1993, a UH-60 from the assault helicopter 
company, callsign Courage 53, was part of a multiple-aircraft mission conducting a 
“show of force” night vision goggle (NVG) mission known as “Eyes over Mogadishu.”9  
The purpose of the flight was to protect UNOSOM and U.S. bases located in Mogadishu, 
and to conduct aerial reconnaissance.  While refueling between 0110 and 0120 hours, the 
crew observed three mortar rounds explode in succession a few hundred yards from the 
UH-60.  Piloted by CW2 Granville “Dale” Shrader, and co-piloted by CW2 Perry W. 
Alliman, the crew of five unhooked from the refuel point, boarded the aircraft, and 
immediately relocated to the south portion of the runway to inspect the aircraft for 
damage.  Upon their departure from the airfield, the crew received coordinates to the 
Somali mortar site from the recently emplaced Q-36 Anti-Battery Radar located on the 
airfield (Shrader, 1993; Alliman, (n.d.); personal communication, CW4 Dale Shrader, 
April 9, 2004).   
Shrader first flew to Checkpoint 42 near the complex in northern Mogadishu 
referred to as the “Pasta Factory.”  Shrader wanted to start there in order to show his crew 
where the downed aviator points were located in the city.  Shrader then flew to “Coni 
Stadium,” to identify for his crew the known safe-haven for aircrews (Shrader, 1993).  
After moonset and just prior to 0200 hours, Shrader flew southeast of the area near the 
old presidential palace at Villa Somalia in order to make one pass near the area of the 
suspected mortar site before heading back to the airfield to refuel.  Flying between 100 to 
110 knots approximately 100 to 130 feet over the city, Somalis downed the UH-60 with a 
                                                 
9 Typically flown by two UH-60's between the hours of 2200 to 0600 hours, and referred to by the 
mission crews as "Eyes Over Mog," this mission was one of the more dangerous missions performed 
during the entire U.S. involvement in Somalia.  Its primary purpose was to provide an armed presence in 
the nighttime skies, while also monitoring the movement of hostiles, and responding to possible threats 
throughout the city.  The tactic was to fly an aircraft in lead, and if it took ground fire, the trail or sniper 
aircraft would return fire.  Typically, the lead aircraft flew slowly at lower altitudes, looking for unusual 
activity.  A normal crew consisted of the two pilots, two door gunners/crew chiefs, two snipers armed with 
Barrett .50 caliber and M-24, 7.62mm sniper weapon systems, and two armed sniper/observers.  All 
crewmembers wore night vision goggles, and unknown to the Somalis, the UH-60 employed an infrared 
(IR) spotlight that was used to illuminate a suspect area for those wearing NVGs.  
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rocket-propelled grenade (RPG) in a street near Mogadishu’s New Port area.10  The RPG 
struck in the rear of the aircraft, causing an explosion in one of the fuel cells that engulfed 
the back of the UH-60 in flames.  The aircraft streaked across the sky for a quarter of a 
mile as Shrader unsuccessfully tried to gain control and reach the safe haven of the New 
Port.  Before crashing, Shrader made at least five consecutive unanswered radio calls that 
his helicopter was going down, as he was unable to coach the crippled UH-60 to reach 
the visible lights coming from the New Port area.  In a command and control (C2) UH-60, 
pilot 1LT Jeffrey Riedel, callsign Courage 46, had just departed the Digfer Triangle area, 
when he saw the sky light up to his front.  Riedel monitored Shrader’s multiple Mayday 
calls saying that he was hit, on fire, and going down  (Shrader, 1993; Alliman, (n.d.); 
Casper, 2001, p. 25; personal communication, CW4 Dale Shrader, April 9, 2004).   
After the QRF Tactical Operations Center’s (TOC’s) notification at 0200 hours, 
the TF-2-14 duty officer (CQ) awakened CPT Michael Whetstone within one minute, and 
told him to report to the TF 2-14 TOC as soon as possible.  The QRC commander had the 
presence of mind to tell the CQ to awaken the rest of his company’s leadership to tell 
them to be ready to move at a moment’s notice.  Whetstone raced up the steps to the 
battalion’s command post as his company was already beginning to prepare.  When 
Whetstone arrived at the TF 2-14 TOC already clothed in full combat gear, LTC Bill 
David (Commander, TF-2-14), and MAJ Mike Ellerbe (Operations Officer (S-3), TF 2-
14), immediately began briefing the QRC commander on the emergency mission.  He 
was told that the Somalis had shot down a UH-60 Black Hawk helicopter in the vicinity 
of the New Port while flying a routine “Eyes over Mogadishu” mission.  He was also 
informed that the aircraft apparently had been hit by an RPG, had crashed, and that his 
wingman would remain on station until the QRC arrived (Whetstone, 2004, p. 3; 
Whetstone, 1993).    
The burning helicopter skimmed off the top of a three-story building before it 
severed a telephone pole, and then slid 100 yards down a street to finally come to rest 
                                                 
10 Later, an Army Captain who had a human intelligence (HUMINT) source told Shrader that the 
mortar site was there the entire time, covered in the back of a parked truck.  The Somali's had dug a trench 
or hole close to the truck, in which a man could lie flat on his back in order to fire a RPG without injuring 
himself with the back-blast.  This also provided an almost perpendicular trajectory, making it truly a “one 
and an million shot” (personal communication, CW4 Dale Shrader, April 9, 2004). 
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when it hit an embankment near a concrete-block building (Casper, 2001, pp. 25-26).  
The two pilots quickly exited the aircraft to escape the flames.11  Alliman immediately 
moved to the crew chief’s window in an attempt to pull out SGT Eugene Williams, but 
the flames were already coming out of the window—there was no movement from any of 
the three crewmembers located in the rear section of the aircraft.  Shrader located 
Alliman at the front of the aircraft, and then pulled him 30-40 feet away from the fire.  
When the 7.62mm ammunition inside the aircraft started igniting from the intense heat, 
Shrader moved Alliman into an alley in order to seek refuge in a doorway, and then 
returned to the aircraft in an attempt to rescue the remaining crew.  Unable to approach 
the aircraft due to the intense heat, Shrader quickly returned to Alliman, loaded his 9mm 
Beretta Model 92F pistol, and attempted to call for assistance on his AN/PRC-90 survival 
radio12 (Shrader, 1993; Alliman, (n.d.); personal communication, CW4 Dale Shrader, 
April 9, 2004). 
Between five and fifteen minutes after the crash (0210-0220 hours), two Somalis 
with AK-47s walked down the alley to observe the wreckage.  The Somalis did not notice 
the hiding pilots, and soon left the same way they came—from the condition of the 
aircraft, they likely assumed no one could have survived the crash.  Shrader then left 
Alliman in a corner in the shadows and positioned himself near a stairway for cover.  
From this position, he could both see Alliman, and observe the alley.  A few minutes later 
at 0220 hours, the Somalis returned to look at the wreckage.  After turning away to head 
back down the alley, the closest Somalia stopped and began walking towards Shrader’s 
position.  Shrader emptied his first fifteen-round magazine firing at the Somalis as they 
fled.  Moments later there were three to four successive grenade blasts, as well as 
sporadic rifle fire intermixed with the grenade blasts which lasted approximately fifteen 
minutes.  The Somalis were trying to flush out any survivors or kill those who remained.  
Two Somalis then came back down the alley, likely noticing Shrader due to his light-
                                                 
11 Shrader broke his wrist while exiting the aircraft, and sustained burns over 18% of his body.  
Alliman injured his right eye and jaw on impact, and sustained third-degree burns over 31% of his body 
(Alliman, (n.d.)). 
12 CW2 Shrader had two full 15-round magazines of 9mm ammunition.  CW2 Alliman also had a 
9mm Beretta Model 92F pistol, but CW2 Shrader could not find any of CW2 Alliman’s magazines.  CW2 
Alliman flew with a M16A2 rifle and approximately 150 rounds of 5.56mm ammunition, but neither man 
retrieved the weapon when exiting the aircraft (personal communication, CW4 Dale Shrader, April 9, 
2004).   
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colored two-piece desert flight suit.  One of the Somalis moved towards him with his 
hand raised, as though gripping a grenade.  Shrader shot at both men at approximately 
0235 hours, and they disappeared (Shrader, 1993; Alliman, (n.d.) personal 
communication, CW4 Dale Shrader, April 27, 2004).  
At about 0225 hours, David took Whetstone outside when the first High Mobility 
Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle (HMMWV) arrived and placed a large map on the hood 
of the vehicle.  David, while identifying an area northwest of the New Port area on the 
map, told Whetstone “‘the bird is down somewhere in this area here.  The wreckage is 
burning.  Go find the glow’” (as cited in Whetstone, 2004, p. 3).  David also gave 
Whetstone a frequency and the callsign to an OH-58.  Whetstone was to link-up with the 
pilot at the airfield, and then use the OH-58 to guide the company to the objective 
(Whetstone, 2004, p. 3; Whetstone, 1993; personal telephone interview, LTC Michael 
Whetstone, April 7, 2004).   
The QRC mounted the marshaled vehicles at 0240 hours, and finally departed the 
University Compound through the Tunisian Gate at 0305 hours.  The QRF proceeded 
through the K4 circle, and then on to the airfield.  Once arriving at the airfield at 0325 
hours, Whetstone contacted with pilot of the OH-58, who assured the QRC commander 
that he would lead the company to the objective in the most expeditious manner possible 
(Whetstone, 2004, p. 4; Whetstone, 1993; personal telephone interview, LTC Michael 
Whetstone, April 7, 2004; personal communication, BG (Ret.) Bill David, April 1, 2004).  
The OH-58 would guide the unit through the city using an on-board laser.  When viewed 
with NVGs, the laser created a “sparkle” effect, which the OH-58 would use to create a 
“yellow brick road” to the crash site, which was not visible to the naked eye.  Trying to 
navigate at night, with a map and compass in a hostile city, did not compare with 
allowing the OH-58 to use its superior optics and field of vision from above to guide the 
QRC to the objective.  
Meanwhile at the crash site, the pilots continued to receive sporadic and probing 
small-arms fire above their heads, as they listened to the Somalis yelling obscenities at 
them in broken English—telling the pilots to come out so they could kill them.  The 
Somalis could not determine the actual location of the pilots, so the Somalis could only 
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attempt to provoke some type of response or noticeable movement.  Approximately thirty 
minutes after the last grenade attack (0300 hours), Shrader got out his white strobe signal 
light and AN/PRC-90 survival radio, and attempted to signal the AH-1Fs and OH-58s 
above them.  After approximately two hours (0350 hours), Alliman left his concealed 
position, and moved to Shrader’s more exposed location.  Fearing the Somalis were 
getting desperate because of the sounds of the now approaching helicopters, the two 
pilots prepared for another Somali attack.  Within three to four minutes, a Somali ran 
down the alley firing his AK-47 on full automatic above the pilots’ heads.  Shrader fired 
all remaining ammunition at the Somali, finishing off the last of his 9mm ammunition at 
around 0355 hours (Shrader, 1993; Alliman, (n.d.) personal communication, CW4 Dale 
Shrader, April 27, 2004).  
Just north of the New Port area, the QRC’s trucks stopped at 0345 hours.  The 
QRC mounted its NVGs, dismounted the vehicles, conducted last minute pre-combat 
inspections (PCIs), and got into march order: 1st Platoon, Company Headquarters 
element, 2nd Platoon, and 3rd Platoon.  Whetstone gave his last minute instructions and 
final brief, and then fell-in with the lead platoon.  With no street signs to follow, and no 
definitive information about the location of the crash site, the QRC moved as quickly as 
possible.  During the dismounted trek into the heart of the city, the men were expecting 
Somalis to ambush them at any moment.  Guided by the OH-58’s sparkle, the QRC 
wasted no time moving down the wider streets of northeastern Mogadishu.  The QRC 
advanced steadily west, block-by-block, following the sparkle, and searching for the 
glow.  As he moved closer to the wreckage, Whetstone pondered the point that “No 
enemy would shoot down a bird and then not have a look.  An age-old guerrilla tactic is 
to wound something and then wait for the rescuers.  We were living that scenario right 
now.”  Then Whetstone saw it—the glow.  At about 0400 hours, an almost blinding white 
light filled Whetstone’s NVGs.  The wreckage of the UH-60 seemed to grow from a 
building—the main compartment had smashed into the side of a corner building.  The 
section where the pilots sat was either completely sheared, or crushed beyond 
recognition.  Whetstone thought to himself, “How could anyone survive that?” 
(Whetstone, 2004, pp. 4-6; personal telephone interview, LTC Michael Whetstone, April 
7, 2004). 
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Shrader then noticed bright lights approximately 100-200 meters from his position 
at around 0400 hours, and incorrectly assumed that more Somalis had joined the effort to 
look for survivors.13  At that instant, while out of ammunition and with Alliman unable to 
see, a Somali man in his late twenties approached their position holding a flashlight, and 
yelled in English, “American boy, American boy” (Shrader, 1993; Alliman, (n.d.)).  Of 
this incident, Shrader later said, “I was between a rock and a hard place, so I had to take a 
risk” (“Faith pulls pilots through Somali terror,” 1993).  Shrader approached the man 
with his empty weapon at the ready, and the friendly man pointed down the street to a 
friendly UNOSOM II United Arab Emirate (UAE) armored personnel carrier (APC) 
around the block and about 100 yards from their current position.14  Shrader then carried 
Alliman to the UAE vehicle through a spray of automatic weapon fire.  Somalis struck 
Alliman in the leg with a ricochet during the short movement.  The UAE APC evacuated 
the pilots to an aid station where they received their initial medical attention (Shrader, 
1993; Alliman, (n.d.); personal communication, CW4 Dale Shrader, April 10, 2004).   
Somalis did not intend their automatic weapon fires to further injure the wounded 
pilots.  As the QRC approached the wreckage, Somali rifle and machine gun fire tore into 
the advancing formation.  Fortunately, the initial fire was characteristically high and 
inaccurate.  Whetstone immediately called forward 1LT Furman Ray’s anti-tank (AT) 
platoon before the Somalis were able to pin the company down.  Ray’s HMMWVs 
quickly moved towards the fight, and established a base of fire next to the UH-60.  One 
maneuvered left, one deployed right, and another stayed in the center, and then 
immediately began suppressing the Somali positions with the 40mm MK-19 grenade 
                                                 
13 In all likelihood, the flashlights Shrader saw were probably from the approaching QRC.  As the unit 
approached the burning aircraft at around 0400 to 0405 hours, the bright light emanating from the wreckage 
rendered the QRC’s NVGs virtually useless.  At about that time, Shrader saw bright lights, and with the 
QRC unable to use their NVGs, the QRC employed their flashlights in order to have some level of vision in 
the darkness.  From a distance, Shrader might have assumed that approaching lights were from the Somalis, 
but the Somalis were not typically known for using flashlights at night.  The timing of the two independent 
events would seem to imply, with a high probability of certainty, that this was the same event (personal 
telephone interview, LTC Michael Whetstone, April 7, 2004; Shrader, 1993). 
14 It could not be determined exactly why the UAE APC was located where it was.  According to LTG 
(Ret.) Montgomery, apparently the UAE Commander dispatched the APC without waiting on UNOSOM 
headquarters to formally request assistance.  It was highly uncommon to venture outside of the UNOSOM 
compound, or leave the security of the airfield at night, but on that evening, the UAE stepped up to help.  
LTG (Ret.) Montgomery could not recall with 100 percent certainty, but thought that a Somali approached 
the UAE checkpoint and told them that there were American survivors near by (personal communication, 
LTG (Ret.) Thomas Montgomery, April 10, 2004). 
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launcher machine guns mounted on their roofs.  The Somalis had positioned themselves 
in an “L,” and then a “U” shaped ambush around the QRC’s position from the west and 
north.  A steady firefight ensued, and the QRC fought diligently for the next forty 
minutes to establish a defensive perimeter around the wreckage.  2LT Ken Haynes’ 1st 
Platoon moved to the left with one squad and emplaced the remainder of his platoon 
around the base of the downed aircraft, forming one arm and the base of a “T” by 0415 
hours.  By 0425 hours, 2LT Robert Love’s 3rd Platoon had positioned their soldiers along 
the street that afforded the egress route and logistical support line to the QRC 
(Whetstone, 2004, p. 6; Whetstone, 1993; personal telephone interview, LTC Michael 
Whetstone, April 7, 2004). 
With a fire still intensely burning in the main cabin of the aircraft, Whetstone 
directed the men to improve their positions, and to secure the high ground of a three-story 
building in 1st and 2nd Platoons’ sectors.  Whetstone ascertained that a vantage point from 
that key terrain would offer the company the ability to observe the local neighborhood, 
and to better develop the situation.  While the QRC’s riflemen and crew-served weapons 
teams continued to suppress Somali firing positions, the company’s recovery elements 
could finally begin the search of the wreckage.  With the site somewhat secured by 0445 
hours, Whetstone first called for fire extinguishers.  1LT Andrew “Mac” McDonald, the 
company’s executive officer, brought forward the HMMWVs with on-board fire 
extinguishers.  The recovery forces attempted to put out the fires, but after they used five 
extinguishers, Whetstone realized that the fire would have to burn itself out (Whetstone, 
2004, p. 6; Whetstone, 1993; personal telephone interview, LTC Michael Whetstone, 
April 7, 2004). 
Between 0530 and 0545 hours, with a small fire still burning, the searchers 
discovered the remains and “dog-tags” of SGT Ferdinand C. Richardson, the intelligence 
specialist (S-2) aboard the aircraft.15  For the next forty-five minutes, the recovery crew 
diligently searched the area for remains and sensitive items.  Since nothing in the 
                                                 
15 Richardson was not a routine crewmember aboard the “Eyes over Mog” flights.  In an effort to 
“gain some practical experience … [and] see his work from a different perspective” (personal 
communication, BG (Ret.) Larry Casper, April 6, 2004), the motivated intelligence specialist requested to 
accompany the pilots.  In his drive to provide the best possible support to the QRF, he “just wanted to see 
the area he was gathering data on every night” (personal communication, CW4 Dale Shrader, April 9, 
2004). 
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aircraft’s hulk was recoverable for either PFC Matthew K. Anderson, the M-60 door 
gunner, or the crew chief, SGT Eugene Williams, the recovery forces collected the 
remains of Richardson, and completed the search around 0630 hours.  Somali fires 
intensified to the point where everyone had to take cover, and MG Thomas Montgomery 
(Commander of U.S. Forces in Somalia (USFORSOM), as well as the Deputy 
Commander of UNOSOM II) personally authorized Whetstone to employ the Cobra’s 
TOW16 missiles from the three scout weapons teams (SWTs) that covered his ground 
forces during the operation.  Just before David ordered the QRC to withdrawal at 0640 
hours, Somali small-arms fire wounded two QRC soldiers.  As the QRC egressed and 
began to load trucks, the QRC took another casualty, SGT Reid, who Somalis hit with an 
RPG.  The blast resulted in Reid initially losing his sight and hearing, severing his right 
arm, and nearly severing his right leg.  The QRC immediately loaded the wounded into 
the front-line ambulance (FLA), and departed the area.  The QRC closed on the east gate 
of the airfield at 0715 hours, and transferred control of the recovered remains and 
equipment to battalion assets (Whetstone, 2004, p. 6; Whetstone, 1993; personal 
telephone interview, LTC Michael Whetstone, April 7, 2004). 
C. ANALYSIS 
1. Relative Superiority 
Analyzing the QRC’s recovery operation in the construct of the SOF-specific 
overt urban PR model, the authors argue that the QRC’s successes directly correlated 
with its ability to achieve and maintain RS Recovery Force.  Figure 6 shows a RS Recovery Force 
graph for the QRC’s 25 September 1993 recovery.  This diagram graphically represents 
how the QRC entered the engagement already having RS Recovery Force over their Somali 
adversaries because of the overwhelming organic and supporting firepower at their 
disposal, relative freedom of movement in the hostile city, and their access to a guide to 
assist in navigation.  As McRaven (1996) states, entering an engagement with RS can 
occur by developing a plan to overwhelm an enemy’s defenses at their weakest point, 
which “makes the enemy’s defenses ineffective, and ‘guarantees’ an advantage before 
one reaches the point of vulnerability” since “overwhelming the enemy does not require 
                                                 
16 “TOW is an acronym standing for Tube-launched, Optically tracked, Wire-guided missile.  The 
missile, armed with a shaped explosive charge, trails a thin wire that transmits flight instructions back to 
the missile from the acquisition sight located on the nose of the aircraft” (Casper, 2001, p. 6). 
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numerical superiority” (pp. 383-384).  Once fired upon at the crash site, the QRC never 
lost its RS Recovery Force because it quickly responded by suppressing the Somali positions, 
and claiming the dominant or key terrain in the area.  While sacrificing some speed on 
the objective in order to recover remains under less than ideal conditions, the QRC’s 
simple plan, quickly launched to gain security, and executed with surprise and purpose, 
overcame the lack of specific rehearsals for the recovery operation.  The only injuries the 
QRC sustained were a result of withdrawing under fire, when the QRC forces were not 
applying the same volume of organic firepower towards Somali positions.  
 Analyzing the RS Isolated Personnel of the two evaders who survived the initial impact 
of the crashes in the construct of the SOF-specific overt urban PR model, the authors 
argue that the survival of the pilots was directly correlated with their ability to quickly 
gain RS Isolated Personnel, even in instances where the pilots had to defend themselves and 
make their survival known.  It was not until the uncommitted Somalis finally identified, 
or reacquired, the hiding pilots that they lost RS Isolated Personnel.  Fortunately for the pilots, 
who had just expended their last round, the arrival of friendly forces precluded the 
necessity to become reabsorbed into their environment. In the end, the pilots affected 
their own recovery by gaining a decisive advantage over the Somalis, not by disappearing 
into the urban landscape, but by removing themselves from the urban landscape by means 
of opportune personnel recovery17 made possible with the assistance of a helpful civilian 
and an APC from the UAE.  The pilots “disappeared” and achieved RS Isolated Personnel at 
the same time—when they boarded the APC.  Figure 7 depicts the opportune recovery as 
the vertical rise in the probability of mission completion that crossed the RS line only at 
mission completion.  As shown in this figure, the sustainment and two losses of RS Isolated 
Personnel are the dips below the RS line.  Mission completion is determined at the point 
where the pilots were no longer responsible for their own welfare when they successfully 
reached friendly forces.   
 
                                                 
17 The proposed definition of opportune personnel recovery from JP 3-50 (first draft revision) is 
“unplanned personnel recovery performed by military forces, indigenous persons, or others not specifically 
organized, trained, or equipped for personnel recovery, but which, due to proximity and/or availability, and 
willingness to assist, are able to assist in the recovery of isolated personnel” (2003, p. GL-20). 
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2. Principles Necessary for the Overt Recovery Force’s Successful 
Operations 
a. Simplicity 
The QRC had one mission, to find the glow, and then search for survivors.  
This number of tactical objectives that the small force needed to accomplish was limited 
to only the most vital of tasks.  The effect of this focus limited the number of personnel 
required, reduced the amount of time on target, and decreased the number of moving 
parts that Whetstone had to control.   
There were considerable gaps in intelligence for this mission.  Before 
deploying, Whetstone said he was moving “toward a tragedy with no known enemy or 
friendly situation” (Whetstone, 2004, p. 4).  The commander never knew the location of 
the downed aircraft until he saw the “glow,” and only his instincts warned him that they 
probably would be ambushed by the Somalis at any moment while moving dismounted to 
the site.  With little intelligence to reduce the number of unknown factors and variables 
that Whetstone had to consider, the QRC commander was forced to employ his forces in 
a risky manner that was responsive and flexible, given the guerrilla tactics employed by 
the Somali militia.  Whetstone’s prior experiences in Mogadishu told him what to expect, 
and his unit’s training would have to make up for the intelligence gap.  This lack of 
intelligence could have just as easily resulted in a total disaster.   
Whetstone was innovative in his use of aviation assets to assist the QRC in 
reaching the objective and accomplish its mission.  Instead of navigating by slower, more 
traditional methods, Whetstone relied on the OH-58’s technology to produce a “sparkle” 
to guide him to the objective quickly.  Moving quickly in the hostile urban area allowed 
the Somalis little time to engage the force while en route to the crash site.   
b. Security 
Because the QRC reacted so quickly to the initial notification of the crash, 
the Somalis could gain little advantage by exploiting security failures.  The QRC’s speed 
of response was its security.  While the Somalis had to be reasonably sure that recovery 
forces would eventually arrive at the site, it is doubtful that the Somalis had any 
foreknowledge of the timing or means of insertion for the QRC.  While the Somalis had 
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somewhat prepared for the arriving recovery force, they had limited knowledge and 
understanding of the combat power available to such a numerically inferior unit.  The 
Somalis’ easily exploited and ad hoc defenses were unable to reduce Whetstone’s speed 
on target.  Whetstone achieved the principle of security, in part, due to the mutually 
supportive principle of surprise gained by his employment of dominant and suppressive 
firepower, which prevented the Somali ambushers from gaining an advantage by pinning-
down the dismounted soldiers as they approached and searched the wreckage.   
c. Repetition 
The preparation phase of this operation was in Whetstone’s unit training 
plan.  The QRC conducted no specific or “full-dress” rehearsals prior to deployment.  
This was a “standard mission profile” for a properly trained QRC.  The QRC’s standard 
operating procedures (SOPs) had reinforced the routine nature of its quick-reaction 
operations.  After just completing a successful training cycle, Whetstone had his QRC at 
a high-level of readiness and training—it had finely honed the individual skills so vital to 
the urban battlefield, and the collective tasks were now second nature.  As the QRC 
commander would later comment on the mission: 
Thank the Lord we had practiced and proven SOPs, Standard Operating 
Procedures that carried the night and the day.  From the time my men 
rolled out of the rack, even as we got onto the trucks, we were following 
our SOPs.  The men trusted what we had trained, and we were using it full 
steam ahead now (Whetstone, 2004, p. 4). 
While the QRC conducted no specific “recovery” training for this mission, the mission 
parameters of moving to, securing, and searching and objective are fundamental tasks for 
an infantry company, and Whetstone’s QRC was at the peak of their training level when 
he received this mission. 
d. Surprise 
If there was anything that caught the Somalis off guard, it was the 
quickness of the QRC’s response to the incident, and the amount of suppressive fires the 
recovery forces had at their disposal.  The Somalis knew that a recovery force would 
have to come to that exact location, so Somalis did not afford Whetstone the luxury of 
attacking the Somalis where they were wholly unprepared.  Whetstone did not attempt to 
deceive the Somalis in order to gain a slight advantage, nor did he attempt to throw the 
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Somalis off as to the timing of the attack.  Instead, Whetstone exploited the Somali’s 
weakness of defense—the Somalis had no idea exactly how effective the QRC’s 
firepower would be, or how ineffective their defensive positions actually were.  
Compared to “typical” reinforced and mutually supportive defensive positions, the tin 
shacks and poorly constructed buildings used by the Somali fighters provided little 
protection from the firepower Whetstone would bring to bear that morning.  This 
weakness of the Somali defensive preparations, while not known to Whetstone before his 
arrival at the crash site, offered an exploitable weakness that the QRC used to achieve 
surprise. 
e. Speed 
To the greatest extent practical, U.S. forces will not leave a fallen comrade 
on the battlefield, even if he or she is deceased.  With the mission of personnel recovery 
in situations where remains must be exhumed or carefully collected due to difficult 
circumstances, generally more time will be necessary for the recovery forces to 
accomplish the mission.  This means that in many personnel recovery operations, where 
the isolated person is not an active or contributing participant, there will be a greater 
amount of time needed to conduct the operation, and thus a greater vulnerability to 
recovery forces.  Whetstone’s immediate gain of RS Recovery Force, and his subsequent 
ability to maintain that dominance, allowed the QRC to sacrifice some speed on the 
objective—and as discussed in the previous chapter, the Somalis were not organized as a 
national military force, so Whetstone could afford to spend more time on target.  
Whetstone’s QRC remained on the site searching for remains as long as was necessary in 
order to ensure that they had conducted a thorough search.  Mitigating circumstances that 
probably resulted in a loss of speed on the objective were the sheer heat of the wreckage, 
which recovery forces could not safely approach in order to search, and the absence of 
either five survivors or five sets of remains.  
f. Purpose 
“No one gets left behind,” is a well-understood creed in the Infantry.  As 
the QRC set out on its mission to recover a downed aircrew, there was no doubt in 
anyone’s mind as to what the mission was, or how important it was.  Whetstone clearly 
defined the mission statement to his subordinate leaders, if for no other reason than by its 
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lack of details.  In this specific case, with no details to offer the possibility of creating 
confusion, all the QRC had to do was maneuver to the glow and recover the aircrew.  
Everyone in the QRC understood this primary objective, and the camaraderie within 
Tiger Company manifested the pride and sense of personal dedication that inspired the 
soldiers to ensure that they would leave no man behind—including all forces benefiting 
from the QRC’s employment.  Two soldiers who demonstrated the limitless nature of 
their dedication to this principle, eventually received Silver Star medals. 
3. Principles Necessary for the Isolated Personnel’s Success  
a. Communication 
Shrader radioed his Mayday at least five times before crashing.  While he 
got no response before impact, Riedel monitored his transmission and initiated the 
reporting procedures.  In this instance, the burning aircraft on the dark Mogadishu night 
made locating the actual position of the aircraft relatively easy—no additional effort on 
the part of the pilots would be necessary unless they moved.  Shrader did attempt to 
signal the aircraft orbiting overhead, but his AN/PRC-90 survival radio malfunctioned, 
and all he could hear was the a loud “squelch.”  Shrader also tried to signal the overhead 
aircraft with his white strobe light, though this turned out to be another unsuccessful 
attempt at communication.  Speaking with the pilot of the OH-58 after his recovery, two 
pilots agreed that the illumination from the aircraft’s intense fire prohibited the aircraft 
from noticing the strobe.   
Unlike a true SOF recovery force, which will generally not launch a 
recovery mission without first knowing the location of the evader, the QRC’s mission of 
reacting quickly to an incident precluded this luxury.  Therefore, the pilots’ process of 
positively identifying or authenticating themselves to the recovery force would have been 
much less of a governing consideration given the conditions and circumstances of the 
crash and the QRC’s mission.  The QRC would have conducted a visual recognition and 
authentication process—if it looks like a duck, walks like a duck, and quacks like a duck, 
then it’s probably a duck.  In any event, the pilots never had the opportunity to identify 
themselves to the QRC forces because their opportune recovery by UNOSOM II forces 




Shrader’s quick response in relocating himself and Alliman into a dark 
and shadowy alley resulted in quickly gaining RS Isolated Personnel.  The first two Somalis 
that came to observe their handiwork did not notice the pilots, and probably assumed that 
nobody could have survived such a crash.  The “invisible” pilots had successfully 
camouflaged themselves by blending in to the darkness.  Unfortunately, this advantage 
would not be maintained for long, which was probably inevitable without moving farther 
away from the wreck, since more and more curious observers would likely come to see 
the fruits of their guerrilla labor.  The pilots did benefit from some lower level of 
visibility after the grenade incident.  Since Shrader likely killed the two attackers, the 
Somalis that initiated the tactics of harassment and probing fires did not know with any 
certainty where the survivors were hiding.  Without the ability to positively identify the 
position of the pilots for more than an hour, the pilots secured valuable time that 
ultimately resulted in their successful recovery.  Without knowing the pilots’ location, the 
threatening Somalis feared the same fate as those that had gone before. 
Since the pilots never moved more than 150 meters from the wreckage, 
there was never an opportunity to temporarily adopt the customs and idiosyncrasies of the 
locals in order to fit in with the patterns of normalcy in Mogadishu, so this aspect of 
adaptability can not be assessed in this case. 
c. Exploitation 
Exploiting the kindness of the one Somali who did not want to kill the 
pilots resulted in a successful recovery.  When the opportunity presented itself, Shrader 
took advantage of the opportunity to escape from his pursuers.  Fearing that the bright 
lights in the distance were more Somalis, and knowing that daybreak was quickly 
approaching, the pilots made a decision to take a risk out of desperation.  Had Shrader’s 
survival radio functioned, and had someone informed him that the QRC was en route or 
just around the corner, he might not have had the necessary incentive to make such a 
potentially risky decision.  In either event, he made the correct decision, and took 
advantage of what his environment offered him.  With no better alternatives to choose  
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from, Shrader gained an advantage in time and space against his hesitant and 
uncommitted adversaries by carrying his copilot the 100 meters to the UAE vehicle, thus 
accomplishing an opportune recovery. 
d. The Gonzales Principle 
CW2 Shrader’s successful evasion was largely a result of his realizing the 
importance of making ones own opportunities in life.  Early in life he had developed a 
competitive nature, which fostered his sense of duty to become strong-willed survivor 
and the “smart evader”—long before he experienced combat.  In a PowerPoint briefing 
he currently gives on his shoot down and subsequent evasion, CW4 Shrader says this 
about realizing the necessity to make and maximize training opportunities: 
I had no formal specialized SERE [survival, evasion, resistance and 
evasion] or Urban Combat training.  However, in high school I was very 
active in sports.  In my school the head varsity coach wore multiple hats, 
so I spent a great deal of time with him.  His greatest impact on me was 
that of being a competitor.  No matter the sport or in life—play to win, I 
don’t care if you’re playing tidily-winks—play to win.  Life may knock 
you down now and then, but you have to get back up and keep fighting.  
This internal drive, or will to survive, must be accompanied with the 
proper assets—from passive systems for sustained survivability in a low 
threat environment, or a situation like mine where survival means you 
have to use deadly force.  The challenge lies with us all.  The commander 
must allocate time for training—from the vest that the aircrew wears, to 
getting help from special ops people for evasion training. The individual 
has responsibilities he or she must account for, from seizing the 
opportunity to attend the SERE B or C course, or just taking advantage of 
the next weapons range (personal communication, CW4 Dale Shrader, 
April 9, 2004).  
Shrader was a smart evader.  His general mindset was developed, enhanced, and 
optimized through realistic training, and his devotion to self-improvement.  Once placed 
in a survival situation, his outlook on life became his tool for survival.  Shrader’s 
demonstrated ability to quickly assess and appraise his predicament, evaluate his 
alternatives, and decide on an appropriate solution was something that only got better 
with rehearsals and training prior to his deployment to Somalia.  His rapid crisis decision-
making, and decision to risk movement and contact when he did, resulted in his 
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IV. THE RECOVERY OF TF RANGER 
A. OVERVIEW AND INTRODUCTION 
The example chosen for the detailed case study of an overt, direct action (DA) 
Special Operations Forces (SOF) personnel recovery (PR) is the raid and recovery 
conducted by Task Force (TF) Ranger in Somalia on 3-4 October 1993 during the 
conduct of Operation GOTHIC SERPENT.  Unless the authors cite otherwise cited, or 
state the time as an approximation, they derived all times from a compilation of official 
timelines from both the Quick Reaction Force (QRF) and TF Ranger.18  Following the 
case study is an analysis of relative superiority (RS) for both the IP (RS Isolated Personnel) and 
the recovery force (RS Recovery Forces), in the context of the SOF-specific overt urban PR 
model.  The authors will follow this analysis with an evaluation of how each of the overt 
recovery force’s six principles, and the four IP-specific recovery principles affected the 
respective participant’s level of RS.  
B. DETAILED CASE STUDY 
On 3 October 1993, TF Ranger executed a raid into General Mohamad Farah 
Aidid’s stronghold near the Olympic Hotel in Mogadishu, Somalia, seeking to capture 
two of his key lieutenants.  Although the task force accomplished its mission and 
captured twenty-four Aidid supporters, Somali clansmen shot down the first of two MH-
60L Black Hawk helicopters using rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs).  With the downing 
of the first of these MH-60Ls, the mission of TF Ranger changed from one of capturing 
Aidid’s supporters to one of safeguarding and recovering American casualties.  From a 
tactical perspective, the subsequent actions of all TF Ranger members to defend the 
position of the first downed Black Hawk and to retrieve the dead and wounded reflected 
credit on their training, courage, initiative, individual soldier skills, and dedication to one 
another.  However, at strategic and policy levels, the events following the raid have 
affected, and will continue to affect, U.S. foreign policy for years (Warner-Levin Report, 
                                                 
18 1) QRF official timeline (version 1, narrative with COL Casper’s signature block) attached as 
Appendix F to CPT Lee Rysewek’s 1994 monograph, “Experiences of Executive Officer from Bravo 
Company, 3d Battalion, 75th Ranger Regiment and Task Force Ranger during the Battle of the Black Sea on 
3-4 October 1993, in Mogadishu Somalia;” 2) TF Ranger official timeline attached as Appendix D to CPT 
Lee Rysewek’s 1994 monograph; 3) QRF official timeline (version 2, narrative with no signature block), 
from the personal files of BG (Ret.) Bill David;  and 4) QRF official timeline (version 3, by time, not 
narrative), also from the personal files of BG (Ret.) Bill David. 
39 
1995).  By applying the SOF-specific overt urban PR model within the context of the 
recovery forces’ failure to sustain the RS Recovery Force gained in the first ten minutes of 
“The Battle of the Black Sea,” and the mixed results of attaining RS Isolated Personnel for the 
two different groups, this case study will show the interdependent and casual relationship 
between RS and successful SOF personnel recovery operations in urban areas.   
The United Nation’s (UN) decision to get involved in Somalia was unique in that 
it was the first time the UN intervened in a nation where it was not only uninvited, but 
warned not to intercede by the local antagonists.  A 5 June 1993 ambush by one of the 
antagonists, Somali warlord Mohamad Aidid, resulted in the deaths of twenty-four 
Pakistani soldiers who were part of UN Operations Somalia II (UNOSOM II).19  In 
response, the UN Security Council (UNSC) passed Resolution 837.  This resolution 
called for the apprehension of those responsible for the ambush of the Pakistani soldiers.  
Retired U.S. Navy Admiral Jonathan Howe, the UN Special Representative to the 
Secretary General (SRSG) in Somalia, pressed the Clinton administration to deploy a 
special operations task force specifically trained and equipped for the task of hostile 
apprehension, and capable of responding if any UN workers were taken hostage by 
Aidid’s clan (Akers & Singleton, 2000, p. 4).  Partially in response to Admiral Howe’s 
persistence, the administration finally approved the deployment only after Somalis killed 
four U.S. Marines and wounded seven others, in two separate incidents involving remote-
controlled land mines on 21 August 1993.  U.S. Special Operations Command’s 
(USSOCOM) numerous objections through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 
(CJCS), General Colin Powell, concerning the appropriateness of the mission had been 
ignored; the task force departed for Somalia on 24 August 1993. 
                                                 
19 UNOSOM II, during the period of TF Ranger’s involvement, was a coalition of only twenty-one 
nations with an approximate strength of 17,200 (USFORSOM AAR, 1997, Vol.1, p. 7).  For the first time, 
the UN invoked its own charter to conduct a peace enforcement intervention in Somalia, which it considered 
a failed nation-state.  UNSCR 837, passed on 6 June 1993, “called for the arrest of those responsible for the 
murder of UN peacekeepers, authorized the neutralization of Radio Mogadishu (also known as Radio Aidid)” 
and “marked the beginning of a military campaign to regain control of the city, neutralize the USC/SNA 
militia, and destroy militia weapon and ammunition storage sites” (p. 11).  “Although authorized to arrest 
those responsible for the deaths of UN peacekeepers, UNOSOM II did not move expeditiously on that task, 
due to inadequate UN military capabilities to execute such a mission” (p. 12).  The rush to approve and 
implement UNSCR 837 also failed to gain consensus with the UNOSOM II contributing nations, most of 
whom were not members of the Security Council” (p. 33).   
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TF Ranger, under the command of Major General William “Bill” Garrison, was a 
battalion-size, self-contained, joint force consisting of approximately 440 personnel from 
each SOCOM component with selective augmentation from conventional forces (Adams, 
2001, p. 261; Marquis, 1997, p. 253).  TF Ranger’s chain of command was separate from 
that of the other U.S. Forces in UNOSOM II (see Figure 8).  Garrison reported directly to 
General (GEN) Joseph P. Hoar, the Combatant Commander (referred to at the time as 
Commander-in-Chief or CINC) of U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM) without 
going through the UN channels, but maintained a close working relationship with MG 
Thomas Montgomery, the commander of U.S. forces supporting UNOSOM II 
(USFORSOM).20  With the most sophisticated equipment available, and access to 
virtually every product of the national-level intelligence collection architecture, the task 
force was prepared to launch an assault on short notice, usually a matter of minutes.  This 
level of readiness required an extreme level of organization, training, and rehearsal.  TF 
Ranger depended on rapid response and minimal time on target once they conducted the 
assault in order to ensure tactical surprise.  The raid of 3-4 October was the seventh 
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Figure 8.   UN/U.S. Force Structure and Relationships with TF Ranger.  (After AAR for 
TASK FORCE RANGER, 1994, p. 1-A-1). 
 
                                                 
20 USFORSOM’s mission was to “‘conduct military operations in Somalia in support of UNOSOM II to 
establish a secure environment for humanitarian relief operations n Somalia as outlined in the Terms of 
Reference (TOR)’” (USFORSOM AAR, Vol 1, 1994, p. 19).  Under the operational control of USFORSOM, 
there was a UN Quick Reaction Force (QRF) maintained by elements of the 10th Mountain Division.  Their 
mission was to be able to reinforce any UN force within 30 minutes notification.  TF Ranger assigned a 
liaison officer (LNO) [MAJ Craig Nixon, XO, 3/75th Ranger Regiment] to bunk with the QRF in order to 
notify the QRF when TF Ranger launched a mission—in case they needed reinforcements.   
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TF Ranger depended on tactical surprise for success.  It was able to achieve this in 
part through the use of sophisticated assault aircraft such as the MH/AH-6 Little Birds 
and the MH-60L, as well as the aerial reconnaissance assets like the P-3C Reef Point and 
OH-58 Kiowa Warrior.  With few exceptions, the robust communications architecture 
was virtually flawless.  However, TF Ranger contributed to the Somali learning curve.  
The task force conducted operations during daylight hours, and repetitiously used the 
same operational templates that allowed for rapid planning and execution.  Daylight 
operations gave the Somalis the opportunity to observe TF Ranger’s tactics, techniques, 
and procedures and benefited the Somalis.  To minimize the increased risk of these 
daylight operations, TF Ranger employed “profile flights”21 and rapid planning 
processes.  Because of the inherent difficulties of tracking specific persons or vehicles in 
a dense urban environment, “assault[s] had to be planned and initiated as quickly as 
possible (using pre-rehearsed battle drills fine tuned for the actual situation).”  TF Ranger 
developed two mission templates—one for strongpoint assault and the other for assault 
against a moving convoy (Northacker, 1998, p. 3).   
TF Ranger’s mission was to capture General Aidid and his principal lieutenants. 
Before the transition of control to UNOSOM II, the U.S. led Unified Task Force 
(UNITAF) underestimated the intentions and military capability of the United Somali 
Congress/Somali National Alliance’s (USC/SNA) militia.  Led by Aidid and Osman 
Hassan Ali Atto, the USC/SNA was one of the most powerful factions in Somalia,22 
retaining influence over 70 percent of Mogadishu.  The USC (Mahdi) influenced those 
areas in Mogadishu not under USC/SNA control.  Aidid had not been sighted since 29 
July 1993, and it is speculated that “this extended period of hiding may have resulted in 
part from media announcements of TF Ranger’s deployment, with open speculation that 
capturing Aidid was [TF Ranger]’s primary mission” (AAR for TASK FORCE 
                                                 
21 “TF Ranger randomly launched missions for training and rehearsal at all times of the day and night.  
We could not protect our launches but the idea was to put the challenge on the surveillance to determine if 
it was a real launch or not” (Faust, 1999, p. 16). 
22 Further contributing to the difficulty in achieving simplicity, there were fourteen recognized 
political factions (also referred to as clans and sub-clans) in Somalia, eleven of which UNITAF considered 
“warring factions.”  The most active militia were the United Somali Congress/Somali National Alliance 
(USC/SNA), United Somali Congress (USC-Mahdi), Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF), Somali 
Patriotic Movement/Somali National Alliance (SPM-SNA), Somali Patriotic Movement (SPM-Gabio), 
Somali National Front (SNF), and the Somali National Movement (SNM) (USFORSOM AAR, Vol 1, 
1997, p. 2-8).   
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RANGER, 1994, p. 2).  Aidid, hiding amongst his extremely loyal clan members, had the 
ability to hide at will with little fear of successful human intelligence (HUMINT) 
operations. 
The initial focus of all of TF Ranger’s intelligence collection and analysis efforts 
was to locate Aidid (Northacker, 1998, p. 2).  Mission success for TF Ranger was highly 
dependent upon, and highly unlikely without, the accurate and timely HUMINT that was 
extremely difficult to obtain in Aidid’s center of gravity—the “hornet’s nest” of the 
Bakara market.  Decision-makers knew this fact before TF Ranger’s final raid, as 
evidenced in a statement by GEN Wayne Downing, the Combatant Commander of U.S. 
Special Operations Command (USSOCOM): 
‘I kept telling [Garrison] not to do anything crazy…be patient, be careful, 
eventually you will get a shot at Aidid…. I told him that (1) he needed to 
be careful in populated areas, and (2) in certain circumstances not to go 
near the Bakara market…. we did not have good intelligence about that 
part of the city.  We didn’t have any presence there or good HUMINT’ (as 
cited in the Warner-Levin Report, 1995, pp. 39-41).   
The Somali clan system stresses segmentation over community, and as such 
preservation of clan identity meant fighting for turf; shifting loyalties and fluid 
allegiances within the Somali clan structure characterized their will to survive.  Aidid 
arguably had no interest in a national reconciliation; he would fight unconventionally, as 
his ancestors had, only to reconcile within his own clan (Stevenson, 1995, pp. 1-6).  The 
mindset of the U.S., which is fundamentally European in tradition, could not (or did not) 
grasp this concept for possible exploitation.  TF Ranger had effective technical 
intelligence collection capabilities, but these were never able to completely overcome the 
archaic culture or society in Mogadishu.23 
On 3 October 1993, TF Ranger caught a break; HUMINT indicated that several of 
Aidid’s lieutenants would be meeting near the Olympic Hotel.  The HUMINT source said 
that Omar Salad Elmi, Aidid’s principle political advisor, Issa Mohammad Siad, and 
                                                 
23 Access to certain areas of Mogadishu depended on having the proper clan, tribe, sub-clan, even so 
far as family pedigree.  Somalis, being totally dedicated to these hierarchies, made it very difficult for TF 
Ranger to recruit Somalis to work against their own.  The chaos and disorder of Mogadishu created 
situations in which the ability to safely gain access to an area once did not mean it could be accessed safely 
again.   
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possibly COL Abdi “Qeybdid” Hassan Awale, the alleged Minister of Interior were at the 
meeting site.  For two hours the TF Ranger JOC’s “intelligence fusion cell” frantically 
managed, redirected, and orchestrated collection and surveillance assets trying to 
determine the credibility of the information.  Reconnaissance assets eventually identified 
a vehicle reportedly associated with Salad (Loeb, 2000, p. W6; Faust, 1999, p. 51).   
Satisfied that he had actionable intelligence, Garrison approved the mission launch.  
Based on previous experience, TF Ranger did not anticipate and plan for all 
contingencies.  For example, the mission began in daylight and all were certain that the 
mission would end hours before dark.  Using all six previous missions as an indicator, 
most of the assault and blocking forces had not brought their night vision devices 
(NVDs), water for more than two hours, or sufficient ammunition for sustained combat 
operations.  
Garrison finalized coordination with Montgomery, informing him of the pending 
mission’s location and target, confirming that no non-governmental organizations 
(NGOs) were operating near the target area, and deconflicting all airspace.  MAJ Craig 
Nixon, the habitual TF Ranger liaison officer to the QRF, notified the QRF of their “be 
prepared to” mission of securing the ground extraction route.  After finalizing the plan, 
preparing for combat, and loading the aircraft, TF Ranger launched the assault force of 
eight AH/MH-6 and eight MH-60L helicopters at 1532 hours.  The task force had taken 
no time to conduct “mission specific” actions on the objective rehearsals, due to the 
timeliness of the actionable intelligence.   
In launching the raid, TF Ranger did little to protect essential elements of friendly 
information.24  The Somalis had an unobstructed view of the airfield from the 
surrounding hills.  Somalis had a clear view both day and night of the soldiers’ billets as 
well as the JOC.  Whenever TF Ranger prepared for a mission, the word rapidly spread 
through the city.  On this day, Aidid’s followers immediately knew that aircraft had taken  
                                                 
24 JP 1-02 (2003) defines essential elements of friendly information (EEFI) as key questions likely to 
be asked by adversary officials and intelligence systems about specific friendly intentions, capabilities, and 
activities, so they can obtain answers critical to their operational effectiveness (p. 185). 
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off.  Based on the Somalis’ pattern analysis of TF Ranger’s previous raids, RPG teams 
rushed to the rooftops along the flight paths of the task force’s helicopters (FM 3-06, 
2003, p. C-7).   
After his initial notification by Garrison, Montgomery immediately started 
coordinating additional support.  Upon committing the QRF’s Quick Reaction Company 
(QRC), it was clear to Montgomery that if recovery forces were piecemealed into the 
fight, they would suffer additional casualties, so he determined that additional heavy 
forces would be required.  He had determined that the 10th Mountain Division’s QRF 
should not attempt a relief/extraction of the northern crash site in unarmored vehicles, so 
he coordinated with the Pakistanis, Malaysian, Italian, and finally the Indian UNOSOM 
forces, all of whom had armored vehicles (“Ambush in Mogadishu;” personal 
communication, LTG (Ret.) Thomas Montgomery, April 10, 2004). 
At 1542 hours, helicopters begin inserting the blocking force and assault elements 
at the target location.  The ground reaction force (GRF-1) then positioned itself in its 
staging area, and awaited the signal to move forward to the target location.  At this same 
time, the TF Ranger JOC notified the QRF TOC that cordon and search elements were on 
the objective in the Bakara market area.  Shortly after the helicopter insertion, GRF-1 
began movement from their staging area towards the link-up point at the target building.  
As the mission was progressing as planned on the target itself, TF Ranger helicopters 
began to notice increasing hostile activity by the local inhabitants. 
Aidid gained an advantage using civilians as part of his prepared defenses; 
Aidid’s was willing to put his civilians into harm’s way, even using them as human 
shields for his fighters.25  Aidid’s knowledge of the rules of engagement (ROE) gave him 
an advantage that he further exploited in order to preempt and then hinder TF Ranger’s 
raid.  On the assumption that the Somali crowds would be largely neutral, TF Ranger first 
exercised all measures other than deadly force—but Aidid’s manipulation of the ROE  
                                                 
25 In a report to the UN Security Council on 1 July 1993, Howe stated that there was “increasing 
evidence that General Aidid deliberately and personally directed the use of women and children for attacks 
on UNOSOM II soldiers; and that he directed his militia to shoot into the crowd on June 13 in order to 
create casualties and embarrass…UNOSOM II before the assembled world press” (Warner-Levin Report, 
1995, p. 22).   
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gave him an exploitable advantage that quickly overwhelmed the Americans.  The 
Rangers quickly realized that they would have to fire through the women and children to 
kill Aidid’s fighters and protect themselves.  
As Aidid apparently knew, “regardless of the size or quality of defensive forces, 
the defender in the urban environment usually extracts large costs from the attacker in 
time, resources, and casualties” (MCWP 3-35.3, 1998, p. 1-16).26  By drawing U.S. 
forces into a fight on his home turf in Mogadishu, Aidid successfully employed guerrilla 
tactics and noncombatants within the confining nature of the urban jungle to make it 
difficult for TF Ranger to employ their technological superiority.  If U.S. forces were 
unwilling to risk harming civilians, Aidid surmised that he could inflict heavy casualties 
on the task force, thereby degrading U.S. public support for operations in Somalia.  Either 
way, civilians on the battlefield benefited Aidid.  If TF Ranger were willing to risk 
increased civilian casualties to protect themselves, those casualties would likely have the 
same effect on public support (FM 3-06, 2003, p. C-5).   Killing civilians would have 
undermined the perceived legitimacy of the intervention.  In urban guerrilla warfare, the 
populace is similar to key terrain in military terms; the side that manages it best has a 
distinct advantage over the other.   
While sniping was more of a nuisance to the ground forces, a much more fruitful 
tactic for the Somalis was attacking vehicles and buildings with rockets and mortars.  At 
most of the roadblocks at key intersections, as well as along main avenues of approach, 
the Somalis had emplaced RPGs teams to disable ground forces traveling in wheeled and 
tracked vehicles.  This use of RPGs proved extremely effective at creating additional 
obstacles along the narrow streets, and was an extremely difficult tactic to counter.  
Somalis gave TF Ranger its first casualties when they hit a 2½-ton truck with an RPG 
while it was en route to link-up with the assault force at the target site.  This would 
provide foreshadowing of the devastating effects of RPG use throughout the next fifteen 
hours.  
                                                 
26 It could be argued that it was clearly not Aidid’s intent to win the tactical battle against the UN’s 
operational center of gravity— the well-trained and technologically advanced American military forces, 
which he could not attack directly.  Aidid chose, instead, to strike at a potential American vulnerability and 
strategic center of gravity— the inability to accept casualties for an operation not vital to national interests, 
since most Americans still viewed Somalia as a humanitarian effort. 
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Unknown to the task force, “Aidid brought in fundamentalist Islamic soldiers 
from Sudan, experienced in downing Russian helicopters in Afghanistan, to train his men 
in RPG firing techniques” (FM 3-06, 2003, p. C-6).  Given the low altitudes and the 
relatively low air speeds of TF Ranger’s helicopters in this urban operation, the 
helicopters were much more vulnerable than anticipated.  Somalis had attempted to use 
massed RPG fires during earlier raids—during the fifth and sixth assaults conducted by 
TF Ranger (both during daylight hours on 18 and 21 September respectively), the use of 
RPGs had begun to increase.  Somalis fired at least twelve RPGs at TF Ranger 
helicopters on its previous (sixth) mission, and they had even succeeded in shooting 
down a UH-60 flying at rooftop level at night just one week before the battle.  During the 
3 October raid, the MH-60Ls loitered for forty minutes over the target area in an orbit 
that was well within Somali RPG range.27     
By 1602 hours, TF Ranger had secured the target building and detained twenty-
four Somalis.  After GRF-1 linked up at the target house, the TF Ranger assault force 
began consolidation at the point of extraction in order to begin the process of 
withdrawing.  Shortly after all of the Somali detainees departed for the airfield, Somalis 
used a RPG to hit and down a MH-60L, callsign Super 61, “Thunderstruck,” at a location 
referred to as the northern crash site, or crash site #1.  This event “cracked the task 
force’s sense of righteous invulnerability...[since] they were the trump card in this God-
forsaken place. …the Somalis couldn’t shoot [Black Hawks] down” (Bowden, 1999, p. 
80).  The pilot, CW4 Clifton P. Wolcott had the presence of mind to alert the crew via 
radio to brace for impact while the helicopter spun out of control toward the street below.  
This radio report alerted friendly forces that there were now isolated personnel on the 
                                                 
27 When questioned about his decision to ignore increased Somali RPG use against helicopters during a 
question and answer luncheon in the Del Monte Room in Herrmann Hall, at the Naval Postgraduate School 
on 28 May 2003, MG (Ret.) Garrison stated that the fact was not ignored.  He stated that he made his 
decision to continue using helicopters in the same manner as the previous six missions based on advice 
provided by the pilots and the unit commander of the attached 1/160th SOAR(A).  They informed MG 
Garrison that it was an acceptable risk, and recommended that it should be mitigated at their level.  This 
seems to suggest that the pilots believed that such a non-precision weapon was ultimately no match for their 
flying skills.  COL Faust corroborated this assumption in his monograph.  After talking to one of the pilots 
who had met with other pilots to discuss the 25 September shoot down of the UH-60 from the 10th Mountain 
Division’s Aviation Task Force, “In their [the pilots’] opinion, the shoot down was lucky, i.e., ‘big sky, little 
bullet.’” The pilot suggested that TF Ranger aircraft “flew rapidly random and irregular flight profiles,” and 
that “the combination of experience and better tactics minimized the RPG threat to TFR aircraft” (Faust, 
1999, p. 40). 
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battlefield.  The other helicopters in the area visually observed the crash at 1620 hours, so 
the location of the aircraft was a known point; the aircraft smashed into an alley about 
500 yards northeast of the target.   
At 1624 hours, an unarmed MH-6 (callsign Star 41) piloted by CW3 Karl Maier 
and CW3 Keith Jones landed in the narrow street.  Maier fired on approaching Somalis 
from the cockpit with a Heckler and Koch MP-5 light submachine gun in his right hand, 
while he simultaneously maintained the aircraft at a hover with his left hand.  The alley 
was so narrow that the rotor blades barely cleared the houses on both sides.  Jones 
confirmed that both Wolcott and CW2 Donovan L. Briley had died upon impact while he 
assisted two wounded snipers onto the MH-6 for extraction at 1631 hours (Rysewyk, 
1994, p. 10).  Unfortunately, only SFC Jimmy Smith made it back alive as the other 
sniper, SSG Daniel Busch, died en route to the airfield from injuries sustained defending 
the crew of Super 61.  The six-man Ranger squad from blocking position #2, led by 1LT 
Thomas Di Tomasso, arrived at the site at 1628 hours.  Shortly after Star 41 departed, 
CW3 Dan Jollota and MAJ Herb Rodriguez, in CSAR MH-60L (callsign Super 68), 
inserted fifteen CSAR personnel via fastrope.  Commanded by CPT Bill Coultrup, the 
CSAR personnel assisted in securing the crash site and treating the wounded.  TF Ranger 
notified the QRF that assistance might be required—the QRF left University Compound 
to preposition itself at the airfield.   
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At 1641 hours, Somalis struck and downed a MH-60L, callsign Super 64, 
“Venom,” with a RPG at a location referred to as the southern crash site, or crash site #2, 
approximately 800 meters south of Super 61.  As command and control aircraft loitered 
overhead, they witnessed Super 61 going down—just as pilots CW3 Michael J. Durant 
and CW4 Raymond A. Frank reported their dilemma over their radio.  While two of the 
AH-6’s orbited the position to provide cover fire, TF Ranger’s LTCs Gary Harrell 
(Commander, C Squadron, 1st Special Forces Operational Detachment-Delta and overall 
Ground Forces Commander for the operation) and Tom Matthews (Commander, 1st 
Battalion, 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment (SOAR) and Air Mission 
Commander for the operation) finally authorized MH-60L (callsign Super 62) pilots 
CW3 Mike Goffena and CPT Jim Yacone, to insert two snipers (MSG Gary Gordon and 
SFC Randy Shughart) after their third plea to provide protection for the crew as they 
watched Somali crowds close in on the position.  Within minutes of the crash, and before 
any of the crew were able to exit the aircraft, Super 62 inserted the two-man recovery 
force who assisted the wounded out of the wreckage while keeping the Somalis at bay.  
Jones and Maier again landed their MH-6 in an alley approximately 100 meters from the 
wrecked aircraft at this site—but this time they could only stay for about one minute due 
to enemy fire they received; they would not have another opportunity to return.  The 
snipers ran out of ammunition before additional recovery forces could arrive—there was 
nothing more they could do.  Though unknown to the task force, with the exception of 
Durant, all of the wounded crew (including crew chiefs SSG William D. Cleveland, Jr., 
and SGT Thomas J. Field), and both of the snipers were overrun and killed by the 
Somalia mob within twenty minutes of the crash (Durant, 2003, pp. 35-37). 
TF Ranger’s assault forces were pinned down in the vicinity of the northern crash 
site, the convoys had to return to the airfield and await QRF assistance since they could 
not successfully navigate to the site, and no more forces could be inserted via helicopters 
due to the heavy Somali presence.  Though all crewmembers had survival radios, the only 
AN/PRC-112 survival radio ever activated belonged to Durant (personal communication, 
MG (Ret.) William Garrison, February 2, 2004).  Shughart used it to contact 1LT James 
O. Lechner on Channel B, the Fire Support Net.  Lechner forwarded the call to LTC 
Matthews and LTC Harrell in the C2 MH-60, who in turn ordered him to inform Shughart 
that “a reaction force is en route” (Durant, 2003, pp. 35-37; Lechner, 1994, p. 23).  The 
Somalis were in control of that radio shortly after that transmission.  Typically, a SOF 
recovery force will not launch a recovery mission without first knowing the location of 
the evader, but in this instance, the task force knew the last known location, and had to be 
sure that no bodies or survivors remained at the site. 
The majority of TF Ranger’s forces had converged on the northern crash site, and 
had become pinned-down by heavy enemy fires.  Soon after the Somalis shot down the 
second MH-60L, Garrison launched two unsuccessful recovery forces to the southern 
crash site because no friendly forces had been able to reach the site.  These forces, 
consisting of a second TF Ranger ground reaction force (GRF-2) and the QRC, met 
heavy Somali resistance.  At around 1740 hours, both GRF-1 and GRF-2 returned to the  
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airfield after failing to reach any of the trapped soldiers.  The QRC would not return to 
the TF Ranger JOC until 1907 hours, when Garrison placed GRF-2 under the operational 
control (OPCON) of the QRF.   
After the QRF completed its initial mission analysis, LTC Bill David 
(Commander, TF 2-14, or the QRF’s ground forces) directed elements of TF 2-14 and 
GRF-2 to move to the New Port.  Upon arrival at New Port, the units conducted final pre-
combat inspections (PCI), and issued more ammunition.  By 2130 hours, David had 
linked-up at the New Port with all of the assets under his control, which included only the 
Malaysian and Pakistani forces.  When David arrived, all forces had arrayed themselves 
administratively, and were not task organized for combat, or marshaled in proper order of 
movement (personal interview, BG (Ret.) Bill David, November 19, 2003).   
David’s initial plan was simple—Pakistani tanks would lead the convoy of 
German-built Malaysian Condor armored personnel carriers (APCs) carrying TF 2-14 
soldiers.28  Company A would attack to break through to TF Ranger at the northern crash 
site.  The TF 2-14 TAC CP and TF Ranger attachments would remain at Release Point 
Yankee approximately 1200 meters past Pakistani Strongpoint 207 on National Street.  
Company C, in the remaining APCs, would pass through the release point, and attack to 
break through to the southern crash site.  Company B, would stage at the airfield to serve 
as the task force reserve.  The attacking elements were to move as far as possible while 
mounted, dismounting only when reaching the assigned objectives (Hollis, 1998, p. 29; 
personal interview, MAJ Mark Hollis, November 17, 2003).   
Somewhere between 2310 and 2324 hours, TF David departed the New Port en 
route to the two crash sites.  For roughly three hours, TF David fought a vicious battle 
until they reached their respective release points.  By 0155 hours CPT Drew Meyerowich 
                                                 
28 David was placed in charge of an ad hoc task force, and given what seemed to everyone to be a 
mission that he could not accomplish.  At the outset of the operation, it appeared to have the makings of 
another Task Force Smith, an ad hoc organization that also lacked interoperability between coalition forces, 
detailed intelligence on the enemy disposition, and time to sufficiently plan a complex operation.  David’s 
ad hoc task force, sometimes referred to as “Task Force David,” consisted of two organic rifle companies, 
two Malaysian mechanized companies (between 24 and 32 APCs with vehicle commanders, drivers and 
gunners only), a composite platoon (+) from TF Ranger, one Pakistani tank platoon, UN LNOs, an anti-
armor platoon from C-1/87th Infantry, and two aviation task forces from both TF 2-25 and TF Ranger.  By 
operation's end, "Task Force David" had successfully achieved what many believed to be impossible.  The 
fact that so few casualties were sustained by this ad hoc organization, in the execution of a near 
insurmountable task, was nothing short of miraculous.  
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(Commander, Company A, TF 2-14) reported that the Malaysians APCs carrying his 
company reported linking-up with the TF Ranger assault force at the northern crash site, 
and began the slow process of removing the trapped body from the crashed helicopter.  
At 0228 hours, CPT Michael Whetstone (Commander, Company C, TF 2-14) reported 
being on the southern objective, at the crash site.  At this time, all elements had reached 
their objectives.  Within thirty minutes, Whetstone had recovered all remaining sensitive 
items from the aircraft, and had supervised the placement of a “thermite” grenade to 
destroy what remained of the aircraft (personal communication, LTC Michael Whetstone, 
April 9 and 11, 2004).  For the next two and a half hour, the QRF continued to secure the 
two crash sites waiting for the TF Ranger to recover the last trapped body. 
On the northern objective at 0528 hours, Meyerowich reported that he and the 
forces at his location had extracted the last body from the MH-60L, had set explosive 
charges to destroy the aircraft, and had consolidated all personnel for movement back to 
the release point on National Street.  At about that same time, Whetstone arrived at the 
Pakistani Stadium.  At 0537 hours, Meyerowich departed the northern crash site.  David 
directed that overflow personnel ride on the top of the APCs (personal telephone 
interview, LTC Michael Whetstone, April 6, 2004).  Approximately fifteen TF Ranger 
personnel began would become known as the “Mogadishu Mile,” at the release point on 
National Street, since all of the APCs were fully loaded.  Fearing friendly forces would 
leave them behind, these personnel literally ran beside the vehicles. 
When the TF Ranger JOC received a report that there was still TF Ranger 
personnel dismounted, David ordered all movement stopped until the vehicles picked up 
the personnel.  Once all personnel were with vehicles, the movement resumed.  At 0632 
hours, David reported that all QRF and TF Ranger forces had closed on the Pakistani 
stadium.29   
C. ANALYSIS 
1. Relative Superiority 
Most regard the plight of TF Ranger as more of a political failure than as a 
hile the task force did not accomplish their mission of military or tactical failure.  W                                                 
29 By 0810 hours, TF Ranger aircraft began shuttling personnel from Pakistani stadium to the airfield.  
By 0916 hours, TF Ranger had accounted for all personnel (TF Ranger still listed six personnel from crash 
site #2 were as MIA). 
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capturing Aidid, they knew before deployment that it probably only had a fifty percent 
chance of success if HUMINT was accurate.  Without HUMINT, military planners 
accepted that they had less than a twenty percent chance of success.30  It is still debatable 
as to whether or not the civilians in the chain of command were aware of this point, but 
Downing and Garrison both made sure that Powell understood this fact.  As the CJCS, it 
would be Powell’s responsibility to convey this to the administration and DoD 
leadership. Still, TF Ranger seemingly offered policy-makers the only viable military 
option for accomplishing the mission.  Regardless, with those odds, it is easy to see that 
TF Ranger was unlikely to succeed in its mission.  Even the skill of the finest soldiers in 
the U.S. Army would not be enough to tip the scales in TF Ranger’s favor.    
Since the mission resulted in a strategic failure, regardless of the tactical victory, 
the reality is that the result of the events during that fifteen-hour engagement have 
negatively affected, and continues to impact, U.S. foreign policies.  While the task force 
clearly succeeded in their mission of capturing the 24 Aidid supporters on 3-4 October 
1993, TF Ranger could not conclude its mission could until it had extracted all members 
of the task force.  The application of conventional heavy forces succeeded in doing what 
is arguably the most daunting tenet of RS in that, “if relative superiority is lost, it is 
difficult to regain.”  While the introduction of the conventional heavy force added to TF 
Ranger’s total numbers, they were still a numerically inferior force compared to their 
adversaries.  In this case, the introduction of additional forces gave TF Ranger the ability 
to apply the principles of security and surprise through firepower, as previously 
discussed.  Additionally, the presence of APCs provided TF Ranger an opportunity to 
apply the principle of speed.  The combination of these principles allowed TF Ranger to 
regain RS, and ultimately complete its recovery mission.  The resulting tactical victory, in 
terms of the numbers of dead and wounded,31 was only made possible by the valor, 
                                                 
30 This assessment of probabilities of mission success (capturing Aidid) in relation to HUMINT was 
confirmed by MG (Ret) Garrison during the question and answer luncheon in the Del Monte Room in 
Herrmann Hall, at the Naval Postgraduate School on May 28, 2003. 
31 Final numbers showed that TF Ranger had suffered only 16 KIA and 84 WIA, which included the 
five soldiers initially listed as MIA/POW (Faust, 1999, p. 41; Marquis, 1997, p. 253).  “The SNA was on 
the edge of defeat.  It knew it had been beaten and it had taken over a thousand killed or wounded” (Faust, 
p. 59). 
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professionalism, and extraordinary dedication exhibited by the men who fought that day, 
which contributed to their regaining the RS Recovery Force lost for more than ten hours.  
In the hostile and reactive environment of Mogadishu, the foundation of TF 
Ranger’s operations was speed, surprise and violence of action.  Success was dependent 
on reacting with the “launch of a direct action force … in 25 minutes or less” (Faust, 
1999, p. 29), and getting off the target as quickly as possible.  TF Ranger was “normally 
on the target for just a matter of minutes before they began exfiltration” (Akers & 
Singleton, 2000, p. 6), which did not allow the Somalis time to react to the assault force 
in a cohesive manner.  On the 3-4 October mission, a series of unanticipated events 
resulted in the assault force spending too much time engaged with the Somalis, 
sacrificing the principle of speed.  This effectively allowed the window of opportunity to 
close, and resulted in a loss of RS Recovery Force.  While the window of opportunity and RS 
Recovery Force disappeared in the snowballing effect of losing the initiative, the door to the 
zone of potential misfortune began to open widely, and engulfed the task force.  As is the 
case with most special operations missions, small and lightly-armed forces are able to 
gain speed, and are generally unable to sustain action against a conventional enemy for 
long periods of time—the fact that the Somalis were not a conventional military force 
made regaining RS Recovery Force more likely.  With more relative strength, TF David 
brought the ability to extend the duration of the battle, and necessarily expanded the 
number of goals that the recovery force could achieve.     
Analyzing TF Ranger’s 3-4 October 1993 raid and subsequent recovery operation, 
in light of the SOF-specific overt urban PR model, the authors argue that TF Ranger’s 
difficulties directly correlated with its failure to maintain RS Recovery Force.  TF Ranger’s 
combined and cumulative failures to correctly apply the six principles of special 
operations during all phases of the operation at the tactical level resulted in a state of 
affairs where the intervention of conventional heavy forces was required to overcome the 
situation.  While the task force eventually succeeded, a more conscious application of the 
SOF-specific overt urban PR model might have resulted in a more quickly completed and 
decisive victory, accomplished with relatively few U.S. casualties.  Figure 9 shows a RS 
Recovery Force graph for the 3-4 October 1993 raid. 
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Figure 9.   Authors’ RS Recovery Force Graph for TF Ranger’s Raid on 3-4 October 1993 
 
Analyzing the RS Isolated Personnel for those who survived the initial impact of the 
crashes, according to the authors’ SOF-specific overt urban PR model, the authors argue 
that the survival of those isolated personnel directly correlated with their ability to 
maintain RS Isolated Personnel.  The IP’s combined and cumulative successes or failures in 
applying the applicable IP-specific principles determined the level of success of their 
survival and recovery.  In the case of the northern crash site, Smith and Busch achieved 
RS Isolated Personnel when they gained a decisive advantage over the Somalis, not by virtually 
disappearing into the urban landscape, but by removing themselves from the urban 
landscape in an MH-6.  Figure 10 depicts this advantage as the vertical rise in the 
probability of mission completion.  From the point where they achieved RS Isolated Personnel, 
they sustained it by a combination of quickly mounting the aircraft, and by the arrival of 
additional friendly forces to secure the area.  The figure also depicts this sustainment of 
RS Isolated Personnel as the gradual increase in the probability of mission completion, which is 
the point where their destiny was not longer in their own hands.  
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Figure 10.   Authors’ RS Isolated Personnel Graph for the Super 61 crash site 
 
In the case of the southern crash site, the six IP never achieved RS Isolated Personnel.  
They were never able to gain a decisive advantage over the Somalis because their injuries 
prevented them from attempting to disappear into the urban landscape.  Figure 11 depicts 
this RS Isolated Personnel graph.  Their injuries also prevented them from taking advantage of 
their one recovery opportunity when they were unable to move to the MH-6 only 100 
meters from their location.  The probability of a successful recovery under the 
circumstances was always low, and gradually decreased, as attacking Somalis killed the 
snipers (depicted by the gradual increase in the area of vulnerability).  Capture is the 
ultimate loss of RS Isolated Personnel and is a recovery mission failure in this scenario; other-
than military means eventually affected Durant’s release.   
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Figure 11.   Authors’ RS Isolated Personnel Graph for the Super 64 crash site 
 
2. Principles Necessary for the Overt Recovery Force’s Successful 
Operations 
a. Simplicity 
Once TF Ranger’s mission changed from a raid to one of PR, the 
significance of the principle of simplicity could not be more apparent.  As the principle 
on which all of the others rest, simplicity is the most crucial principle with which to 
comply.  In the case of TF Ranger, while operating as a recovery force for those in the 
two downed MH-60’s, the task force had violated all three elements of simplicity critical 
to success: limiting the number of objectives, good intelligence, and innovation. 
TF Ranger did initially limit the number of tactical objectives to only the 
raid site, but the number of objectives grew because of circumstances beyond the task 
force’s control.  The vital or limited objective of capturing the twenty-four Aidid 
supporters on 3 October 1993 focused the task forces’ training and preparation for that 
mission, and was sufficiently limited in scope to satisfy the principle of simplicity.  When 
those captured departed for the airfield, the mission was complete with the exception of 
the extraction of the remaining task force personnel.  Once the first MH-60L was shot 
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down, TF Ranger began to hastily implement rehearsed contingency plans for an 
immediate (or emergency) self-recovery, the simplicity of the operation began to slip 
away as the task force assumed another tactical objective.  With the downing of the 
second MH-60L, TF Ranger quickly realized that yet another tactical objective had been 
added to the list, and wrestled with the knowledge that it had no contingency plan or 
dedicated CSAR forces for more than one downed aircraft.  TF Ranger’s simple plan had 
now grown to a level that was unmanageable without outside intervention—it was the 
task force’s lack of quality intelligence about the enemy situation near the Olympic 
Hotel, and not the target-specific intelligence, that compounded this fact. 
In order to circumvent or remove obstacles that would otherwise 
compromise, surprise and/or complicate the rapid execution of the mission, TF Ranger 
would have been better served to use innovation in order to simplify the plan during the 
planning phase of the operation.  While usually associated with technology, the 
application of unorthodox tactics can also result in innovation.  For the purposes of TF 
Ranger’s recovery mission, the successful application of new technology or innovative 
tactics would have been to assist the assault elements in reaching the two crash sites, and 
then to quickly and effectively eliminate the enemy in order to recover those at the crash 
sites.  Since the task force was already committed to the engagement when the first MH-
60L crashed, there was little that TF Ranger could do to bring any significant amount of 
innovation to the fight.  The task force was relegated to fighting in a street-by-street 
brawl, reminiscent of highly conventional military operations in urban terrain (MOUT)—
it was too late to start thinking about innovative methods of recovering those at the crash 
sites once the bullets were already flying.  Technical intelligence collection would be TF 
Ranger’s greatest hope for innovation.  The routine of TF Ranger’s operations ultimately 
resulted in an exploitable advantage for the Somalis, largely due to TF Ranger’s failure to 
use unorthodox tactics or innovation and superior technical systems to any marked 
advantage.   
b. Security 
Due to the nature of special operations, tight security is necessary to 
prevent the enemy from gaining an unexpected advantage through foreknowledge of the 
timing and/or means of insertion of an impending attack.  Nevertheless, not knowing the 
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time or method of an attack did not prevent Aidid from preparing for an assault.  TF 
Ranger’s failed security efforts resulted in the Somalis preparing a surprise of their own, 
and subsequently preempting the attack and effectively reducing the speed on target, both 
of which resulted in dramatically reducing the possibility of achieving or maintaining RS 
Recovery Force.  TF Ranger ignored the previous warning signs that told it what defenses the 
enemy was preparing.   
Once again, the clan culture of the Somalis made successful mission 
preparation with regard to security more difficult, but no less important, for TF Ranger’s 
mission accomplishment.  The Somalis that fought for Aidid placed much less value on 
human life, and had no moral aversion to placing noncombatants in harm’s way.  
Unorthodox, or guerrilla, tactics initially gave Aidid an advantage in overcoming TF 
Ranger’s use of the principle of security to achieve RS Recovery Force.  The stereotypical 
urban guerrilla will usually have the advantage over forces solely applying scripted, non-
innovative, and non-asymmetrical tactics and techniques. 
c. Repetition 
During the preparation phase of the operation, repetition is indispensable 
for success, especially since success is largely dependent on minimal exposure time to 
overwhelming enemy forces.  Counterterrorist [CT] units like TF Ranger perform high 
risk standard mission profiles as a matter of routine, but the PR situation TF Ranger 
quickly found itself dealing with was anything but routine.  Routine had honed individual 
and unit tactical skills to the point where quick reactions to threats were more instinct 
than critical thought, but the new threat was incongruent with the standard scenarios for 
which the unit had been practicing.  While TF Ranger did conduct one full-dress 
rehearsal of a single downed aircraft during the execution of a raid, this rehearsal did not 
unmask all of the weakness of that contingency plan, nor did it address multiple aircraft 
losses.  Compounded by a general intelligence failure in applying the principle of 
simplicity, TF Ranger had not prepared for, nor did it desire, a fifteen-hour street battle 
against an entire city of Aidid’s supporters.  More importantly, it had not adequately 
planned for or rehearsed PR operations for task force personnel who would potentially 
become isolated in the urban areas of downtown Mogadishu.  In those circumstances, 
individual initiative and leadership would have to carry the day. 
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The failure of both TF Ranger and the QRF to conduct full-dress 
rehearsals with the UN contingents eventually used to rescue TF Ranger greatly 
contributed to difficulties with extraction.  Garrison never anticipated and “never thought 
of a contingency plan for backups of equipment like tanks and APCs” (Warner-Levin 
Report, 1995, p. 33), all of which were readily available from coalition forces under 
UNOSOM II, and ultimately proved to be invaluable in the extraction of pinned-down 
personnel on 4 October 1993.   
d. Surprise 
Any force that repetitively uses the same operational techniques will 
eventually cause the enemy to adopt strategies that will counter that technique. This 
significant counterintelligence failure makes it very difficult to achieve tactical surprise.   
In the postmortem of the October 3 battle, it transpired that Aidid’s militia 
divided Mogadishu into eighteen sectors, each with a tactical 
commander…Colonel Harif Hassan Giumale, the commander of the 
Somali force that engaged Task Force Ranger on October 3, had attended 
a Soviet military academy in Odessa for three years.  His subordinate, 
Colonel Ali Aden, summed up his commander’s perspective on U.S. 
tactics: ‘If you use one tactic once, you should not use it a third time.  And 
the Americans had already done basically the same thing six times’ 
(Stevenson, 1995, pp. 93-94). 
Since special operations forces such as TF Ranger do not generally have 
the luxury of attacking the enemy when or where he is unprepared, they must typically 
attack in spite of enemy preparations.  TF Ranger would only achieve surprise by 
catching the enemy off guard by using deception, timing, and taking advantage of the 
Somalis’ vulnerabilities.  Since Aidid had his followers watching the airfield both day 
and night, the word rapidly spread through the city when TF Ranger launched a mission.  
On 3 October 1993, Aidid’s followers immediately knew that aircraft had taken off and 
were heading to the downtown area—the task force had already lost the element of 
tactical and doctrinal surprise.  Having seen virtually the same mission six times before, 
the Somalis were ready to take advantage of the scripted scenario about to unfold before 
them in their center of gravity.   
In terms of the principle of surprise, the raid of 3-4 October 1993 was an 
obvious failure.  TF Ranger failed to (1) delay the enemy’s reaction or divert the enemy’s 
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attention, (2) attack where the enemy was weakest (compared to other defenses, the 
Bakara Market was probably Aidid’s strongest location), or (3) attack at a time that was 
most beneficial.  On the other hand, if the goal was capturing Aidid, the task force really 
did not have the opportunity to attack at weak points or at optimal times—time-sensitive 
intelligence drove the operation.  Therefore, TF Ranger could actually only expect to 
delay or divert the Somalis’ reaction.  Other than the unsuccessful signature or “profile 
flights” used to protect actual mission launches, nothing was done to deceive the Somalis 
or delay their reaction to an actual operation; little was done to exploit the principle of 
surprise.  The U.S.’s reliance on technical advantages results in a bias suggesting that less 
technologically advanced adversaries can be easily surprised.  However, the Somalis 
overcame their lack of technical means of providing early detection of attacks through 
their use of human spotters.  Additionally, with much fewer means to protect themselves, 
the Somalis should have been much more vulnerable to exploitation through the U.S. 
military’s technology and equipment dominance, but they made do with what they had 
available.   
e. Speed 
Within Aidid’s center of gravity, the Bakara market, any delay by TF 
Ranger expands the area of vulnerability and decreases the probability of achieving RS 
Recovery Force.  Because the Somalis were in a defensive position, they only had to counter 
the attack, and their ability to react was a constant.  This ability of the Somalis to react 
made it even more critical for TF Ranger to move as quickly as possible regardless of the 
Somali reaction; speed could contribute to gaining RS Recovery Force if the task force moved 
with such swiftness that the Somalis’ reaction was not an overriding factor.   
Once TF Ranger’s mission changed from a raid to a PR, the ability to 
execute rapidly was lost.  Since TF Ranger could not affect the extraction of all TF 
Ranger forces at the same time that vehicles extracted the twenty-four captured Aidid 
supporters, the task force remained under hostile conditions for the next fourteen hours.  
One of the Ranger squads secured the northern crash site within four minutes of the shoot 
down, and within eight minutes, fifteen CSAR personnel further reinforced the position.  
Recovery forces rescued all personnel from the northern crash site, and extracted with the 
main body the following morning.  In contrast, though only 800 meters from the northern 
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crash site, except for the two snipers, no friendly forces reached the southern crash site 
until ten and a half hours after the shoot down.  The speed at which recovery forces were 
able to reach the crash site was the critical factor in determining whether a recovery was 
successful or unsuccessful. 
If there was any principle that should have been much easier to 
accomplish in Somalia, it should have been the execution principle of speed.  The 
Somalis relied on informal networks that made it difficult to quickly react with an 
organized force.  In addition, with much less reliance on technology to communicate, the 
informal networks that dominated Mogadishu were typically not quick enough to react to 
TF Ranger’s quickly planned and executed missions (normally completed in less than 
thirty minutes).  Had Somalis not shot down the Black Hawks on 3 October, TF Ranger 
would have successfully completed its mission in thirty-one minutes from the time of 
insertion.  Unfortunately for TF Ranger, gaining RS Recovery Force required proper 
integration of all six principles.  The monopoly of speed that TF Ranger possessed was 
not enough to overcome the effects of the other interdependent and mutually supportive 
principles.  Only by reducing uncertainties, thorough contingency planning and 
minimizing U.S. vulnerabilities, can the benefits of monopolizing this principle be 
attained, regardless of the enemy’s actions. 
f. Purpose 
All members of TF Ranger had an acute understanding of the prime 
objective of their new personnel recovery mission in spite of the emerging obstacles or 
opportunities presented by the Somalis.  Even during the heat of battle, every individual 
soldier understood the primary objective of recovering their comrades, and demonstrated 
immeasurable personal commitment to achieving that end.  At the tactical level, there 
was little that the Somalis could have done to negatively impact TF Ranger’s sense of 
purpose—though they did a superb job at influencing the will of the politicians and 
public at home in the U.S.   
After Somalis shot down the first of the MH-60Ls, the mission of TF 
Ranger changed from one of capturing Aidid’s supporters (who were already in custody) 
to one of safeguarding and recovering American casualties.  The actions of TF Ranger’s 
soldiers were automatic, and required no prompting.  The loyalty and extreme sacrifice 
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they displayed could clearly only be characterized as “knowing no limitations,” 
especially from the Somali perspective.  The clearly defined purpose of TF Ranger’s 
“new” mission ensured that even in the fog of battle, and no matter what else happened, 
the individual soldiers understood their primary objective, and would die before failing to 
accomplish that mission.  They believed in the purpose summed up in the U.S. Army 
Ranger Creed, especially the last two stanzas—they would fight to the last man to ensure 
that no one was left behind.32 
3. Principles Necessary for the Isolated Personnel’s Success 
a. Communication 
In both of these situations involving immediate or emergency self-
recovery, communication was not as critical as in situations where the location of the IP 
or incident is not visually observed by forces that can affect recovery.  Since the object of 
the principle of communication is for the IP to convey a location to the recovery forces, 
in both of these cases, visual observance of the crashes by recovery forces replaced the 
need for communication—and was sufficient to affect recovery.  In either event, the 
significant lesson is that the quicker that ample recovery forces can be inserted, the 
higher the probability of successful recovery.  Moreover, any type of recovery is better 
than a MIA status.  Though there were only two of four IP still alive at the northern site, 
TF Ranger forces were not going to leave until they had recovered all bodies; the 
Americans would leave no one behind.  Communication is typically a two-way process 
critical to successful recovery, but it also works when the recovery party is only receiving 
a location—there is not always a requirement for the IP to receive a response. 
At the crash site of Super 61, the insertion of recovery forces came only 
after first knowing the exact location of the IP, and visual recognition had served as 
positive identification.  As discussed earlier, at crash site #2, the only survival radio 
activated belonged to Durant; Shughart used it to contact Lechner.  The Somalis were in 
control of that radio shortly after that transmission.  Typically a SOF recovery force will 
                                                 
32 Fifth Stanza of the U.S. Army Ranger Creed:  “Energetically will I meet the enemies of my country.  
I shall defeat them on the field of battle for I am a better trained and will fight with all my might.  
Surrender is not a Ranger word.  I will never allow a fallen comrade to fall into the hands of the enemy, and 
under no circumstances will I ever embarrass my country.”  Sixth Stanza: “Readily will I display the 
intestinal fortitude required to fight on to the Ranger objective and complete the mission, though I be the 
lone survivor” (as cited in Faust, 1999, p. iii). 
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not launch a recovery mission without first knowing the location of the evader, but in this 
instance, the task force knew the last known location, and had to be sure that no bodies or 
survivors remained at the site. 
b. Adaptability 
If a critical principle for the survival and evasion of IP is adaptability, then 
the two separate crews of Super 61 and Super 64 were at a distinct disadvantage.  At the 
northern crash site, the two pilots died upon impact.  A MH-6 successfully extracted the 
two snipers within eleven minutes of the crash, so there was never really an opportunity 
to assume the chameleon-like quality of being able to blend in with the environment.  
Since there was no opportunity to hide in plain sight of the Somalis, the northern crash 
site does not offer clear evidence that an inability to adapt almost immediately will likely 
result in capture.  Likewise, the IP of Super 64 never had the opportunity to slip into the 
patterns of normalcy that one can only achieve with knowledge gained from area, 
cultural, and linguistic familiarization.  Clearly, given the situation in Mogadishu on 3 
October 1993, this would have been difficult at best, since the only pattern of normalcy 
was total chaos.  In a situation where the civilian population is an active and hostile 
participant in the fighting, temporarily adopting the customs and idiosyncrasies of the 
locals to not appear out of place would be almost impossible.  Under such circumstances, 
especially during daylight hours, it would better serve an IP to assume the chameleon-like 
quality by hiding quickly without the knowledge or observation on the adversary. 
At the southern crash site, all four members of Super 64’s crew had 
survived the initial impact of the crash, though all were seriously injured (Durant, 2003).  
Of the six isolated personnel at the crash site, only Gordon and Shughart had a chance at 
applying the principle of adaptability.  Given the enemy situation and the quandary of the 
TF Ranger ground recovery forces, the insertion of the snipers was conducted as a last 
hope to defend the crash site; they were not going to evade from that location and leave 
the crew at the mercy of the Somalis.  With the seriousness of the injuries that the four 
crew members sustained, there was no chance of them moving from that location without 
significant assistance from more ground or CSAR forces, or the MEDEVAC MH-60L 
piloted by CW3 Stan Wood and CW3 Gary Fuller.  These were not likely options given 
the circumstances—the unfortunate inability to adapt to their environment sealed the fate 
63 
of the six IP at the southern crash site.  In contrast to the situation at the northern crash 
site, with no prospect of hiding in plain sight of the Somalis, the southern crash site offers 
some support to the idea that an inability to adapt almost immediately will likely result in 
capture.  Nevertheless, as with Super 61, injuries prevented the IP of Super 64 from 
having the opportunity to slip into the patterns of normalcy only achieved with 
knowledge gained from area, cultural, and linguistic familiarization.   
c. Exploitation 
Similar to the principle of adaptability, the two separate crews of Super 61 
and Super 64 were at a distinct disadvantage when it came to applying the principle of 
exploitation.  With the two pilots killed on impact at the northern crash site, only the two 
wounded snipers had an opportunity to put time and space between themselves and the 
Somalis.  The two snipers successfully benefited from exploiting the capabilities of the 
MH-6, which was the only available asset able to land in the narrow alley in which they 
had crashed.  In this instance, the unpredictable action of landing a helicopter in the alley 
provided the necessary bold and audacious shock value that was sufficient to gain an 
advantage in time and space against the hesitant Somalis.  No other application of 
exploitation was necessary, as friendly forces numbering in the nineties quickly 
consolidated at the site. 
At the southern crash site, the four seriously injured members of Super 
64’s crew had virtually no opening to put time and space between themselves and the 
Somalis that were quickly closing in on their position.  Given that TF Ranger inserted the 
snipers as a last hope to defend the crash site while recovery forces fought to reach the 
site, and the seriousness of the crews’ injuries, there were few chances to apply the 
principle of exploitation given their limited resources.  The best opportunity for possible 
exploitation came shortly after Shughart and Gordon removed Durant from the helicopter 
wreckage.  In contrast to the situation at the northern crash site, the injured and immobile 
IP were unable to take advantage of the nearby MH-6, and would not see another 
prospect for gaining an advantage through bold and audacious behavior.  The southern 
crash site offers some substantiation for the claim that an inability to quickly gain or 
exploit some type of significant advantage in time and space over ones adversary will  
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likely result in capture.  Only with the introduction of more forces would the six isolated 
personnel have had a chance at exploiting an opportunity against the mob of Somalis 
closing in on their position.   
d. The Gonzales Principle 
It is only when an evader is placed in a situation requiring self-
preservation that the Gonzales principle can become a tool for survival, since it is 
something that is developed, enhanced, and optimized during times of peace through 
realistic training and an institutional devotion to improving human capital.  Honed critical 
thinking skills and the acquired proficiency to survive and evade were critical to the 
survival of those who survived the initial impact and Somali gun fire.  At the northern 
crash site, Smith’s ability to think critically under duress resulted in quickly assessing and 
appraising the crisis, evaluating alternatives, and deciding on the most appropriate 
solution.   Possessing a way out of his current predicament, Smith seized the opportunity 
at hand, and quickly got himself and the injured Busch to the MH-6 in order to affect 
their recovery.  Smith’s rapid crisis decision-making aptitude was the result of many 
maturing events such as high-risk live-fire full-dress rehearsals during hundreds of hours 
of realistic and focused training in peacetime.  Smith’s “street-smarts” resulted in the 
successful recovery of the two snipers, even though Busch did not survive the flight.  
Under the circumstances, Smith would probably have survived long enough for recovery 
forces to reach the crash site (since the area would soon be saturated with more than 
ninety TF Ranger personnel), but Busch’s only chance for survival was to quickly get 
medical attention at the 46th Combat Support Hospital.  Smith’s sense of duty towards 
surviving gave Busch that opportunity, and it is a testament to his unit’s institutional 
mentality of ensuring sufficient opportunities are available for such education and 
training. 
As it pertained to the southern crash site, applying the Gonzales principle 
was the significant contributing factor to Durant’s survival.  Since the attacking Somalis 
killed all five of the other IP defending their location, only Durant would have the 
opportunity to apply the Gonzales principle to affect his survival.  Once Durant realized 
that he was probably the last man alive, the reality of eventual capture started sinking in.  
Facing a certain and horrible death, he instinctively reasoned that his survival depended 
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on acting passively in order to survive the critical first five minutes of capture.  He placed 
his empty weapon across his chest, placed his open hands on top of it, and assumed a 
non-threatening posture while the mob of enraged civilians and militia surged toward him 
to unleash their vengeful fury.  Properly and rapidly executed crisis decision-making 
skills, and critical teaching points instinctively recalled from his high-risk of capture 
(HRC) survival, evasion, resistance, and escape (SERE) training arguably saved his life 
that day.  For the moment at least, Somalis would spare Durant the fate of his fellow 
comrades.  Durant received exceptional training that was mandatory in the 160th Special 
Operations Aviation Regiment (Airborne), as well as the unique training imparted as an 
enlisted member in the 7th Special Forces Group (Airborne).  Had Durant not had the 
opportunity to conduct such institutionalized education and training he might not have 





   
 
                                                 
33 There is an uncorroborated account in CPT James Lechner’s monograph, which offered another 
version of why the Somali mob did not kill Durant.  Lechner stated that Durant “was only saved by the 
timely intervention of the son of Osman Atto, who happened to be at the scene, and wanted a live prisoner 
in the hopes of trading for his father” (1994, p. 24).  Atto was allegedly Aidid’s principle lieutenant and the 
SNA’s chief financier when TF Ranger captured him on 21 September 1993 during the conduct of a 
daylight “aerial ambush” of his convoy (Faust, 1999, p. 48; Rysewyk, 1994, Annex C). 
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V. THE LOST PLATOON 
A. OVERVIEW AND INTRODUCTION 
This chapter is a detailed case study of an overt, direct action (DA)-type personnel 
recovery (PR) mission conducted by Task Force (TF) 2-14.  The operation was the Tiger 
Company’s recovery of the Quick Reaction Force (QRF) “Lost Platoon” in Mogadishu, 
Somalia on 4 October 1993.  The Quick Reaction Company (QRC) had extensively 
trained in Mogadishu for this very scenario; it had been in Somalia for weeks, and had 
trained specifically for the “rescue” of engaged, distressed, or trapped United Nations 
Operations Somalia II (UNOSOM II) forces.  As a matter of routine, TF 2-14 augmented 
the QRC’s task organization with medical specialists instead of just the more commonly 
assigned mortar and anti-tank squads–specifically for sustaining the lives that TF 2-14 
would rescue. 
This case begins with some of the background and historical context before 
beginning the detailed case study.  Following the case study is an analysis of relative 
superiority (RS) for both the IP (RS Isolated Personnel) and the recovery force (RS Recovery 
Forces), in the context of the SOF-specific overt urban PR model.  The authors will follow 
this analysis with an evaluation of how each of the overt recovery force’s six principles, 
and the four IP-specific recovery principles affected the respective participant’s level of 
RS.  
While part of the recovery force led by forces from the 10th Mountain Division 
during the “Battle of the Black Sea,” the majority of 2LT Mark A. B. Hollis’ 2nd Platoon, 
traveling in the back of two Malaysian Condor armored personnel carriers (APCs), 
became isolated from the main body of the recovery force at the outset of the battle to 
break through to TF Ranger.  Originally dispatched as part of the 70-vehicle convoy 
attempting to recover TF Ranger personnel pinned down in two different parts of the city, 
the “Lost Platoon” inadvertently became another isolated force that would need 
recovering prior to the withdrawal to Pakistani Stadium.  This case study examines the 
actions of the UN QRF force starting from their link-up with armored forces at the New 
Port, with particular attention given to the details of the Lost Platoon’s recovery.  The 
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authors discussed major events before consolidation at the New Port in Chapter IV.  
Unless the authors cite otherwise cited, or state the time as an approximation, they 
derived all times from a compilation of official timelines from both the Quick Reaction 
Force (QRF) and TF Ranger.34 
B. DETAILED CASE STUDY 
At around 2052 hours, LTC Bill David directed elements of TF 2-14 and the 
second ground reaction force (GRF-2) to move to the New Port.  The column began 
movement with CPT Michael Whetstone’s company and elements of TF Ranger in the 
lead, followed by CPT Drew Meyerowich’s company.  Upon arrival at New Port, the 
units conducted final pre-combat inspections (PCIs), and issued more ammunition.  At 
2100 hours, BG Greg Gile gave COL Larry Casper a change of mission—to effect link-
up with the Rangers at the northern crash site first (site #1, where MH-60L, callsign 
Super 61 crashed), then, if the tactical situation permitted, to proceed to the southern 
crash site to rescue survivors or recover bodies.  From about 2100-2130, Casper and his 
battle staff flew to the New Port to continue planning the operation, and to conduct initial 
coordination with the Malaysian Mechanized Battalion (MALBATT) and Pakistani 
Armor Company.  By 2130 hours, David had linked-up at the New Port with all assets 
under his control, including the Malaysian and Pakistani forces.  When David arrived, all 
forces had arrayed themselves administratively, and were neither task organized for 
combat, nor marshaled in proper order of movement.  After fleshing out the plan, David 
briefed the QRF Liaison Officer (LNO) to the Pakistanis, 1LT Ben Mathews, and the 
QRF LNO to the Malaysians, 1LT John Breen, on what he expected (personal interview, 
BG (Ret.) Bill David, November 19-20, 2003; personal communication, BG (Ret.) Larry 
Casper, April 9, 2004).   
David’s initial plan was simple—Pakistani tanks would lead the convoy of 
Malaysian German-built Condor APCs carrying TF 2-14 soldiers.  As Combat Team 
Alpha, TF 2-14’s Company A would attack to break through to TF Ranger at the northern 
                                                 
34 1) QRF official timeline (version 1, narrative with COL Casper’s signature block) attached as 
Appendix F to CPT Lee Rysewek’s 1994 monograph, “Experiences of Executive Officer from Bravo 
Company, 3d Battalion, 75th Ranger Regiment and Task Force Ranger during the Battle of the Black Sea on 
3-4 October 1993, in Mogadishu Somalia;” 2) TF Ranger official timeline attached as Appendix D to CPT 
Lee Rysewek’s 1994 monograph; 3) QRF official timeline (version 2, narrative with no signature block), 
from the personal files of BG (Ret.) Bill David;  and 4) QRF official timeline (version 3, by time, not 
narrative), also from the personal files of BG (Ret.) Bill David. 
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crash site in APCs assigned to MALBATT’s Company B.  Combat Team Bravo, the TF 
2-14 Tactical Command Post (TAC CP) and TF Ranger attachments, would remain at 
Release Point Yankee approximately 1200 meters past Pakistani Strongpoint 207 on 
National Street.  As Combat Team Charlie, TF 2-14’s Company C, in APCs assigned to 
MALBATT’s Company A, would pass through the release point, and attack to break 
through to the southern crash site.  TF 2-14’s Company B, would stage at the New Port to 
serve as the task force reserve.  The attacking elements were to move as far as possible 
while mounted, dismounting only when reaching the assigned objectives (Hollis, 1998, p. 
29; personal interview, MAJ Mark Hollis, November 17, 2003; Zakaria, 2000, p. 28).   
When Meyerowich returned from his mission briefing from David, 2LT Hollis, 
the 1st Platoon Leader (2LT Damon Wright), and the 3rd Platoon Leader (2LT Curtis 
Crum), were all waiting at the commander’s HMMWV.  Meyerowich briefed everyone 
on their unit’s task and purpose, but there remained some confusion as to the actual route 
to the objective.  The platoon leaders had enough information to begin loading the 
vehicles, and assumed more details would follow, especially concerning the route.  After 
loading the vehicles, 2LT Hollis went back to Meyerowich in order to get more 
information concerning the exact route.  Meyerowich told him not to worry about the 
route, because the Malaysian drivers knew the route to the objective.  Satisfied that his 
commander had the situation under control, 2LT Hollis returned to and loaded his APC.  
He positioned himself directly behind the Malaysian driver, with his Radio-Telephone 
Operator (RTO) seated next to the side door, which offered a small view port.  From this 
position, 2LT Hollis had limited observation of what was to the front and one side of his 
APC (Hollis, 1998, p. 29; personal interview, MAJ Mark Hollis, November 17, 2003).   
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At 2256 hours, Casper reported problems with the Pakistanis and the order of 
movement.  With their better knowledge of the area, the Pakistani-driven M-48 tanks 
were supposed to lead the column the entire way to the Rangers.  The Pakistanis no 
longer wanted to lead without NVGs since they would have to use their white lights to 
navigate, which would make them easy targets for the Somalis.  This forced David to 
change his plan—the Malaysians would now lead with two APCs, with the Pakistanis 
immediately following.  Just before departing the New Port, the plan changed again, 
whereby the Pakistanis agreed to lead the convoy along the secured UN route as far as 
their first strongpoint along the route, Strongpoint 69.  Turning west on National Street, 
the Malaysian-driven Condors were to take the lead.  CPT Meyerowich had not briefed 
2LT Hollis on any of these changes to the originally briefed plan, and 2LT Hollis was 
still under the impression that the Pakistanis were leading the entire route (Hollis, 1998, 
p. 29; personal interview, MAJ Mark Hollis, November 17, 2003).   
Somewhere between 2310 and 2324 hours, TF David departed the New Port en 
route to the two crash sites.  Gore continued to coordinate the direct fire air support, and 
deconflict air space between TF Ranger and TF 2-25 helicopters.  TF 2-25’s SWT guided 
and covered the convoy’s movement up to Strongpoint 207, and then handed-off 
responsibilities to TF Ranger.  About one kilometer outside of the New Port, the 
Pakistani tanks encountered a roadblock,35 and the Pakistani commander refused to go 
through fearing Somalis had mined it.  1LT Mathews fired a magazine of 5.56mm 
ammunition into the roadblock, and told the commander to go through.  The Pakistanis 
reluctantly complied.  The convoy continued east to Checkpoint 77, and then turned north 
to Checkpoint 69.  At Checkpoint 69, the Pakistani brigade commander informed the 
battalion commander that he could no longer lead the column because they did not have 
NVGs.  Two of the three Malaysian APCs containing 2LT Hollis’ personnel then 
unknowingly assumed the lead of the convoy36 (Casper, 2001, p. 69). 
As the lead APC went 200 meters west down National Street to Strongpoint 207, 
the beginning of Habr Gidr territory manned by a UNOSOM M113 APC and a 
sandbagged position, all hell broke loose.  The Somalis began firing huge quantities of 
small arms and RPGs at the convoy.  The Somalis had once again initiated a deliberate 
ambush using extremely heavy rocket, mortar, and automatic weapons fire.  David’s 
subordinate leaders, clearly understanding the gravity of the situation and their 
commander's intent, immediately returned fire and continued to slowly advance down 
National Street’s gauntlet of destruction.  For roughly three hours, TF David fought a 
vicious battle until they reached their respective release points, and finally broke through 
                                                 
35 Debris scattered across Via Roma from the USMC HMMWV that had struck a mine that morning. 
36 Garrison wanted the QRF to take a more direct route using Tanzania Street from the New Port.  
Montgomery denied this request, and finally approved the route along Via Roma to the east, to Via Londra, 
then turning north at Checkpoint 77, going north on Via Jen Daaud through Pakistani Checkpoint 69, and 
finally turning west on National Street passing Pakistani Strongpoint 207 (Casper, 2001, p. 54). 
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to their objectives.  2LT Hollis heard numerous explosions outside his APC, and felt the 
shrapnel hitting the vehicle.  With Somali fires still heavy, by 2350 hours the TAC CP 
had reached the holding area and release point about 1200 meters past Strongpoint 207 on 
National Street (Hollis, 1998, p. 29).   
The lead Malaysian drivers reacted to the increased fire by erratically jerking the 
vehicle forward in an almost convulsive motion.  This violently threw around all of the 
U.S. passengers in the back of the APC.  The limited land navigation that 2LT Hollis had 
been able to maintain up until that point in time then became next to impossible, because 
every time he tried to look out the small port, he would be thrown in a different direction.  
Suddenly, and without warning, the APC increased its speed, and began to scale curbs 
and other obstacles in the road, which again threw the U.S. passengers around the back of 
the vehicle.  The Malaysians’ Platoon Commander, LT Zunaidi bin Hassan, had ordered 
the two APCs to move through the “kill zone” established by the Somali ambush.  
Unknown to 2LT Hollis at the time, both he and SGT Hollis’ APCs were breaking 
contact with the rest of the column.37  Hassan, unable to pass the tanks that were blocking 
the narrow road, and unable to see the lead APCs, got on the radio and told them to turn 
towards the objective (Hollis, 1998, p. 29; personal interview, MAJ Mark Hollis, 
November 17, 2003; Zakaria, 2000, pp. 33-34).  
Fortunately for the convoy, Meyerowich’s HMMWV placement as the third 
vehicle in the convoy was arguably the only thing that prevented the other Malaysian 
drivers from following the lead of the two runaway APCs.  Meyerowich knew the APCs 
had broken contact, but decided to continue on to his objective (Ferry, 1994, p. 28).  This 
unfortunate reaction by the Malaysian drivers effectively separated the two lead APCs 
from the remainder of the convoy.  2LT Hollis could not accurately maintain his bearing 
while bouncing around in the back of the APC, and coupled with the explosions outside, 
communications with his commander were virtually impossible.  Totally disoriented, and 
still unaware that they were now on their own, 2LT Hollis and his lead squad would not 
link up with their company until the next morning.  Plagued by confusion and a language 
barrier, the two APCs continued west on National Street, then went south instead of north 
                                                 
37 For a more detailed account of the Lost Platoon, see “Platoon Under Fire: Mogadishu, October 
1993,” by Captain Mark A. B. Hollis, Infantry Magazine, January-April 1998 edition. 
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after receiving heavy fire from the vicinity of the Olympic hotel at 2359 hours.   They 
continued moving south instead of north, probably attempting to return to the New Port 
facility (Hollis, 1998, p. 30; personal interview, MAJ Mark Hollis, November 17, 2003).  
The vehicles proceeded south roughly one kilometer beyond the southern crash 
site, when they entered a Somali ambush at approximately 0005 hours, near the Italian 
Compound, or Villa Italia.  RPG fire first impacted the lead vehicle directly into the 
driver’s compartment, mortally wounding the Malaysian driver.  At approximately 0007 
hours, Somalis also disabled the second APC with an RPG round placed into the engine 
compartment, on the right-hand side of the vehicle front.  2LT Hollis recalled that the 
blast felt as though someone had lifted the vehicle up and balanced it on a pedestal.  The 
APC seemed to teeter back and forth, the smell of an explosion filled the compartment, 
and a high-pitched ringing sound filled the ears of the APC’s occupants.  With their 
APCs disabled near the old presidential palace, 2LT Hollis would soon discover that the 
damage also resulted in the Malaysians losing radio contact with their company 
headquarters (Hollis, 1998, p. 30; personal interview, MAJ Mark Hollis, November 17, 
2003).     
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SGT Hollis, from inside his lead vehicle, immediately called 2LT Hollis 
requesting guidance.  At approximately 0011 hours, 2LT Hollis instructed him to assist in 
establishing security upon dismounting the APCs.  As 2LT Hollis opened the hatch and 
exited his APC, he observed the lengthy, inclined road down which he just had traveled.  
With no other vehicles behind him, it was then that he finally realized the gravity of his 
situation—his platoon was isolated on a hostile battlefield.  Instinctively, he turned to his 
RTO, SPC Keller, and said the legendary infantry leader’s phrase “Follow me.”  He 
moved to a building east of the vehicle, and occupied some low ground that existed on 
the south side of the building.  Still not wanting to accept the fact that he was isolated, 
2LT Hollis contacted SGT Hollis and told him to stay in his security position.  He then 
told SGT Hollis that he would take his group back up the inclined road to the north in an 
attempt to reestablish contact with friendly forces.  Keller’s persistent attempts to contact 
the company’s RTO were unsuccessful, probably because the low ground and buildings 
blocked their line-of-sight transmissions (Hollis, 1998, p. 30; personal interview, MAJ 
Mark Hollis, November 17, 2003).   
At approximately 0015 hours, 2LT Hollis led his platoon headquarters group and 
engineer team north.  After passing only two buildings, small-arms fire originating from 
the direction of travel began to intensify.  With the enemy fires intensifying the farther 
away he moved from SGT Hollis’ position, and with the fear of Somalis potentially 
dividing his forces, 2LT Hollis decided to return to SGT Hollis’s position.  Keller 
continued to have no success at reaching any friendly forces over the radio.  At 
approximately 0020 hours, 2LT Hollis led his element back to the initial ambush 
position, and reestablished local security.  Upon his return, the Malaysians from the trail 
APC finally decided to exit the vehicles and join the Americans in their security positions 
(Hollis, 1998, p. 30; personal interview, MAJ Mark Hollis, November 17, 2003).   
Desiring to improve his unit’s level of security, 2LT Hollis then turned to the 
engineer squad leader, SSG Maxwell, and while pointing to a wall, asked if he could 
make a hole in the wall surrounding an adjacent cluster of houses.  Upon Maxwell’s 
affirmation, 2LT Hollis contacted SGT Hollis, telling him of his plan to produce a hole in 
the compound, in order to establish security positions within the more protected 
compound.  At approximately 0030 hours, the charge’s blast did more than make a hole 
in the wall—it completely blew the wall over, as well as a small building on the other 
side of the wall.  2LT Hollis jumped up, sprinted across the street, and entered the 
compound while firing into the house.  With no fire returned, he then called for SGT 
Hollis to move his squad into the compound in order to establish a more defensible 
perimeter in the courtyard.  2LT Hollis later discovered that two adults and several 
children inhabited the house, but since the Somalis had positioned themselves in the back 
room of the house in a non-threatening manner, the Americans left them alone (Hollis, 
1998, pp. 30-31; personal interview, MAJ Mark Hollis, November 17, 2003).   
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On National Street, Somalis ambushed the Pakistani tanks with machine guns and 
7-10 RPG rounds, which were back in the lead since the two Malaysians took the wrong 
turn.  The tanks stopped to return fire, and it took several minutes for Mathews to get the 
column moving again.  The Pakistanis passed the road leading to the crash site, and 
secured the far west end of National Street.  At 0050 hours, Whetstone reported he was 
now 300-500 meters past Checkpoint 207.  At 0056 hours, a TF Ranger OH-58D, 
callsign King 57, reported that there was no friendly activity observed in the vicinity of 
the southern crash site.38  At 0103 hours, David gave Whetstone the order to depart the 
release point and move towards the southern objective after linking up with his guide 
OH-58D and after passing the vehicles parked to his front (personal communication, LTC 
Michael Whetstone, April 11, 2004). 
Back at the “Lost Platoon” at roughly 0130 hours, 2LT Hollis returned to Keller, 
only to discover that his RTO had still made no progress in contacting any friendly 
forces.  Out of pure frustration, 2LT Hollis removed the AN/PRC-77 radio from the 
rucksack, and disconnected the devices used for secure communications.  He then 
frantically transmitted unsecure, or “in the clear.”  His voice was “several octaves above 
normal…[with] speech so fast and his voice so high that he was barely audible” (Casper, 
2001, p. 74).  The first voice 2LT Hollis heard was that of David, who told the platoon 
leader “Keep doing what you’re doing.  You’re alive, and I will work on getting you 
out.”  After being told “to hold the course, remain steady, and keep pushing forward,” 
2LT Hollis briefly paused, then responded with a natural, calm voice, “Roger, Dragon 06, 
everything is under control” (p. 74; Hollis, 1998, p. 31).39 
David directed 2LT Hollis to contact Whetstone on Company C’s assigned radio 
frequency.  At about 0145 hours, 2LT Hollis and Whetstone first made contact on the 
radio, but suppressing the Somalis who had just disabled two of his APCs had Whetstone 
occupied.  Shortly after initially contacting friendly forces, CPL Parent, the Alpha Team 
Leader, informed 2LT Hollis that he heard screams of pain coming from the lead APC.  
When the Malaysians exited their vehicle earlier, they had left one of their wounded 
comrades in the APC, probably mistaking him for dead.  2LT Hollis directed Parent to go 
back to the APC and recover the wounded man.  Parent, courageously dashed into the kill 
zone, retrieved the mortally wounded soldier, and then attended to his wounds.  Shortly 
after Parent’s daring rescue, an AH-1F Cobra helicopter flew over the platoon at about 
                                                 
38 Shortly after TF Ranger's arrival, TF Raven chopped the Fort Hood-based OH-58Ds to TF Ranger.  
The OH-58D’s unique mast-mounted optics and FLIR could be “down-linked” directly to TF Ranger’s 
JOC (personal communication, BG (Ret.) Larry Casper, April 6, 2004). 
39 Hollis would later write of this communication with his seemingly calm battalion commander, 
whose voice was filled with confidence and strength as he instructed the young officer while speaking with 
an absence of emotion, “The leader must transmit all radio traffic in a calm voice.  Leaders trying to gain 
information will not understand jumbled transmissions, [therefore] the transmitter must speak slowly and 
clearly.  My Commander, LTC David, spoke clearly and effectively on the radio.  His transmissions 
inspired confidence and were even great calming influences” (Hollis, 1998, p. 33; Casper, 2001, p. 74).   
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0200 hours, while 2LT Hollis was requesting a “status” from Whetstone (Hollis, 1998, p. 
32; personal interview, MAJ Mark Hollis, November 17, 2003).     
By 0155 hours, Meyerowich reported linking-up with the Rangers at the northern 
crash site.  Whetstone reported that he was 100 meters from the southern objective [100 
meters away from Super 64] at 0158 hours.  Casper directed David to have his units 
move to the Pakistani camp in the soccer stadium upon their withdrawal.  At 0228 hours, 
Whetstone reported being on the southern objective, at the crash site.  At this time, all 
elements had reached their objectives.  Whetstone then had to fight his way to the actual 
crash site while dismounted.  Company C with TF Ranger attachments went on to search 
the wreckage and the areas surrounding the southern crash site, and found nothing but 
multiple blood trails headed in several different directions as they called out the names of 
the isolated TF Ranger personnel.  By approximately 0245 hours, Company C had 
recovered all remaining sensitive items from the aircraft, and placed “thermite” grenades 
to destroy what remained of the helicopter (personal communication, LTC Michael 
Whetstone, April 9 and 11, 2004).  At 0244 hours, Meyerowich had requested more 
APCs to transport the additional 90+ TF Ranger personnel, and advised that if not 
provided, the overflow personnel would walk to Pakistani Stadium. 
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While returning back to the APCs in order to begin the process of consolidation, 
reorganization, and establishing a better defensive position, Whetstone had the idea of 
using star clusters to locate the “Lost Platoon.”  In order to determine a general distance 
from his current location, Whetstone directed the platoon leader to fire a red star cluster 
signaling device (personal telephone interview, LTC Michael Whetstone, April 7, 2004).  
At approximately 0250 hours, 2LT Hollis fired the star cluster, unintentionally 
illuminating some of Whetstone’s 1st Platoon near the southern objective.  This 
illumination inadvertently silhouetted the soldiers, and resulted in the Somalis increasing 
their fires on the newly identified defensive positions (Scott Hilliard, personal telephone 
interview, 5 April 2004).  Whetstone then fired a green star cluster at approximately 0255 
hours, and the two agreed that no more than 1,000 meters separated them.  Whetstone 
then informed 2LT Hollis that he should remain in place, and that he would work on 
moving his company toward 2LT Hollis’ platoon (Hollis, 1998, p. 31; personal interview, 
MAJ Mark Hollis, November 17, 2003).   
Meanwhile, at 0307 hours, Casper reported to Gile at the JOC, that the Terminator 
element, minus one platoon, was still on the northern objective and had recovered all 
killed (KIA) and wounded (WIA) except the trapped pilot.  Casper also informed Gile 
that David had instructed the Terminator element not to leave the site until they had 
recovered the last body, and that the Tiger element at the southern objective had no 
contact with any TF Ranger elements.  At approximately 0300 hours, Whetstone directed 
2LT Hollis to move north and attempt to link-up with Whetstone’s lead platoon, which 
would attempt to move south.  2LT Hollis immediately summoned SGT Hollis and 
Maxwell, and from 0300-0315 hours, they formulated a plan to move north.  The final 
plan was for Maxwell’s engineers to lead, followed by 2LT Hollis and his M-60 
machinegun team, the Malaysians, and finally SGT Hollis’ squad.  Concurrently, 
Whetstone directed that one squad from LT James K. Haynes’ 1st Platoon, the closest unit 
to 2LT Hollis, be sent out as a recon element to determine if there was an alternate route 
to reach the isolated platoon.  Upon his return, SSG Tewes’ reported that there was only 
one route to 2LT Hollis, and that if the company attempted to move along that route 
dismounted, that there would be a high number of casualties given the intense 
concentration of Somalis between their two locations.  Around 0315 hours, Whetstone 
asked the Malaysian Company A Commander, Major Ab Aziz bin Ab Latiff, to “borrow” 
a couple of his APCs to affect the recovery of 2LT Hollis’s platoon.  After Aziz had 
asked for permission, which his battalion commander denied, he informed Whetstone that 
he was sorry, but that he was not authorized to offer any assistance (personal telephone 
interview, LTC Michael Whetstone, April 6, 2004; personal communication, LTC 
Michael Whetstone, April 7, 2004; Hollis, 1998, p. 32; personal interview, MAJ Mark 
Hollis, November 17, 2003). 
Shortly after that, at approximately 0325 hours, 2LT Hollis contacted 
Meyerowich to inform him that he was beginning his movement north.  Whetstone had 
explained to 2LT Hollis that he was having trouble moving south, and that the enemy 
resistance between the two units was too great for his dismounted company to move 
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through without sustaining significant casualties.40  David reported to the QRF TOC at 
0337 hours, that Somalis had hit three or possibly four APCs, and that one or more was 
still burning.  Soon after the Lost Platoon began its movement north, the engineers moved 
past the garage where 2LT Hollis had moved to immediately following the ambush.  2LT 
Hollis positioned himself on the corner of the garage facing north.  The Malaysians 
moved past 2LT Hollis’ position, moving closer to the engineers, when all of a sudden a 
Somali stepped out from an alley, and unloaded his weapon into the lead element at 
approximately 0340 hours.  SGT Hollis eventually killed the Somali, but not before the 
Somali shot SGT Cornell Houston in the chest, PFC Xiong Ly in the back, and Maxwell 
in the knee.  Now 2LT Hollis had two casualties who were  “litter priority,” two 
casualties who were “litter urgent,” and eight casualties who were “walking wounded” 
(Hollis, 1998, p. 32; personal interview, MAJ Mark Hollis, November 17, 2003).   
As 2LT Hollis had to be thinking things could not get any worse, they did.  At 
about 0348 hours, another Somali started engaging the platoon from across an open lot to 
the north.  2LT Hollis desperately needed help.  Yelling to his RTO, 2LT Hollis directed 
Keller to contact Whetstone and inform him of the platoon’s status, and to request 
immediate transportation out.  Keller made the call at about 0355 hours, and was 
informed at 0400 hours that the Malaysians were in route, and that TF Ranger “Little 
Birds” were on station to support the link-up.  Aziz had finally grown tired of listening to 
his battalion commander telling them to stay put, while his fellow Malaysians were 
seriously wounded at 2LT Hollis’ location.  Just as Whetstone had his entire company 
ready to move dismounted towards 2LT Hollis’ platoon, fully recognizing that he would 
certainly sustain numerous casualties along the 1,000-meter gauntlet of Somali fires to 
his south, Aziz pointed to Whetstone, signaling to him that he wanted Whetstone to keep 
his unit in place.  Aziz then disobeyed a direct order from his battalion commander as he 
ordered his Number 3 Platoon leader, 2LT Muhammad Juraimy bin Aripin, to prepare to 
                                                 
40 Given the heavy volume of fires along the road 2LT Hollis’ APCs had initially traveled, CPT 
Whetstone assumed that 2LT Hollis would understand that he was to move north using an alternate route.  
Not understanding what CPT Whetstone intended, 2LT Hollis opted to use the known and most expedient 
route to CPT Whetstone’s position (personal communication, LTC Michael Whetstone, April 7, 2004; 
personal communication, MAJ Mark Hollis, April 19, 2004).  Arguably, this was also the most dangerous 
route given the consistent levels of Somali activity throughout the night. 
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move his APCs to 2LT Hollis’ position.41  Aziz pointed at Whetstone, and then into the 
night sky, indicating that he wanted Whetstone to have aircraft provide covering fires 
during his movement.  While synchronizing the recovery of 2LT Hollis’ platoon, 
Whetstone had already requested and coordinated AH-6 support from King 56 and King 
57 (two of the orbiting OH-58Ds attached to TF Ranger).  This would augment the AH-
1F “mini-gun” fires that he had been requesting since arriving at the southern objective 
(personal telephone interview, LTC Michael Whetstone, April 6, 2004; personal 
communication, LTC Michael Whetstone, April 7, 2004; Hollis, 1998, p. 32; personal 
interview, MAJ Mark Hollis, November 17, 2003). 
Whetstone directed 2LT Hollis to use the M-203’s parachute flares to mark the 
buildings of known enemy locations surrounding the extraction point.  Shouting over to 
SGT Hollis, 2LT Hollis asked him if he could mark the building with a flare.  Getting an 
affirmative reply from SGT Hollis, 2LT Hollis directed his RTO to inform the pilots that 
he was marking the building with an M-203 flare.  SGT Hollis shot the flare at 
approximately 0405 hours, but hit the wrong building.  The AH-6 made one pass, and 
destroyed the marked building with its mini-guns and rockets.  2LT Hollis then had his 
RTO inform the pilots that he would now mark the building with 5.56mm tracer rounds.  
Standing up from behind the stoop, 2LT Hollis emptied an entire magazine of tracers into 
the building at approximately 0410 hours.  The AH-6 approached perpendicular to the 
platoon’s location, fired the 7.62mm “gatling gun,” then the 2.75-inch rockets, and the 
building disappeared (Hollis, 1998, p. 32; personal interview, MAJ Mark Hollis, 
November 17, 2003).   
As Juraimy’s Condors began moving south towards 2LT Hollis’ platoon at about 
0410 hours, Whetstone called in eight to ten more AH-6 and AH-1F mini-gun and rocket 
runs to keep the route cleared for the APCs.  Without the 20-30 minutes of aerial fire-
support, the recovery APCs would likely have met the same fate as the two APCs already 
destroyed at 2LT Hollis’ location; the sheer volume of Somali fires between the two units 
                                                 
41 There is some discrepancy as to the number of APCs that Juraimy led to Hollis’ position.  From 
personal interviews, both MAJ Hollis and LTC Whetstone recall that it was two APCs.  Casper (2001) and 
the MALBATT accounts both recall that it was three APCs.  LTC Whetstone conceded  “In the heat of the 
mess at the time, getting the company back in defensive mode, I [guess I could have] missed a vehicle” 
(personal communication, LTC Michael Whetstone, May 4, 2004).   
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was highly lethal for most of the night.  Before they departed, Whetstone had told Aziz to 
go to the chemical lights, or “chemlights,” which 2LT Hollis would emplace to mark the 
pick-up location.  SGT Hollis had marked the road with green chemlights by 0420 hours, 
and both 2LT Hollis and SGT Hollis had prepared the highly concentrated (HC) smoke 
grenades.  The plan was to ignite the HC smoke grenades once the APCs had moved to 
their position and turned around, allowing the cloud of thick smoke to sufficiently build 
so as to cover their movement before advancing toward the vehicles (personal telephone 
interview, LTC Michael Whetstone, April 6, 2004; personal communication, LTC 
Michael Whetstone, April 7, 2004; Hollis, 1998, pp. 32-33; personal interview, MAJ 
Mark Hollis, November 17, 2003). 
Juraimy’s Condors arrived at the chemlight extraction point just before 0430 
hours.  The language became a problem once more, because 2LT Hollis had planned on 
the drivers turning their APCs around before he was to enter the vehicles.  2LT Hollis 
was concerned that the vehicles would attempt to continue moving south, back into the 
ambush site, thinking that that route was the quickest way back to the New Port.  After 
having little luck at getting the vehicles to turn around, one of the Malaysians who had 
been with the platoon all night finally understood what 2LT Hollis wanted and started 
yelling in Malaysian to the drivers, who faced the vehicles north at about 0435 hours 
(Hollis, 1998, p. 32; personal interview, MAJ Mark Hollis, November 17, 2003).  While 
this occurred, the TF 2-14 TOC reported at 0431 hours, for QRF HQ to be prepared to 
receive for 40-50 wounded soldiers. 
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After the “Lost Platoon” quickly mounted the vehicles during the daring recovery 
with APCs, Whetstone finally physically linked-up with the 2LT Hollis at the southern 
crash site between 0445 and 0450 hours.  Whetstone immediately began the process of 
ensuring 100 percent accountability while loading the remaining vehicles for withdraw.  
At about 0515 hours, Whetstone began his planned withdrawal to Strongpoint 207, but 
the Malaysians had other ideas, as they began receiving conflicting instructions from 
their chain of command en route to Strongpoint 207.  At 0524 hours, MAJ Craig Nixon, 
the TF Ranger LNO collocated with David, reported that the Malaysian APCs returning 
from the southern objective were out of Whetstone’s control as they passed Strongpoint 
207 heading for the Pakistani Stadium.  David’s planned withdrawal had all elements 
linking up at Strongpoint 207 in order to perform an orderly and covered withdrawal.  In 
the back of the APC, Whetstone knew what the plan was, but was not able to control the 
drivers.  When he strongly suggested to his driver to stop, the Malaysian pointed to his 
earpiece, as if to suggest that he was only following the orders he was receiving over his 
radio net.  At that point, it was already too late—there was no turning the APCs around 
before they reached the stadium (personal telephone interview, LTC Michael Whetstone, 
April 6, 2004; personal communication, LTC Michael Whetstone, April 9, 2004; Hollis, 
1998, p. 32; personal interview, MAJ Mark Hollis, November 17, 2003).  Whetstone and 
2LT Hollis’ Lost Platoon arrived at the Pakistani Stadium at 0530 hours. 
C. ANALYSIS 
1. Relative Superiority 
Analyzing Whetstone’s recovery of the “Lost Platoon,” in accordance with the 
SOF-specific overt urban PR model, the authors argue that the QRC’s successes directly 
correlate with its ability to quickly gain and maintain RS throughout the battle.  The RS 
diagram shown in Figure 12 graphically represents how the vastly outnumbered QRC 
entered the engagement already having RS Recovery Force because of the overwhelming 
organic and supporting firepower at their disposal, relative freedom of movement and 
protection provided by the APCs, and their access to an OH-58 “guide” to assist in 
navigation.  The QRC also reaped the benefits of security and surprise by not allowing 
the Somalis to preempt the attack, and by taking advantage of the Somalis’ 
vulnerabilities, through the application of overwhelming organic and supporting 
firepower at its disposal.  After completing his primary mission of locating and searching 
the southern crash site, Whetstone was then able to focus on his new recovery mission 
while he waited on Terminator Company to recover the last body at the northern 
objective.  The Tiger Company never lost its RS Recovery Force once at the crash site, 
because it applied the principles of surprise, repetition, and purpose by quickly 
establishing fire superiority and then setting up a defensible position.  Once Aziz 
committed his APCs, recovery forces executed the simple plan quickly, and with 
overwhelming coordinated aviation fire-support, to gain security over the numerically  
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superior Somalis.  Moreover, since recovery forces executed the plan with surprise, 
speed, and purpose, the recovery forces overcame the lack of specific rehearsals for the 
operation. 
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Figure 12.   Authors’ RS Recovery Force Graph for the “Tiger” Company, 3-4 October 1993 
 
   
Analyzing the RS Isolated Personnel of the “Lost Platoon,” in accordance with the SOF-
specific overt urban PR model, the authors argue that the cumulative survival and 
recovery of the platoon facilitated its ability to gain and maintain RS Isolated Personnel 
primarily by capitalizing on the principles of adaptability and exploitation.  Adhering to 
these principles allowed the platoon to gain protection and concealment when it secured 
and occupied the courtyard.  As is shown in the attainment, sustainment, and subsequent 
loss of RS Isolated Personnel in Figure 13, only when the platoon moved in the open did it 
violate the principle of adaptability and lose RS Isolated Personnel by placing itself at the 
mercy of its committed Somali pursuers.   
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Figure 13.   Authors’ RS Isolated Personnel Graph for the Lost Platoon, 3-4 October 1993 
 
In the end, the platoon was finally able to gain a decisive advantage over the 
Somalis, not by disappearing into the urban landscape, but by removing themselves from 
the urban landscape via an APC extraction.  Only the armored vehicles and 
accompanying aviation fire-support allowed the platoon to gain a decisive advantage over 
the Somalis, because the number of wounded effectively removed the possibility of the 
platoon disappearing into the urban landscape.  Had the APCs and AH-6s not shown up 
to support when they did, the platoon’s failure to apply the principle of adaptability 
resulting in a loss of RS Isolated Personnel, coupled with its ratio of wounded to capable 
fighters, would likely have resulted in many more casualties and possibly its total 
elimination by the determined Somalis.  Fortunately, the platoon “disappeared” and 
achieved RS Isolated Personnel at the same time—when it boarded the two APCs.  Figure 13 
depicts the final stage of the recovery as the vertical rise in the probability of mission 
completion—which crossed the RS line only at the point of mission completion.  Mission 
completion is determined at the point where the platoon was no longer responsible for its 
own welfare, when it successfully boarded the APCs. 
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2. Principles Necessary for the Overt Recovery Force’s Successful 
Operations 
a. Simplicity 
From the standpoint of limiting the number of tactical objectives to only 
those that are vital, the mission given to Whetstone could have been anything but simple.  
Whetstone’s primary objective was to break through to the southern crash site, secure the 
area, search for survivors or remains, recover any sensitive items, and finally destroy the 
aircraft.  And while this was being accomplished, Whetstone was responsible for 
coordinating air support from two aviation task forces, communicating in sign language 
to his Malaysian counterpart, stabilizing his wounded, and establishing a hasty defensive 
position while the Terminator element worked on recovering the pilot still pinned in his 
aircraft.  Fortunately, much of this was already completed or in motion by the time David 
informed Whetstone that there was an isolated platoon near him.  Thus, when given the 
order to recover the lost platoon, Whetstone had only one tactical objective. 
Whetstone had no good intelligence or information on the location of the 
Lost Platoon.  He used an innovative tactic of firing star clusters in order to determine the 
rough location and distance from his current position at the southern crash site.  Once 
Whetstone assessed the threat in moving dismounted to 2LT Hollis’ location, he realized 
that his best chance for a successful recovery lay with using the APCs.  While APCs were 
not organic assets in his light infantry company, Whetstone quickly realized that only 
armored “technology,” coupled with surprise from the lethal and precise aviation mini-
gun suppression, would allow him to break through the heavy Somali defenses arrayed 
between their two positions.  Whetstone’s use of coalition partners and dominant aviation 
assets eliminated obstacles that would have otherwise compromised and complicated the 
rapid execution of the mission. 
b. Security 
It would be a fair assumption to believe that the Somalis thought that a 
recovery force would use the “main” road that the APCs did eventually use to conduct 
the recovery and extraction.  It was not the impending mission that Whetstone needed to 
conceal, but the timing and method of insertion for his recovery forces.  The Somalis had 
no prior knowledge of the time or method of attack that Whetstone would use—they were 
83 
merely prepared and waiting.  In the end, the lack of knowledge about the timing or 
method of the rescue attempt precluded the Somalis from preparing another vehicular 
ambush, preempting the attack, or reducing the speed of the APCs at the extraction point.  
The use of the AH-6 “Little Birds,” in particular, dramatically increased the probability 
of the success of the insertion method, and ensured the ability of the rescue force to 
maintain their RS Recovery Force by taking away the Somalis’ ability to react to the recovery 
attempt. 
c. Repetition 
In the case of the IP evading capture in the urban environment, extensive 
mission–specific rehearsals are impractical given the desire to affect recovery prior to 
capture.  The QRC’s routine and standard operation procedures (SOPs) served as the 
essential rehearsals necessary for successful PR missions.  As was the case in the UH-60 
recovery mission of 25 September 1993, the preparation phase for this operation was in 
Whetstone’s unit training plan.  The QRC conducted no specific or “full-dress” rehearsals 
before deploying into the “Black Sea.”  This was a “standard mission profile” for a 
properly trained QRC, though the conditions under which the QRC conducted the 
mission could not have been any worse.  The QRC’s SOPs had reinforced the routine 
nature of its quick-reaction operations.  Whetstone’s company was still at a high-level of 
readiness and training, especially the individual skills necessary for surviving the urban 
battlefield of Mogadishu.  If one could consider the 25 September mission a rehearsal for 
the “Battle of the Black Sea,” then everything Whetstone was doing throughout the 
evening and early morning of 3-4 October had already been rehearsed, only eight days 
prior.  Lessons learned on 25 September, implemented by Whetstone to refine his 
company’s SOPs, as well as his tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs) for urban 
combat and recovery operations, proved their value during this battle.   
d. Surprise 
As McRaven defined it, special operations seek to gain surprise through 
deception, timing, and taking advantage of the enemy’s vulnerabilities.  The main tactic 
that caught the Somalis off guard was the amount of suppressive fires that the AH-6 
“Little Bird” brought to the fight as the recovery forces moved to the Lost Platoon’s 
location.  The Somalis were certain that the recovery force would have to move to 2LT 
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Hollis’ physical location, so Whetstone, once again, was not afforded the luxury of 
attacking the Somalis where they were unprepared.  As he had done on 25 September, 
Whetstone did not attempt to deceive the Somalis in order to gain a slight advantage, nor 
did he attempt to throw the Somalis off as to the timing of the attack.  Once again, he 
exploited the Somalis’ vulnerabilities to AH-6’s mini-guns.  The poorly constructed 
buildings used by the Somali fighters to form a gauntlet of lead between the two units 
provided little protection from the accurate and lethal aerial firepower that Whetstone 
synchronized with the APC employment.  This weakness of the Somali defensive 
preparations, taken advantage of only days earlier in a similar situation, offered an 
exploitable weakness that the recovery force used to achieve its surprise.  Since the main 
effort for the recovery was elsewhere in the city, and compounded by the fact that 
helicopters had rarely over flown their location up until that point, the recovery forces 
used the principle of surprise through the use of concentrated and overwhelming aerial 
suppression from the nimble AH-6s.  
e. Speed 
Somalis in the “Black Sea” area only wanted to counter the QRF’s attack 
to break through to the two crash sites.  Knowing this well beforehand, the QRF moved 
as quickly as possible and without regard to the enemy’s reaction, except in the cases 
where UNOSOM forces refused to quickly move through roadblocks for fear of mines.  
TF David gained and maintained RS Recovery Force despite the Somalis’ best efforts, 
primarily because the attacking forces moved with sufficient speed to their respective 
objectives, such that the Somalis’ reaction was not an overriding factor.  As is the case 
with most special operations missions, speed is gained by using small and lightly-armed 
forces, which are generally unable to sustain action against a conventional enemy for 
long periods of time—the fact that the Somalis were not a conventional military force 
made achieving RS Recovery Force that much easier.  This was not the case with TF David; 
with more relative strength came the ability to sacrifice some speed on the objective in 
order to extend the duration of the battle, and accept the number of goals that they had to 
achieve. 
As for the principle of speed with regard to Whetstone’s specific mission 
to recover the Lost Platoon, it is more similar to a special operation, in that it involved 
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direct and immediate contact with the Somalis, and minutes and seconds could have 
determined the difference between success and failure.  In the very specific case of 2LT 
Hollis’ recovery, Whetstone’s forces quickly achieved RS Recovery Force, and the APCs 
completed the actual recovery mission in well under thirty minutes.  With only two 
APCs, the recovery force gained speed using a small, lightly armed force.  Without the 
assistance of the aviation firepower to suppress the Somali firing positions along the 
gauntlet, the APCs would have been unable to sustain action for any significant amount 
of time.  This less than robust strength greatly restricted the goals that recovery forces 
could have accomplished, and resulted in limiting the duration of the sustainable combat.   
f. Purpose 
David, upon informing Whetstone that he would need to recover the “Lost 
Platoon” emphasized the point that the QRF would leave behind no American.  In the 
initial stages of planning the recovery, while Aziz’ higher headquarters still denied him 
permission to assist, Whetstone formed a plan in which he would maneuver roughly half 
of his company down to 2LT Hollis’ location.  Right before Aziz said he would conduct 
the rescue, those QRC soldiers preparing to attempt the rescue stood up, and looked down 
the gauntlet of relentless tracer and RPG fires.  Even though Whetstone knew that he 
would take casualties, everyone understood that the QRF would leave no American 
behind.  More than twelve hours after their first combat in that battle, and without 
concern for their own personal safety, the company’s willingness to put it all on the line 
for their fellow “Golden Dragons” clearly demonstrated a sense of personal dedication 
that knew no limits. 
3. Principles Necessary for the Isolated Personnel’s Success 
a. Communication 
Initially 2LT Hollis had no communication with anyone, though his 
commanders knew that he was isolated somewhere on the battlefield.  After he finally 
radioed David, by transmitting in the clear, 2LT Hollis was finally able to make his status 
and general location known.  With no knowledge of where the “Lost Platoon” had finally 
ended up, the QRF would never have launched a recovery force given the hostile 
environment.  The use of a star cluster to convey 2LT Hollis’ general location and 
distance from the recovery force greatly facilitated his recovery.  2LT Hollis also 
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significantly assisted his recovery when he marked enemy locations for the AH-6’s with 
M-203 parachute flares, and by marking the extraction point with chemlights.  Without 
these communication aids, the AH-6 could not have engaged the most dangerous 
Somalis, and the Malaysians would not have been as secure in their mission without 
knowing how the extraction point was marked. 
b. Adaptability 
2LT Hollis was able to blend in with his environment only so far with the 
number of isolated personnel under his control.  2LT Hollis inadvertently took advantage 
of the best camouflage available by hiding in plain sight in the courtyard, while 
occupying a defensible position.  This was an extremely limited use of adaptability, as 
defined for this thesis.  While moving out of plain sight did remove the easy targets for 
the Somalis, many of their pursuers still knew where the platoon had relocated.  On both 
occasions that the platoon attempted to move dismounted, they violated the principle of 
adaptability, and subsequently lost RS Isolated Personnel, resulting in drawing huge volumes of 
Somali fires.  In the final move north, failure to follow this principle resulted in three 
serious injuries.  Moving north via a different route might have resulted in a different 
outcome.  Had the AH-6’s and recovery forces not arrived as soon as they did after 2LT 
Hollis’ unit took those three serious injuries, the failure to apply this principle would 
have likely resulted in severe limitations to the platoon’s ability to react and defend itself 
against the Somalis. 
c. Exploitation 
Given the number of casualties that 2LT Hollis’ platoon had sustained, 
there were limits to what they could exploit.  The most significant advantage that the 
platoon leader gained was by taking advantage of his engineers, who blew a hole in the 
wall so that the platoon could move out of the direct line of Somali fire.  While both 
opportunistic and resourceful of 2LT Hollis, it did not put time and space between his 
unit and the Somalis in pursuit.  What it did do was allow the platoon to “disappear” from 
plain sight.  Evidence that this was successful at fooling many of the Somalis as to their 
actual location, was demonstrated by the actions of the Somalis during most of the 
morning, who continued focusing on the APCs instead of the courtyard:   
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Their favorite action was to stand off and lob RPG’s at the compound.  I 
counted no less than ten RPG impacts within a one minute period, and this 
kept up throughout the night. … [but] the vehicles were still the favorite 
targets for the gunners.  The sound from my vehicle was like a mad 
popcorn machine (Hollis, 1998, p. 32). 
Under the circumstances, the shock value of the bold and audacious 
behavior demonstrated by the attempt to move north while dismounted did not succeed in 
gaining an advantage in time and space against the Somalis.  These Somalis were not 
hesitant or uncommitted adversaries, but they erroneously believed that they had the 
upper hand on the isolated platoon—even though they were unable and unsuccessful in 
harming the platoon once in the courtyard.  2LT Hollis would have been wise to use 
some type of tactical deception to divert attention away from his dismounted movement, 
but even that would probably not have worked given the constraints.  The optimal 
exploitation under the circumstances and given the injuries to his soldiers would have 
been for 2LT Hollis to either refuse to move his platoon dismounted, and to wait for 
recovery forces to arrive, or to move north along another route.   
d. The Gonzales Principle 
2LT Hollis, as a new officer and leader, had only begun to learn his job 
when he deployed to Somalia.  Before this, 2LT Hollis had little exposure to realistic 
peacetime training.  This greatly reduced his pool of resources of exploitable human 
capital that had been developed, enhanced, or optimized.  However, 2LT Hollis did 
capitalize on the limited training that he had experienced, as he recounted: 
I did not conduct the train-up with 2d Platoon; I only refined and continued 
the training once we deployed.  For me, Ranger school was the best, most 
realistic training for combat.  I graduated from the Ranger course, went on 
leave for two weeks, and then arrived at the battalion.  Ranger training 
gave me the ability to look beyond my physical and mental exhaustion and 
make the tough decisions (Hollis, 1998, pp. 33-34). 
The ability to quickly assess and appraise a crisis, evaluate alternatives, 
and decide on an appropriate solution only gets better with rehearsals and training.  Rapid 
crisis decision-making executed poorly, such as risking movement or contact at the 
wrong place or time, can mean the difference between evading and escaping.  The 
decision to attempt the move north without the aid of aviation fire-support platforms, or 
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without the protection of armored vehicles, placed the platoon in an extremely vulnerable 
position.  There was no imminent threat requiring the platoon to move to the north given 
the lack of effective Somali fires they received while in the courtyard.  Another option 
available to 2LT Hollis would have been to advise Whetstone that moving dismounted 
with casualties was not a supportable course of action given the enemy situation. 
The second element of the Gonzales principle, employing the acquired 
proficiency to survive and evade, was extremely limited due to 2LT Hollis’ newness to 
the military.  After the experience, 2LT Hollis realized the importance of becoming the 
“smart evader,” and the necessity of taking advantage of all training opportunities before 
combat.  He wished he had taken more advantage of the opportunities given to him 
during the Infantry Officer Basic Course (IOBC): 
Doctrine states that we should train as we fight and fight as we train.  I 
remember going through the Infantry Officer Basic Course and learning 
about the Bradley fighting vehicle, thinking to myself, “Why is this 
important?  I am going to be a ‘light’ fighter.”  But the concepts taught 
about maneuver with mechanized forces were important, and I should 
have paid closer attention to them. …The location from which I chose to 
command and control our vehicles’ movement was unsatisfactory.  I 
learned that I should avoid any location where my field of view is limited.  
If I had taken the assistant driver’s position instead, I would have known 
immediately when my element broke contact with the rest of the company 
(Hollis, 1998, p. 33). 
Whetstone also believes that newness was a factor but stated that “[Hollis] and I have 
evolved.  Our institutional knowledge is a key factor in survival or recovery operations.” 
Whetstone thinks that the sum total of his experiences contributed to his survival and 
allowed him to pass on valuable lessons learned.  He stated that it would have been 
harder for 2LT Hollis to think through the numerous variables than it was for him.  If he 
were the IP, Whetstone alleged that he would have evaded through the shantytown where 
he could have better controlled the outcome.  “It would have been longer but we would 
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VI. MODELING NONCONVENTIONAL ASSISTED 
RECOVERY 
A. RELATIVE SUPERIORITY 
As illustrated in Figure 25 (Appendix A), nonconventional assisted recovery 
(NAR) is an operation uniquely created for high threat scenarios when conventional 
methods are infeasible to affect personnel recovery.  The urban environment is not only 
an area of high threat, but also becoming an area with a higher probability of isolated 
personnel events.  Urban environments contain the preponderance of targets for strategic 
air assets, have the highest population concentrations for peacekeeping operations, and 
fall upon key lines of communication.   Recovery forces in this environment must be able 
to gain and maintain RS Recovery Force to have a chance at being effective against the 
increased number of adversaries. 
While McRaven’s theory and model for special operations is more appropriate for 
direct action (DA) scenarios, this chapter will show how to implicitly apply it to NAR, a 
sub-mission of unconventional warfare.  In his conclusion McRaven states, 
The best approach, of course, is to enter the engagement with relative 
superiority . . .. This reduces the possible area of vulnerability because half 
of what constitutes [the] area of vulnerability—that is the will of the 
enemy—is not present (p. 382).  
Figure 14 is an example of McRaven’s model that illustrates when forces attain RS 
before engagement.  The following paragraphs explain how this model can apply to NAR 
operations.   
McRaven uses stealth as a potential example of how to attain RS before entering 
an engagement.  NAR operations are clandestine by nature, and depend on the presence 
of Special Forces or indigenous surrogates that comprise a recovery mechanism (RM) 
network.  By establishing this network before the onset of hostilities, or at the very 
minimum before an isolated personnel event, the RM enters the graph well above the line 
of RS.  The earlier the network is established and operating in the area of interest, the 




Figure 14.   Example of Entering the Engagement with RS. (From McRaven, 1996, p. 383). 
 
Once an isolated personnel event occurs, the progress of the graph along the x-
axis will differ from the way that McRaven’s does concerning time.  The primary reason 
for this is that the basis for McRaven’s model is DA missions where time is a critical 
factor.  NAR missions, a subset of unconventional warfare missions, by their nature are 
protracted.  The principle of speed is still important, but generally only during the phase 
where linkup of the evader and the RM occurs; this is particularly crucial in urban 
situations.  Following that particular phase, speed may not only be unnecessary, but 
dangerous.  McRaven noted that his RS graph is not a quantitative mission analysis.  He 
always expressed the timeline across the horizontal axis quantitatively, though, in his 
case studies.  Since it would be impossible to quantify a NAR model in terms of hours, 
days, weeks, or even months, this model will illustrate RS with respect to NAR specified 
tasks rather than actual time.  The numbers across the bottom of the graph are arbitrary 
and simply show ordinal progression as illustrated in Figure 15. 
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Figure 15.   Authors’ model for RS Recovery Mechanism 
 
B.  PRINCIPLES SUPPORTING RELATIVE SUPERIORITY FOR THE 
RECOVERY MECHANISM 
As discussed earlier, McRaven lists six principles required to gain RS.  Just as in 
the case of the RS graph, this study modifies these principles in two ways in order to 
apply them to the unconventional aspects of NAR operations.  First, the structure 
illustrating the integration of the principles is different.  Unlike DA operations that 
precariously balance themselves on the apex of simplicity, NAR operations sit on a base 
of long-term vision.  Due to the risks of sponsoring such clandestine operations, this 
vision originates at the strategic level of decision-making.  Vision supports the 
operational base of a simple and reliable command, control, communications, computers, 
and intelligence (C4I) infrastructure that, in turn, support the tactical apex of four 
principles that support each other in the execution of NAR operations.  Note that the 
model progresses from the strategic and operational foundations of the program (vision 
and C4I) to the tactical execution of an operation (trust, security, flexibility, and access).  























Figure 17.   NAR-specific principles necessary to achieve RS Recovery Mechanism (top view). 
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This model derives many of its principles from various U.S. and foreign military 
doctrinal sources.  Vision and trust, however, are not comparable to typical military 
principles of warfare.  Case study research and interviews with contemporary planners 
for NAR operations during recent conflicts helped derive the principles that the following 
paragraphs define in application to the model. In addition, this study further references 
RS, with regard to NAR operations, as RS Recovery Mechanism and RS Isolated Personnel in order to 
prevent confusion.   
C. DEFINITIONS OF RECOVERY MECHANISM PRINCIPLES 
1. Vision 
Vision is essential to establish an effective and enduring NAR program.  
Maintaining vision is important to participants at all levels of operations, from decision 
makers to operational executors.  This vision is the building block of a NAR program and 
forms the base of this model.  Two critical aspects of vision include long-term 
conceptualization and innovative thinking. 
Long-term conceptualization is critical due to the clandestine and protracted 
nature of NAR operations.  First, preparing the battlespace in advance of combat 
operations is crucial.  Since predicting actual combat operations well in advance is 
difficult at best, a continuous global presence of NAR RMs in high-risk areas is the 
optimal strategy.  Secondly, early presence and consistent commitment of resources will 
facilitate the formation of a sound and appropriately protracted strategy for NAR 
operations. 
  Extending the vision from immediate combat operations to sustained 
maintenance and improvement of NAR infrastructure will be crucial to its success.  Some 
may argue that existing intelligence networks perform the same basic functions as a NAR 
mechanism, and therefore, a dedicated NAR network is an unnecessary and costly 
venture.  While this argument may seem reasonable for a peacetime scenario, since 
domestic priorities typically dominate the demand for resources, history illustrates how 
the demand for intelligence sources in a crisis surpasses their availability.  Therefore, if 
the military continues to claim that personnel recovery is one of its highest priorities, it 
should consider a dedicated NAR infrastructure in those areas deemed as high risk.  Early 
preparation of NAR infrastructure in any particular theater will provide for integration 
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and coordination that are more efficient in establishing RMs and networks. This is partly 
because increased interaction with RM personnel would lead to stronger, more prudently 
developed trust bonds within the RM.  This increased trust allows for more timely and 
efficient execution during combat operations.42  The actual time involved in creating an 
effective RM will vary based on environment, existing formal and informal relations with 
the area, and amount of resources available. 
Employing people who possess strong innovative capabilities is also important to 
implementing a long-term strategy.  Leaders who cannot break existing paradigms cannot 
hope to effectively combat an adversary who understands the benefits of employing 
innovative and asymmetric strategies.  This is evident throughout history and the 
evaluation of the conventional ways of thinking that initially derailed recovery operations 
during World War II (WWII) will illustrate the point. 
By breaking conventional paradigms with innovative thinking, leadership can 
realize improved methods and better allocation of resources.  Increased use of indigenous 
surrogates can lead to a more efficient use of U.S. resources and ease the burden of the 
current operations tempo.  Visionaries in the personnel recovery arena may need to 
develop unique approaches in order to maximize the benefits of these sources while 
maintaining security against counterintelligence operations.  Innovation can also create 
better continuity in NAR corporate knowledge.  Currently, there is a generation gap in 
NAR knowledge (personal interview, Ron McNeal, November 13, 2003).  Since the 
previous paradigm has been in place for so long, there has been little or no effort to 
further develop NAR education in either doctrine or the professional military education 
system.  Innovative thinkers will provide the catalyst for providing NAR doctrinal 
training to the education systems and extend the corporate knowledge farther into the 
future. 
  
                                                 
42 A summarized concept of efficiency with trust is: “When knowledge is received from a trusted 
source, the receiver is less likely to verify the knowledge for accuracy and is more inclined to accept the 
knowledge at face value.  This allows the receiver to immediately act on the knowledge and use it to 
generate additional knowledge.  In this way, the receiver uses the trustworthiness of the source as a proxy 
for the quality and veracity of the knowledge conveyed.”  McEvily, Perrone, and Zaheer, “Trust as an 
Organizing Principle,” Organization Science 14 (1), Jan-Feb 2003, pp. 91-103. 
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2. Simplicity (C4I) 
Simplicity is a common principle in warfare, but this thesis limits its 
consideration to the aspect of C4I.  This is because a blanket statement of simplicity 
would not necessarily fit NAR operations.  The links within a RM may in fact be quite 
complicated to ensure meeting redundancy and security.  The concept of simplicity 
applied to C4I, however, provides a general framework that enhances the ability of an 
RM to operate efficiently and effectively. 
Centralized control and decentralized execution contributes to the concept of 
simplicity of C4I.  Enhancement of this simplicity occurs even more when only two 
levels of hierarchy between the command and the operators exist.  The section on 
flexibility provides a more detailed discussion of decentralized execution.  In order to 
ensure a unity of effort and effective use of resources, a centralized agency with oversight 
responsibilities for deconfliction and the development of coordinated operational 
objectives is necessary.  Directors of each RM should report only to this one organization 
for direction, oversight, and support.  In turn, each member of the RM should also report 
to only one RM director.  This command and control structure is also important to 
facilitate unity of effort by keeping the number of objectives for NAR forces as simple 
and limited as possible in order to increase the chances that they will achieve their 
operational objectives. 
Communications and computers add to the concept of simplicity because they 
help reduce the complexity of compiling and analyzing data necessary for reacting to an 
isolated personnel event.  Their structure, however, must also maximize the concept of 
simplicity as much as the operational environment permits.  Communications equipment 
provided to the RMs must be easy to operate and conceal.  In addition, interagency 
communications and computer equipment should operate under the same, or at least 
compatible, technological capabilities.  These systems should also have inherent 
redundancies in the event of failure so that there is no need to develop alternate means to 
convey information in the middle of combat operations.  Finally, the language applied to 
these systems must be universal for the RM.  Due to complications of translation, using 
RM personnel without English language skills or RM directors without theater language 
skills violates this principle. 
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Of all the C4I tools available to NAR operations, intelligence is of paramount 
importance.  Intelligence forms the core of all NAR operations.  Intelligence is vital to 
determining the location of isolated personnel, the disposition of enemy troops, the health 
of RM networks, and the availability of resources (friendly and enemy).  In short, 
intelligence provides the “ground truth” to every player in the NAR infrastructure.  
Two important factors for facilitating intelligence operations in support of NAR 
include limiting objectives and interagency cooperation.  Limiting objectives refers to 
tasking NAR intelligence resources primarily for gathering and analysis for NAR 
operations.  NAR resources provide additional intelligence collection capabilities that 
other defense and federal agencies may try to task for purposes other than NAR.  While 
extraordinary situations may justify such actions, routine operations do not.  This does 
not mean, however, that intelligence gathered in the course of NAR activities should not 
be shared with agencies which have vested interests affected by such information.  While 
NAR planners must protect the sources and methods of derived information to the 
utmost, the information itself should be available to other agencies.  This spirit of 
cooperation is critical in the development of inter-departmental networking that allows 
the cross flow of both information and resources.  High operations tempo, limited 
intelligence resources, and overlapping areas of interest make this cooperation necessary 
for effective operations.  Through effective memoranda of agreement, fusion cells, and 
other cooperative efforts, the intelligence backbone of NAR operations can be strong and 
effective.   
3. Trust 
The issue of trust is essential in establishing a clandestine network, but requires a 
delicate balance with the principal of security.  The literature on escape networks of 
World War II uses the word trust extensively to describe the relationship between 
members of the RM networks.  Without the existence of some level of trust within the 
RM, operations could not hope to succeed. 
Trust requirements for NAR networks begin with recruitment.  The members of 
these clandestine organizations must keep their activities secret and they face constant 
risk of discovery as shown in the WWII case studies.  There is a great risk, therefore, in 
opening the organization to unknown personnel.  This risk is necessary, though, in order 
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to establish a network that is capable of performing the NAR mission.  Milward and Raab 
(2002) note that, “risk enforces recruitment along the lines of trust” (p. 21).  This 
generally means that clandestine organizations limit their recruitment to familiar 
individuals they know very well and with whom they feel a strong sense of trust.  While 
this limits the amount of capable personnel a network may have, it helps ensure security. 
Trust is also essential for NAR operations in order to react to an isolated 
personnel event in an expedient manner.  As stated earlier, speed may be important for 
the phase where the RM has to contact the isolated personnel before the enemy.  
McEvily, Perrone, and Zaheer (2003) observe: 
When knowledge is received from a trusted source, the receiver is less 
likely to verify the knowledge for accuracy and is more inclined to accept 
the knowledge at face value.  This allows the receiver to immediately act 
on the knowledge and use it to generate additional knowledge (p. 91). 
This obviously can create a dangerous security risk if NAR personnel misplace trust, 
which is why NAR operators must verify trust cautiously.  Therefore, “trust is not a naïve 
faith, where people take for granted the reliability, competence, and integrity of their 
counterpart based on a decision made in the distant past” (McEvily, et al., 2003, p. 99).  
This statement illustrates that even trusted sources must be continuously tested and vetted 
to warrant continued trust. 
Finally, RM personnel should grant trust proportionately to the other agent’s 
position in the network.  Clandestine networks will generally have a core and a periphery.  
The core has a dense network of connections and influences the direction for the overall 
network.  Outside the core is the periphery, containing varying levels of connections 
depending on the way the network is organized (Williams, 1998, p. 155).  High levels of 
trust are essential in the network core and only those with undisputable credentials should 
ever be permitted direct access to the core.  As one moves out from the core, the level of 
trust will correspondingly decrease.  Members of the periphery either have not been a 
part of the network long enough to have gained high levels of trust, or simply do not 
require such levels to contribute to the network.  Erickson (1981) supports this concept 
when she states, “strong ties are always preferred as the building blocks of secret 
societies, but the kind of tie used actually varies.  Relatively weak ties may be used if the 
99 
degree of risk is relatively low” (p. 195).  Therefore, the degree of risk to the RM, 
coupled with the need for effective operations will determine the level of trust granted 
throughout the infrastructure. 
4. Security 
Security is a principle used in McRaven’s theory and model of special operations 
and this study applies it to NAR in a similar manner.  The operational environment in the 
area of operations will dictate the level of security required.  In some cases, it may be 
acceptable for the adversary to know of the existence of a network, but not the details.  In 
other cases, the RM may need to completely conceal its existence.  In addition, while 
some methods of operation may require careful safeguarding, other methods may be 
expendable.  For example, the gains of exposing a particular method (moving a larger 
number of IP) may be so great that they outweigh the compromise of that method (the use 
of a tunnel system).  Typically, however, the safety and continued operation of the RM 
will outweigh extraordinary risks for a single IP event. 
Some individual factors that contribute to the security of NAR operations include 
invisibility, cellular network development, and source development.   Invisibility is not 
limited to just effective camouflage techniques.  More often for NAR mechanisms, this 
invisibility simply means going about unnoticed.  Third country national (TCN) laborers 
whose presence is barely recognized, or alternatively, members of the community who 
can surreptitiously provide support in the daily routine of their duties can achieve 
invisibility.  The idea is that their network activities are invisible.  Maintaining a 
normalized routine can facilitate this invisibility.  Identifying and vetting personnel such 
as these can help establish an indiscernible NAR network. 
Distributed, cellular networks can be very effective in preserving the integrity of 
the entire mechanism in the event of a partial compromise. Using assets dedicated only to 
NAR operations also enhances security, as they are not exposing their presence in the 
pursuit of other objectives.  Finally, properly training and equipping recruited surrogates 
for their roles within the RM increase their abilities to operate without detection, thus 




Flexibility is necessary to react to the very dynamic environment encountered by 
NAR forces in the urban environment.  Flexibility gives RMs the ability to conduct 
operations across multiple environments and areas of interest.  Three factors that ensure 
flexibility are decentralized execution, anonymity, and redundancy.   
Decentralized execution allows for better efficiency and speed of action by those 
implementing the NAR plan.  By allowing forward operators the authority to activate 
their mechanisms and sources, the overall infrastructure can be more flexible to 
constantly changing conditions and react to an isolated personnel event in a timely 
manner. 
Anonymity is similar to invisibility in that the RM personnel can adapt to various 
levels of scrutiny regarding their activities.  The Iraq case study will exemplify this 
concept.  If an RM agent can move about an area of interest with some level of 
anonymity, he or she can adapt his or her credentials and cover stories better to continue 
to perform their required activities. 
Creating redundancy in the NAR infrastructure is another effective method for 
improving flexibility.  One method of course would be to create networks with multiple 
links between nodes.  Scale free networks such as this require caution, since such a scale-
free network is very vulnerable to coordinated attacks.43  Redundant communications, 
transportation, and housing methods can also greatly increase the flexibility of a NAR 
RM to changing plans. 
6. Access 
This concept refers to the requirement of NAR networks for information and 
resources.  This can apply to personnel in the NAR administrative section as well as those 
in the operational arena.  The stove-piped security requirements inherently limit NAR 
infrastructure.  Exploiting the human capital of indigenous sources can create security 
dilemmas.  Therefore, NAR networks should have multiple avenues of access available to 
                                                 
43 The concepts of network development and their implications for redundancy and security are vast 
and beyond the scope of this thesis.  It is important, however, to identify the importance of proper network 
analysis in the consideration of flexibility and security.  For a comprehensive compilation of information 
on network organization, visit http://www.orgnet.com. 
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exploit.  When feasible, using the administrative mechanism of the NAR infrastructure 
itself is most secure, if it has the capability to deliver the RM’s requirements. 
Due to the inherent bureaucracy of the interagency process, made more 
complicated by the security requirements of NAR, informal methods of access are 
typically required to operate effectively.  The personality of individuals running NAR 
functions largely drives the development of informal ties in the administrative arena.  In 
order to gain access to information and resources from other governmental agencies 
where parochialism is present, informal networks can bridge the gap between individuals 
within the organizations.  This work-around provides a majority of the access for many 
interagency cooperative efforts. 
Within the operational realm, access is easier to identify and apply.  NAR 
networks may require access to certain physical areas, various resources (transportation, 
medical, and communications), key community personnel, and intelligence.  The key 
factor in developing this network is to ensure that the mechanism has a capable, varied 
and distributed capability.  For instance, a reputable man in a community may have 
access to key personnel and information, but is extremely restricted in his ability to move 
about unnoticed.  On the other hand, a TCN laborer can anonymously move about from 
place to place without raising suspicion, but would have difficulty securing 
communications and medical resources. 
D.  RELATIVE SUPERIORITY AND ISOLATED PERSONNEL 
Figure 18 shows the relationship of NAR principles and the four IP-specific 
principles of communication, adaptability, exploitation, and the Gonzales principle.  The 
pyramid illustrates the complete NAR model and functions just as it does when used as a 
stand-alone model—except that the tactical peak rests on the IP-specific principles.  The 
pyramid’s strategic and operational base balances the survival and freedom of the IP and 
steadies the tactical apex of the RM principles.  If any one of these IP-specific principles 
is lacking, then the evader’s successful recovery could be in jeopardy—the principles are 
necessary but not sufficient.  In the case where the mission is not going well for the 
recovery force, the pyramid could shift, causing one of the balls that represent the 
evader’s principles to collapse under the shifting pyramid and jeopardizing a successful 
recovery. 
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The NAR-specific urban PR model graphically represents the idea that SOF DA 
recovery forces succeed in achieving situational superiority, in spite of their numerical 
inferiority, when two things occur:  
1) The NAR RM is able to gain RS Recovery Mechanism with a visionary plan, 
with a simplified C4I structure, while implementing security, access, 
trust, and flexibility. 
2) The IP with a composed warrior mindset (from applying Gonzales 
principle) is able to gain RS Isolated Personnel through exploiting 
opportunities in order to adapt to the urban environment long enough to 














Figure 18.   Authors’ NAR urban PR model. 
 
E. METHODOLOGY 
Four historical cases will illustrate the concept of RS Recovery Mechanism in NAR and 
its six corresponding principles of vision, simplicity of C4I, security, trust, access, and 
adaptation.  These principles provide NAR forces with RS Recovery Mechanism, which is 
103 
critical to successful NAR operations.  The absence of these principles, through 
ignorance, neglect, or environmental constraints resulted in some degree of failure. 
Within the context of NAR, these principles helped achieve RS Recovery Mechanism in 
accordance with the model.   
This thesis hypothesizes that RS Recovery Mechanism is necessary, but not sufficient, 
condition for successful NAR operations.  It is not sufficient because RS Recovery Mechanism 
only gains an advantage over the enemy’s will.  The isolated person, local populace, or 
other external factors will also influence the outcome of operations.  With regard to the 
enemy, though, losing RS Recovery Mechanism will most likely result in mission failure.  While 
luck may provide a few examples counter to this hypothesis, NAR planners should not 
consider luck a viable planning principle.  Achieving RS Recovery Mechanism requires the 
adherence to the six principles listed above.  While a lapse in one or more principles does 
not necessarily result in a total loss of RS Recovery Mechanism, it will generally result in 
reduced effectiveness.  These principles are closely related and the reader should consider 
them independently.  For instance, if a NAR plan focuses primarily on security, it will be 
difficult to develop adaptation, access, and purpose, and hence, successful recoveries.  In 
addition, if visionary leaders, who foster innovative thinking, are not involved in the 
development NAR operations, it will be impossible to continue to capitalize on the other 
principles leading to successful NAR execution. 
The hypothesis, simply stated, is that RS Recovery Mechanism and RS Isolated Personnel are 
necessary conditions for successful NAR operations.  In turn, the six principles for NAR 
RMs are required in order to attain the RS Recovery Mechanism, while the four IP principles are 
required for RS Isolated Personnel.  Since the case studies focus primarily on the life cycle of an 
RM, the remaining chapters will not discuss the IP principles in detail, the chapters will 
broadly consider these principles based on the detailed analysis of the previous chapters.  
To begin, this section will apply the principles against a case study from World War II.  
Next, in order to illustrate the timelessness of the hypothesis, the authors analyze two 
contemporary NAR-related case studies.  The authors chose these cases because of the 
availability of open source data and applicability to the analysis.   
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VII. WORLD WAR II CASE STUDY 
A. OVERVIEW AND INTRODUCTION 
The example selected for this case study is from the French theater of operations 
during World War II (WWII).  The authors chose this particular theater for the following 
reasons:  the extensiveness of Allied-created escape lines, the abundance of open-source 
data relating to these lines, and the relatively high population density of French territory.  
While many operations occurred in the Balkan, Asian, North African, and other European 
theaters, they did not provide the abundance of data available as those in France and 
contained differing conditions that would not have met the method of difference.   
First, a background narrative will describe how the organizations that created the 
escape lines developed and structured themselves.  Next, an analysis of the Pat O’Leary 
escape line follows with a discussion of the RS of the recovery mechanism (RS Recovery 
Mechanism).  Following this is an analysis of the six nonconventional assisted recovery 
(NAR) principles attributing to RS Recovery Mechanism.  The authors chose this particular 
escape line because of the high variance of RS Recovery Mechanism during its lifespan.  The Pat 
O’Leary line maintained RS Recovery Mechanism for over two years before completely 
collapsing after Gestapo infiltration.   
B. BACKGROUND:  INTERWAR PERIOD 
Before Great Britain’s entry into WWII, the British Chiefs of Staff took an 
interest in the concept of irregular warfare.  They tasked J. C. F. Holland, future founder 
of the commandos and Special Operations Executive (SOE), to head the new Military 
Intelligence Research (MI R) division.  Holland brought a former colleague from his 
cadet days, MAJ Colin Gubbins, to assist him.  
Both were original thinkers, who kept their originality within the bounds 
of common sense and practicability.  Both foresaw that there might be 
hundreds of thousands of prisoners in the next war, each of whom might 
be turned into a small thorn in the enemy’s side; and that there might well 
be hundreds or thousands of evaders as well, loose in the enemy’s rear 
areas and in need of guidance (Foot & Langley, 1979, p. 32).44 
                                                 
44 More details regarding the formation of the SOE, and these men’s backgrounds is available in SOE: 
An Outline History of the Special Operations Executive, 1940-1946 by Michael Foot (1984).  
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Holland formed a new organization in order to deal with the impending problems 
that would accompany such numbers of distressed soldiers.  This organization, under the 
War Office and staffed with liaison officers from the Air Force and Navy, was headed up 
by Major N. R. Crockatt.  Holland made this choice because he needed “a strong man 
without bias . . .who could display the energy and drive of a leader as he controlled and 
co-ordinated [sic] the team of experts working under him” (Foot & Langley, 1979, p. 33).  
Crockatt’s organization assumed the named MI 9, the evasion and escape department of 
British Military Intelligence.  Crockatt was well aware of the difficulties of interagency 
cooperation, particularly with services operating under such secrecy.  He perceived these 
difficulties as “a dense fog of security, in which the germs of inter-secret-service jealousy 
breed fast” (Foot & Langley, 1979, p. 40); therefore, he worked diligently to create and 
maintain rapport with his fellow intelligence services.   
Crockatt initially chose six uniquely qualified officers to join him.  These officers 
had all seen active service in World War I and Crockatt selected them for their reliability 
and restraint; tradecraft traits that would ensure the security and success of Britain’s new 
efforts to support isolated personnel (IP).  These officers were shrewd, and understood 
how to work around bureaucratic hurdles.  One officer, Clayton Hutton, in his efforts to 
appropriate necessary funds ran into some trouble with some government ministries and 
the Board of Trade.  He was careful, though, not to cross so many lines as to jeopardize 
the existence of MI 9 (Foot & Langley, 1979, p. 36-39). 
In May 1940, Germany swept across the Low Countries and France in a massive 
offensive.  The British Expeditionary Forces (BEFs) in France managed to repulse an 
assault by the German Sixth Army, but remaining German tank divisions raced to the 
French coast in attempts to cut off ports for retreat.  The swift movement of the German 
Army thwarted an organized retreat.  Despite the fact that the Dunkirk evacuation moved 
hundreds of thousands of troops from the beaches of France, several thousand British 
troops remained isolated throughout the country (Murphy, 1987, pp. 25-37). 
In the summer of 1940, the number of evaders from the British Army was far 
greater than the number of prisoners.  This came as quite a surprise to the members of the 
War Department.  The previous paradigm of trench warfare, static fronts, and limited 
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airpower employment typically resulted in far more prisoners of war than evaders.  The 
majority of soldiers, therefore, became prisoners of war almost immediately following 
their isolation during WWI.  This caused MI 9 to focus their efforts on training their 
domestic forces to deal with internment and develop their infrastructure to cope with 
prisoner support.  The same paradigm also resulted in the BEF being unprepared to cope 
with evasion situations.  The British decision makers undoubtedly did not foresee the 
confusion that ensued from the German blitzkrieg attack leaving thousands of troops 
unable to evacuate as forces retreated to the coast.  This occurred despite the German’s 
previous demonstrations of such capabilities in Poland and Belgium.  These new 
challenges required innovative approaches for successful personnel recovery efforts to 
occur.  MI 9 realized that it erred in concentrating solely on the prisoner scenario and 
began to increase its efforts to support evaders. 
This is an instance of how ready Crockatt was to change his mind, when 
there was clear evidence that he had made a mistake.  Flexibility of this 
kind was not a leading characteristic among most of his army 
contemporaries, yet from it much of MI 9’s effectiveness rose (Foot & 
Langley, 1979, p. 68).   
From these foundations, the evasion networks of occupied France, began their legendary 
work in returning allied soldiers to friendly control.  
C. PAT O’LEARY LINE 
1. Background 
Unfortunately, British leadership made scant effort to prepare the BEF for escape 
or evasion contingencies before the German blitzkrieg attack across France.  MI 6, the 
British special intelligence service, offered its assistance in setting up an escape line from 
Marseilles to Spain.45  Donald Darling, who once lived in France and spoke French and 
Spanish fluently, headed this endeavor under the cover of British Vice consul in charge 
of repatriation at Lisbon (Foot & Langley, 1979, pp. 66-73). 
Darling then became aware of a captain named Ian Garrow from the Fifty-first 
erritorial unit.  Garrow became isolated from his division Highland Division, a British t                                                 
45 MI 6’s motives for this move are speculative.  At this point, SOE had encroached on MI 6’s long-
term monopoly of clandestine activities behind enemy lines and some believed that leaders at MI 6 wanted 
to ensure that MI 9 did not encroach upon their mission.  Regardless, Crockatt had little choice since he 
lacked the immediate resources to deal with the problem.  For more discussion on the intelligence rivalries 
during these formative years, see Michael Foot’s book, SOE (1984). 
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and began evading with hopes of rejoining his division in England.  He began to take 
notice, however, of the large number of British troops wandering the streets of Marseilles 
without any resources to affect their own escape.  Garrow began to think that assisting in 
the evacuation of his fellow servicemen would better serve the cause (Ottis, 2001, p. 76).   
Garrow initially received no assistance from MI 9 because there was no 
communications yet established between MI 9 and occupied France.  Garrow, therefore, 
made use of his access to the American consul, many aristocratic expatriates, and various 
local friends in support of his efforts.46   Finally, establishing contact with Garrow, 
Darling became his link to MI 9 and British financial support (Foot & Langley, 1979, pp. 
66-73).  The financial requirements surpassed that which Garrow could receive through 
the inefficient courier lines, but he was able to overcome that through his access to Louis 
Nouveau.  Nouveau, a French entrepreneur, himself had a number of contacts and 
resources and was eager to assist the allies against the Nazi occupation. 
A short time later, Garrow recruited a man named Patrick Albert O’Leary.  
O’Leary was a pseudonym for Albert Marie Edmond Guerisse, a Belgian doctor who 
initially left France with his cavalry regiment during the Dunkirk evacuation.  He then 
joined the British Navy and came under enemy arrest during a rescue mission off the 
coast of southern France.  O’Leary managed to escape and sought out Garrow, whom he 
heard about during his imprisonment.  Personally impressed by O’Leary’s reputation and 
charm, Garrow requested and received authorization from MI 9, through Darling, for 
O’Leary to become an agent for the line47 (Ottis, 2001, pp. 85-86). 
In October 1941, French police arrested Garrow.  Two officers had convinced 
Garrow of their sympathies to his efforts in their attempts to infiltrate the line.  When 
Garrow began to trust them, he compromised himself enough for the arrest.  A military 
tribunal in Lyon sentenced him to twenty years of hard labor.  Garrow was shrewd 
                                                 
46 The American consul was ordered to cease any support for the evasion and escape of British forces 
after the June 1940 British attack of the French fleet at Mers el Kebir.  While maintaining its diplomatic 
veneer of compliance, however, various individuals within the consular offices continued to provide 
Garrow with forms and stamps for false papers (Ottis, 2001, p. 78). 
47 While Garrow had a great amount of latitude in running the escape line, he was a man of duty.  
Since O’Leary was still a member of the Royal Navy, Garrow wanted to ensure that O’Leary was officially 
released from that position. This type of respectful rapport that Garrow maintained while independently 
working clandestine operations can be one of the reasons MI 9 was able to overcome the frictions typical of 
interagency cooperation. 
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enough, though, not to expose the other cells within his network.  The escape line was 
able to continue operations under the new leadership of Pat O’Leary (Murphy, 1987, p. 
141). 
Shortly after Garrow’s arrest, O’Leary confronted one of the line’s core agents, 
Harold Cole, for embezzling funds for his own use.  Cole escaped through a bathroom 
window and German counterintelligence later picked him up in December of 1941.  Cole 
cooperated with the Abwehr interrogators without much encouragement.  His deposition 
resulted in thirty typewritten pages that named scores of agents and effectively decimated 
the northern portion of the O’Leary line (Murphy, 1987, pp. 144-169).   
Despite this setback, O’Leary continued to move six hundred people along the 
line over the next year.  During this period, he initiated the repair of the northern lines 
while still moving the increasing number of evaders out of France.  His lone wireless 
radio operator also deserted the line to be with his wife.  The Gestapo then arrested his 
next radio operator. Facing increasing demands, and decreasing assets, the line had to 
recruit assets quickly and without the assistance of intelligence vetting from London 
(Foot & Langley, 1979, pp. 77-78).   
Noveau was O’Leary’s primary coordinator for the Pas de Calais, Brittany, and 
Normandy branches of the line and in December of 1942, he recruited Roger LeNeveu 
into the line.  LeNeveu was previously a member of the French Foreign Legion for three 
years; and he came highly recommended by other branches of the resistance.  Rather 
quickly, Noveau introduced LeNeveu to his leading agents.  For the next two months, 
LeNeveu transported several groups of evaders along the line.  In January, though, he 
arrived in Toulouse without his evader.   LeNeveu claimed that the Germans had arrested 
them both, but he had escaped.  Noveau elected not to interrogate him personally since 
another agent was satisfied with LeNeveu’s explanation (Ottis, 2001, p. 112).   
In February of 1943, Noveau was to meet with LeNeveu in Paris to receive five 
airmen for transport to Toulouse.  LeNeveu was able to push through the line of waiting 
passengers at the train station and obtain the required passes just in time to prevent 
canceling the operation.  Noveau boarded the train with the five airmen and two other 
guides and waved goodbye to LeNeveu for the last time.  A short distance down the line, 
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the Gestapo arrested Noveau and his companions and then escorted them to Gestapo 
headquarters (Ottis, 2001, pp. 112-114).  This marked the end for the O’Leary line. 
LeNeveu later asked for an appointment with O’Leary so he could pass 
information about Noveau’s arrest.  Minor agents such as LeNeveu did not typically have 
access to the administrative or organizational members of the line, but O’Leary wanted to 
know what happened to one of his core agents, thus he agreed to the meeting.  The two 
met at a café in Toulouse on 2 March 1943.  When asked if he knew who was responsible 
for the betrayals, LeNeveu replied that he indeed did.  At that time, the Germans arrested 
O’Leary and LeNeveu.  O’Leary realized later that LeNeveu was the traitor, but it was far 
too late to stop the inevitable.  The O’Leary line was dead48 (Foot & Langley, 1979, pp. 
140-141).  
2. Analysis—Relative Superiority of the Recovery Mechanism 
In this section, the authors evaluate the operations of the O’Leary line as a whole 
with respect to RS Recovery Mechanism.  The analysis begins when Ian Garrow actively begins 
forming an escape network within occupied France and ends with Pat O’Leary’s arrest.  
The timeline in Figure 19 does not suggest any recommendations for the tempo of NAR 
operations, but only to show the time of the events as they occurred.  The authors 
consider RS Recovery Mechanism satisfied as long as Garrow was able to conduct NAR-related 
tasks and maintain the integrity of the network.  While varying challenges may have 
stalled or temporarily halted actual movement of IP from occupied France, the RM 
maintained RS Recovery Mechanism.  Because of the protracted nature of NAR operations, the 
model considers the viability of the line to survive and operate essential for RS Recovery 
Mechanism.  The actual exfiltration of IP from a theater of operations is then a factor of RS 
Recovery Mechanism along with RS Isolated Personnel in addition to other environmental factors that 
work against the model.   
The RS Recovery Mechanism graph in Figure 19 shows that the O’Leary line was able to 
gain a significant advantage over the enemy by beginning operations from behind the 
                                                 
48 Some sources cite that the O’Leary line continued to function, on a reduced scale, until the 
liberation of France in 1944.  Francoise Dissard was attributed with regrouping the survivors of the line at 
her residence in Toulouse and the continued support of Allied evaders.  While these events indicate the 
courage and tenacity of the individuals from the O’Leary line, they do not support the continuance of the 
preexisting network.  Online access to further discussion on Dissard’s contributions after April 1943 can be 
found at:  http://www.conscript-heroes.com, or http://www.christopherlong.co.uk/pub.rafes.html. 
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Figure 19.    Authors’ RS Recovery Mechanism Graph for the O’Leary line 
 
German lines in occupied France.  Using his own ingenuity, and contacts in Marseilles, 
Garrow began evacuation operations for Allied evaders.  Once he established contact 
with Donald Darling, his financial and intelligence support increased, giving his 
mechanism and even more decisive edge against the Germans.  His arrest exposed 
portions of the network, but Pat O’Leary’s leadership allowed the RM to maintain RS 
Recovery Mechanism.  This suggests that a large network, properly organized for security, is not 
necessarily more vulnerable than a smaller network.  The network continued to operate 
effectively until the Abwehr arrested Cole.  This inflicted severe damage to the network, 
although it continued to operate just above the RS line.  Then, the loss of their only radio 
operator caused an intelligence gap that slowly eroded the network’s capability and 
security.   
The decisive point that finally brought the O’Leary line below the RS Recovery 
Mechanism frontier was the recruitment of LeNeveu.  Although the line continued to operate 
for two more months, his presence in the line eroded any remaining RS Recovery Mechanism 
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the network possessed.  Eventually, LeNeveu had collected enough information to 
compromise the entire line, once this occurred the German’s began to eliminate and arrest 
members of the network.  Noveau’s arrest marked the decisive event that placed the 
network below the RS line.  At this point, LeNeveu had collected enough intelligence to 
bring down the rest of the network and assisted the Germans in dismantling it.  The line 
continued to function for a short time, but there was no hope for the continued survival of 
the network or regaining RS Recovery Mechanism.  The arrest of Pat O’Leary categorically 
ended operations for the O’Leary line.  
It might appear to some that the line did not have RS Recovery Mechanism because the 
German’s were apparently aware of their operations.  The Germans, however, could not 
confidently act to bring the entire line down until more intelligence was gathered, 
allowing the line to continue conducting NAR operations.  The infiltration may indicate 
the beginning of the decline of RS Recovery Mechanism, but should not suggest a lack of it.  
Just because the enemy knows or suspects the presence of an escape line, it does not give 
them the ability to stop it. 
3. Analysis of NAR Principles for the O’Leary Line 
a. Vision 
Military policymakers obviously realized the danger posed by Germany as 
WWII approached.  Their interest in irregular warfare resulted in the selection of very 
qualified and innovative officers to deal with the uniquely unconventional aspects 
associated with this type of warfare.  Despite their ability to identify the problems that 
might occur with IP, the paradigms developed from the policymakers’ experiences in 
World War I encumbered their vision.  The focus on prisoner over evader issues and poor 
training of the BEF illustrate this point. 
Although strategic vision was lacking, the vision of operators in the 
tactical environment still allowed recovery forces to achieve RS Recovery Mechanism early in 
the war.  Ian Garrow, walking the streets of Marseilles, envisioned the successful 
evacuation of those soldiers roaming throughout the cities and countryside of France and 
successfully implemented an effective operation.  Garrow, though, had one distinct 
advantage from the leadership in England; he was already in the operational area and 
could formulate a more coherent plan revolving around his resources and knowledge of 
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the enemy situation.  He most likely did not foresee the events leading to his escape line 
any more than the strategic planners in Britain did, but once they occurred the vision was 
more apparent to him than those across the channel. 
b. Simplicity (C4I)49 
Considering the context of their time, the O’Leary line fulfilled this 
principle fairly well.  Their command structure was as simplified as could be allowed 
with the limited means of communications available.  The technological limitations of the 
period drove the requirement for O’Leary to report to Darling, who in turn reported to 
Crockatt, who was the final approving authority for operations in France.  This was still 
relatively simple in terms of a command structure, and resulted in moderately 
decentralized control.  O’Leary and Darling typically had autonomy to make their own 
decisions and sought guidance only on those actions with profound implications such as 
releasing O’Leary from his Royal Navy commitment, or dealing with traitors in the line.   
Having only one radio operator was an obvious limitation for the O’Leary 
line.  Radio sets of the time, however, were rather cumbersome and easy to intercept.  In 
France, maintaining communications with Allied support was “a very precise business, 
and the air was alive with such communications and every second counted” (Long, 1985, 
p. 150).  Coupled with the high volume of traffic, was the organization’s fear of 
compromise.  Garrow’s first wireless operator withdrew his support stating, “you know, 
it’s extremely dangerous doing transmitting like this . . . if they can hear us, then so can 
the Gestapo with their detecting devices” (Feriere, as cited in Long, 1985, p. 152).    The 
shortfall of communications within this principle was most likely beyond the capabilities 
of anyone to overcome at that time, but definitely affected the line’s ability to perform 
and survive. 
Unfortunately, intelligence and communications are closely linked 
portions of this principle.  For the most part during this period, the personnel within the 
RM had a better situational awareness of the ground situation than those in the 
intelligence offices.  One key role that the intelligence section could have played, 
                                                 
49 While the term C4I was not yet in use during WWII, we feel the term can be universally applied.  
All aspects of C4I were present during this period, although not recognized in this relationship.  While one 
can argue that computers did not exist during the time period of this case study, coding machines used for 
secure communications meet the criteria and the term, therefore, still applies. 
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however, was in vetting potential agents and evaders.  As the case study points out, MI 9 
did everything possible to ensure that their relationship with the other MI departments 
was amicable.  As Foot and Langley (1979) point out: 
There has never been any sign that MI 9 behaved in any way that MI 5 
disapproved, and the older department gave the younger every possible 
help in checking the bona fides of occasional suspects (p. 41). 
Thus, while the intelligence was difficult to disseminate, MI 9 ensured that every possible 
avenue was available for its efforts. 
Overall, the line marginally followed the principle of simplicity of C4I.  
Arguably, MI 9 successfully satisfied this principle more than any other agency in the 
War Office during the same period relative to the resources available.  MI9’s ability to 
continue extensive clandestine activities, despite resource and budgetary constraints not 
realized by both conventional and more prestigious intelligence agencies, illustrates their 
ability to enforce this principle.  This was most likely one of the primary reasons that the 
O’Leary line was able to obtain RS Recovery Mechanism during the early portion of the war. 
c. Trust 
On at least two occasions, the O’Leary line seriously compromised the 
principle of trust, as described in chapter 5.  The first time was with Harold Cole: 
Its [the O’Leary line’s] great strength came from the fact that the people 
who formed its guiding core all knew, liked and trusted each other . ...  
The enormous advantages of this inner cohesion were offset by a 
countervailing, catastrophic snag:  one of them was no good (Foot & 
Langley, 1979, pp. 75-76).   
The violation of this principle occurred when Garrow disregarded the 
concerns of at least two of his inner core of trusted members who expressed concerns 
regarding Cole’s trustworthiness.  One of those members was Pat O’Leary, who later 
exposed Cole’s indiscretions.  Garrow should have immediately addressed this problem 
in his core trust element, particularly since it was not just one voice of concern.  The 
blind trust of an agent improperly vetted created severe damage to the organization.  
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The other instance involved LeNeveu’s infiltration of the network.   The violation 
of the trust principle occurred shortly after his recruitment.  Noveau almost immediately 
brought LeNeveu into the line’s core trust group.  Noveau relied on second-hand 
testimony on LeNeveu’s character in formulating his level of trust.  Noveau should have 
kept LeNeveu at the periphery of the network until the RM could properly vet and test 
him over a period to establish his trustworthiness.   
d. Security 
The founders of the O’Leary line developed it fairly well in terms of 
security.  They organized the network in a cellular fashion such that the compromise of 
one portion of the RM did not jeopardize the operations of the rest of the mechanism.  
The continued survival of the network despite the numerous arrests of its members 
illustrated the benefits of this organization.  The line also did an effective job in rendering 
its activities essentially invisible to local security apparatuses through normalized daily 
routines.   
The first violation of security in this case study occurred with Cole.  The 
reason the Abwehr picked up Cole was his flagrant violation of security.  As one evader 
noted: 
Cole had no qualms about speaking his poor French around the Germans 
and insisted that the evaders mingle with the Germans in public, rather 
than engaging in the more passive and less risky approach of keeping to 
themselves (Ottis, 2001, p. 91). 
The Abwehr identified Cole as a resistance agent long before taking him into custody, but 
his actions were so grandiose that they delayed his arrest to ensure he was not working as 
a double agent for another branch of the German police.  While this behavior had short-
term benefits for Cole, it did not give him enduring safety (Murphy, 1987, pp. 149-150).   
O’Leary also violated this principle when he met with LeNeveu personally 
to hear what had happened to Noveau.  The network did not allow minor agents to meet 
with the organizational core of the network.  This procedure was in place to protect the 
most vulnerable part of the network from those less reliable portions.  While the original 
line was arguably unable to regain RS Recovery Mechanism from this point, O’Leary could have 
remained free along with his other key members if he had adhered to procedure.  
e. Access 
Of all the principles considered in the NAR-specific model, the RM most 
effectively applied the principle of access, both strategically and tactically.  The network 
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had nearly permeated the entire theater of operations; their access to various intelligence, 
finance, and transportation sources made this possible.  These provisionary sources also 
possessed redundant capabilities, ensuring continued access in the event of a temporary 
loss from any one source.  Rail lines, vehicles, ships, bicycles, and walking guides 
provided the basis for transportation.  More importantly, Allied governments and local 
entrepreneurs provided large amounts of money to secure such transportation. 
The primary shortfall in the network’s access was, again, communications.  
This problem, however, did not violate the principle of access.  Despite the handicap 
associated with poor communications, the network still maintained access throughout its 
existence through couriers, letters, and coded broadcasts over the British Broadcasting 
Corporation’s (BBC’s) programs.  
Strategically, the leadership in MI 9 fostered close, cooperative 
relationships with its Allied counterparts in the intelligence community.  This greatly 
assisted tactical access as illustrated by MI 6’s assistance in sending Darling to Lisbon to 
set up the initial coordination for evasion networks from occupied France.  MI 9’s careful 
relationships with other government agencies also ensured that the lines were able to 
access the necessary monetary support from England. 
f. Flexibility 
The O’Leary line adapted quite well to evolving situations in Europe.  Its 
ability to work across the multiple environments of the cities, farms, and mountainous 
terrain illustrates a very adaptable network.  The line itself gained flexibility through the 
sum of the innovations by its individuals.  It all began, of course, with Ian Garrow who 
was able to begin the network without any administrative support.  He was able to 
compensate when individual contacts were no longer able to support the network and 
operate in occupied France with only a very limited knowledge of French. 
The hallmark of the RM personnel’s flexibility was their continued ability 
to move hundreds of allied airmen following the decimation of the northern sector of 
their RM.  The network was able to shift resources to other sectors while attempting to 
rebuild the network in the north.  Another fact worth noting was that they were able to do 
this for over one year with only sporadic wireless communications, relying primarily on 
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non-technical communications by courier.  With the line somewhat handicapped, 
O’Leary came up with the idea of mass evacuations off the French Mediterranean coast.  
The HMS Tarana was one of the ships employed for this task; it disguised itself as a 
fishing trawler sailing under false Moroccan or Spanish colors to pass German patrols 
(Brooks, 1996, p. 558).  O’Leary was able to move approximately one hundred evaders 
on three operations dedicated to his line.50 
D. RELATIVE SUPERIORITY OF THE ISOLATED PERSONNEL 
This chapter focused on the RS Recovery Mechanism because an analysis of the lifespan 
of the line is more illustrative of the model’s applicability than a single IP event.  The 
requirement to achieve and sustain RS Isolated Personnel applies in a similar manner as in overt 
recoveries.  The IP principles for NAR situations do not differ from those participating in 
overt recoveries.  Adaptability will remain the single most critical factor for RS Isolated 
Personnel.  In WWII, due to their familiarity with European customs, the British adapted 
easier than Americans did.  However, similar physical characteristics, combined with 
clever concepts of appearing deaf or deranged to avoid the language barrier, allowed 
many American IP to overcome their unfamiliarity (Murphy, 1987, pp. 44, 71). 
The primary difference between overt and clandestine recoveries concerns 
communication.  In many cases, the survivor initiates overt recoveries by radio contact 
with the RF or other friendly element.  In WWII, most PR communications occurred 
through face-to-face interactions between RM and IP.  While radio technologies may 
allow today’s NAR forces to have radios, the survival radios of U.S. armed forces are 
typically unencrypted and easy to triangulate.  Therefore, it is reasonable to expect 
today’s NAR recoveries to utilize similar non-technical means of communication 
between RM and IP similar to those implemented in WWII.   
 
                                                  
50 The details on the exact number of missions and personnel evacuated are contradictory, but all 
sources support the statement above.  Ottis’ research gathered data that supported anywhere from three to 
five evacuations; she went with five in her publication. Brooks’ account was chosen due to the amount of 
detail in his book including many of the Captains’ logs.  He only attributes three evacuations as tasked to 
the O’Leary line, but there are two others to the same area that are listed in support of the Secret 
Intelligence Service.  O’Leary most likely used his contacts to move a portion of his own people on his 
counterpart’s missions.  The summary of the O’Leary line’s evacuations is conveniently listed in Brooks’ 
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VIII. CONTEMPORARY CASE STUDIES 
A. OVERVIEW AND INTRODUCTION 
The examples selected for these case studies are from the Korean War and 
Operation IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF).  The authors selected these cases for the following 
reasons:  to show the timelessness of the proposed principles and the availability of open-
source data for personnel recovery (PR) operations in these conflicts.  The Korean War 
offers extensive data from recently declassified reports and documents.  While the more 
relevant nonconventional assisted recovery (NAR) cases that occurred in OIF are still 
highly classified, the case selected represents NAR-like characteristics to compare with 
the model.  In the OIF case, RS Isolated Personnel was not applicable since the IP was actually 
in enemy control.  While this does not fit the definition of NAR, the applicability of this 
recent NAR-like scenario is similar enough to warrant analysis using the NAR model.  
While there are inherent limitations of using such a case, the relevance of such a recent 
occurrence warrants its analysis.  
The analysis considers the Korean War in its entirety and the analysis shows that 
the recovery mechanism (RM) created in this period generally never achieved RS Recovery 
Mechanism.  OIF, on the other hand, is limited to a single IP event during the conflict.  As 
discussed, this limitation is due to the lack of open-source data on these current personnel 
recovery events.  The “RM” established for this single recovery analysis maintained RS 
Recovery Mechanism throughout the mission. 
The analysis will begin by providing a background description of how the military 
dismantled the personnel recovery agencies following the end of hostilities in World War 
II and then, subsequently reorganized them when needed in Korea.  This discussion will 
set the stage for the shortfalls in vision that led to the problems with NAR in Korea.  
Then a discussion will follow of how efforts to clandestinely move personnel continued 
in the early years of the Cold War.  These discussions will lead to an introduction to the 
Korean War.  The study will then assess the RS Recovery Mechanism formulated to assist 
isolated personnel (IP) in that theater; following this is an analysis of the six NAR  
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principles that comprise RS Recovery Mechanism.  Contrasting with these results will be an 
evaluation of RS Recovery Mechanism during a NAR-like case from OIF, again followed by an 
evaluation of the associated principles. 
B. BACKGROUND: POST WORLD WAR II 
Almost immediately after the end of WWII, America disbanded MIS-X, its 
agency for personnel recovery.  In addition, they destroyed all records and documents, 
with only a few obscure references from other organizations surviving (Shoemaker, 1990, 
pp. 200-205).  This decision would come back to haunt the Americans only a few year 
later when attempts to conduct PR operations were made during the Korean War. 
A short-lived relative to NAR operations did emerge immediately after World 
War II in response to the threat posed by the Soviet Union.  During this period, many 
Soviet soldiers and diplomats were approaching American and British personnel with the 
desire to defect; “but diplomats in London and Washington regarded defectors as an 
unwelcome embarrassment and wished to return them to their home country, regardless 
of their fate” (Aldrich, 2002, p.96).  Some U.S. personnel in the counter-intelligence 
corps (CIC), however, saw these defectors as valuable sources of information. 
Once the CIC had garnered all possible information from the Soviet defectors, 
they had to decide what to do with them.  In order to maintain their supply of good 
intelligence, the CIC could not allow the Soviets to capture the defectors and make 
examples of them.  They also could not find safe haven for the defectors within Europe 
due to the intensive activities of the Soviet security service as well as the negative 
reactions of European leaders towards assisting defectors.  Therefore, MAJ James Milano 
created a “Rat Line” for these defectors that ferried them to locations in South America.  
Milano was the commander of the 7769th Military Intelligence Service (MIS) in Austria 
and in charge of the CIC (Milano & Brogan, 1995, pp. 43-49).  Milano successfully 
performed these activities without the knowledge or approval of the political leadership 
back in the U.S for almost five years.  In July 1950, Milano’s tour in Austria ended and 
he closed the Rat Line.  Milano’s successor reopened the line six months later for a final 
client, Klaus Barbie.  It was not until 1983 that the existence of the line was exposed.  It 
was not until 1983 that the investigations exposed the existence of the line.  This occurred  
120 
when the Bolivian government discovered and deported Barbie, who was a Nazi war 
criminal; his escape to Bolivia was soon associated with the Rat Line.  The subsequent 
Ryan Report found: 
The use of the Rat Line for informants and defectors raises troubling 
questions of ethical and legal conduct . . . .By concealing information from 
United States agencies, and by possibly violating lawful regulations on 
travel, currency, and documentation, the Army did not act responsibly . . .. 
There is an important distinction between lawfully establishing a covert 
escape route and covertly taking advantage of a secretive and unauthorized 
scheme (as cited in Milano & Brogan, 1985, p. 208).51 
Due to the U.S. military’s wanton destruction of documents on clandestine personnel 
recovery operations and the reorganization of intelligence agencies following World War 
II, there is little wonder America was ill prepared to enter the Korean War with an 
effective personnel recovery program.  
C. THE KOREAN WAR 
1. Background 
The overwhelming military capability of North Korea, combined with their 
inability to undermine the South Korean government through guerrilla action, led to the 
North’s assault across the thirty-eighth parallel on June 25, 1950.  The North Koreans 
drove the South Korean forces to the southern edge of the peninsula where the South 
stalled the effort at an area known as the Pusan perimeter.  This South Koreans held this 
defensive perimeter, despite the North Korean attempts to finish them, until General 
MacArthur arrived in September to stage an assault on Inchon Harbor and cut off the 
North’s extended supply lines leading to Pusan.  This allowed the troops defending Pusan 
to counterattack toward the North and drive the Communist aggressors back to the 
demarcation line (Haas, 2000, pp. 4-5).   
                                                 
51 The authors considered the case of CIC’s Rat Line for in-depth analysis in this thesis, but later 
discarded the case.  Since Milano’s first hand account in his book is practically the only surviving data on 
the line, and it was written thirty-five years after the event, the data could not be considered reliable for 
detailed analysis.  The discussion was included to illustrate, what we feel, is the foundation of the reason 
the U.S. military’s inability to form effective NAR mechanisms following World War II.  The Central 
Intelligence Agency knew of the Rat Line’s existence since 1951, when it took over operations from the 
CIC in Austria.  This possibly attributed to an attitude that the military could not responsibly form and 
supervise such operations.  The public outcry in 1983 over the operation only reinforced that 
preconception. 
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MacArthur, overwhelmed with confidence, ordered his forces to continue across 
the 38th parallel in pursuit of the retreating North Korean Army.52  This move led to the 
intervention of the Chinese military, which drove MacArthur’s forces back to the 
demarcation line.  The remainder of the war represented a fluid stalemate between 
Communist and UN forces near the demarcation line.  The war continued until July 27, 
1953, when both parties signed an armistice. 
Some critics attribute MacArthur’s decision to cross the thirty-eighth parallel to 
an over-confident and arrogant personality.  Some argue that his attitude had a strong 
effect on other military leaders.  Lebow (1981) states: 
MacArthur’s need to be surrounded by sycophants extracted a heavy price.  
His well-publicized belief that China would not intervene in Korea had 
already seriously hampered intelligence activities on that peninsula.  Now, 
it prevented his field commanders from exercising proper caution (p. 160). 
This influence may contribute to an understanding of why an ill-conceived and 
ineffective personnel recovery program emerged during the Korean War. 
The first NAR operations began in September 1950 when the Commander of Fifth 
Air Force, General Partridge, requested them.53    The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) 
then recruited and trained two hundred Korean troops to support NAR operations behind 
enemy lines.  Forty-five days later, the CIA considered these personnel, broken into four-
man teams, ready to infiltrate for operations.  The agency cancelled the infiltration just 
before execution and then terminated the entire NAR program. 
Both of these actions were taken in the headquarters euphoria that 
followed the UN successes in North Korea, successes that seemed certain 
to fulfill MacArthur’s 24 November pledge to ‘have the troops home by 
Christmas’ (Haas, 2000, p. 197). 
Chinese intervention, however, created the requirements for this program once again.  
Remnants of the old teams were speedily reconstituted and filled out with new recruits.  
                                                 
52 Although this paper focuses on the leadership and personnel of the U.S. military, the forces 
involved were actually a combined United Nations (UN) force.  The forces that pressed across the thirty-
eighth parallel, commanded by MacArthur, consisted of American, British, and Australian soldiers. 
53 The term NAR did not yet exist during this period.  This program was actually described as “covert 
escape and evasion (E&E) program,” but this concept meets the existing definition for NAR. 
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By December 5, 1950, the CIA reported that a number of these teams were operational 
near Pyongyang, the North Korean capital city. 
By March 1951, the CIA discontinued the infiltration of these four man teams 
dedicated to NAR operations.  These teams were ill equipped, lacked intelligence, and 
had no reception parties for their infiltration.  While Hass (2000) states that the CIA 
attributed a number of rescues to these teams, there is no corroborating information to 
that fact and all but one of the teams were either lost or pulled out when compromised (p. 
198).  The role of NAR then went to “general resistance warfare groups” as a collateral 
mission.  Within ten months, these groups successfully performed fifteen confirmed 
rescues.  However, some have attributed the successful PR missions carried out by these 
groups to luck rather than effective operations.  One reason for this is that CCRAK 
[Combined Command Reconnaissance Activities, Korea] teams operating in these 
USAF-designated safe havens were not issued a radio receiver that could pick up distress 
calls from standard issue USAF survival radios!” (Haas, 1997, p. 64). 
These groups of partisans faired somewhat better than the initial four-man teams 
airdropped into North Korea.  This was largely because they were operating from isolated 
islands off the coast of North Korea and continually protected by friendly naval and air 
forces.  While they did project many missions toward the North Korean mainland, the 
partisans performed the in relatively close proximity to the coast.  Even these missions 
became more difficult as the front began to stabilize near the 38th parallel in October 
1952 and the North Koreans were able to concentrate their efforts on rear area security 
and coastal defense (Malcom, 1996, pp. 37, 138).  While operating offshore ensured their 
security and ability to operate, it did not lead to a highly successful NAR program.  Luck, 
was a primary reason for success in a majority of the actual rescues.  Another major 
factor causing the land based partisan operations to fail was that, “to stand any chance of 
pickup or even evasion, they [the pilots] had to get at least as far as the offshore islands 
where U.S. partisan forces . . . operated” (Haas, 1997, p. 63).  This negates the purpose of 
a NAR program, which is to create these capabilities where the threat level makes overt 
forms of PR infeasible. 
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The command relationship for NAR operations was confusing and replete with 
interagency parochialism.  Beginning in July of 1951, the CIA formed a number of 
partisan forces under the guise of the Joint Advisory Commission, Korea (JACK).  These 
groups were primarily responsible for all CIA-directed unconventional warfare (UW) 
operations in theater.  The Far East Command (FEC) founded the CCRAK in November 
1951 and gave them the sole authority to conduct unconventional operations in the area.  
In theory, JACK now fell under the control of the CCRAK; but in practice JACK was 
expected, but never required, to coordinate any CIA operations with its CCRAK.  In fact, 
CCRAK and JACK took offices at opposite ends of Seoul and a long period of bitterness 
ensued.  This relationship is one that severely constrained the ability to properly employ 
and coordinate UW activities in the theater. 
In January 1952, the CIA attempted to resume airdrops of personnel to establish 
cache sites for NAR operations.  These groups of personnel, called “special action 
teams,” conducted intelligence collection and sabotage raids against North Korea.  These 
units again met with disaster; many became double agents for the North, while the 
remainder were killed, captured, or simply disappeared.  The CIA supplied many of these 
teams with communications equipment that received, but could not transmit signals.  Re-
supply operations for these teams were conducted by prearranged time and location; 
therefore, it was impossible to know whether the supplies were lost, captured, or in the 
hands of the teams (Haas, 2000, pp. 88-90).  Some attribute the quick compromise of the 
dropped agents to ignorance of the North Korean social system.  Planners assumed that a 
Korean should easily be able to blend in anywhere within the peninsula.  This was 
grossly incorrect because the North Koreans had instituted an aggressive campaign 
against infiltrators right down to the village level.  Strangers or newcomers were 
immediately considered suspects and local authorities notified.  People in the 
neighborhood only accepted outsiders without question if they personally knew them 
(Malcom, 1996, pp. 131-137). 
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Discouraged by the lack of results, Far East Air Force (FEAF) moved to take over 
NAR operations in May 1952.  The CIA, already irritated at its subordination to CCRAK 
for unconventional operations, attempted to head off the move.  They argued that if the 
FEAF had the resources to head such an operation, they should make those resources 
available to the JACK, which the CIA claimed had authority for NAR operations as 
delegated by CCRAK.  FEAF conceded and JACK maintained control of NAR 
operations throughout the remainder of the war.  The CIA was concerned, however, that 
JACK was not meeting the requirements for NAR operations because they were 
conducting predominantly overt sea and coastal rescues from their islands of operation 
off the North Korean coast (Haas, 2000, pp. 194-200).  While these rescues occurred in 
enemy territory, the partisans primarily conducted them by using indigenous fishing 
vessels and UN patrol boats.  While still ensuring that isolated personnel did not fall into 
enemy hands, these groups did not meet the CIA’s desire to establish an effective NAR 
network on the North Korean mainland. 
After the armistice of 1953, the CIA conducted an intense evaluation of NAR 
operations.  Their goal was to create a viable, secure network in those areas of North 
Korea where the enemy shot down a majority of aircraft.  Their hope was that if 
hostilities resumed, they would have already established an effective network to conduct 
NAR operations.  The CIA’s North Asia Command, however, realized that the only way 
to conduct such operations would be through a “truly joint effort by all the military 
services and the CIA, a joint effort that was never developed” (Haas, 2000, p. 200).  The 
CIA subsequently terminated the NAR program in September 1954. 
A 1973 historical review stated that, “no airman or POW was known to have been 
assisted by CIA-sponsored clandestine mechanisms.”  The review also quoted the Korea 
Branch Chief at CIA headquarters who, in a 1954 report, stated that “E&E operations as 
conducted by the CIA in Korea were not only ineffective but probably morally 
reprehensible in that the number of lives lost and the amount of time and treasure 
expended was enormously disproportionate to attainments therefrom [sic]”54 (as cited in 
Burns, 2000).   
2. Analysis—Relative Superiority of the Recovery Mechanism 
RS Recovery Mechanism is achieved when NAR forces enter the area of operations 
controlled by the enemy with the freedom of movement to conduct operations to include:  
                                                 
54 Evanhoe’s description of these results contradicts those cited by Haas and Burns from the CIA 
historical review.  Evanhoe (1995) attributes three assisted recoveries of prisoners of war and “a number” 
of airmen to the NAR networks (p. 91).  He does not provide a source for his data; therefore, the authors 
accept as factual for the purposes of this thesis, all data cited from the CIA’s internal review. 
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recruitment, network coordination, as well as contact, authentication, support, movement, 
and exfiltration of IP.  This section will divide the assessment of RS Recovery Mechanism into 
the airdrop NAR operations of the CIA and the land-based partisan NAR operations. 
As indicated by the comments of the CIA’s historical report, none of the NAR 
assets dropped by the CIA contributed to the rescue of IP during the period of the Korean 
War.  It is also evident that these teams did not achieve RS Recovery Mechanism at any point in 
their attempts to create a viable NAR network.  Based on the limited data available on the 
individual actions of the teams inserted into North Korea due to communications gaps, 
the conjecture is that they did not actually attain sufficient RS Recovery Mechanism.  Figure 20 
illustrates this point.  The graphic illustration remains below the RS line is because North 
Korean and Chinese forces were actively searching for agents from the South.  
Compounding this was fact that the CIA dropped the agents into areas where they the 
locals quickly identified them as strangers because there was no reception apparatus in 
place.  The steep decline to a zero percent probability of mission success is because the 
North Koreans captured, killed, or compromised each team of agents who were 
attempting to form NAR networks.  The data collected also appears to support the 
supposition that these agents were unable to operate for any length of time within North 
Korea to establish networks.  The depiction does not indicate any quantitative time as 
there were numerous such drops and no data on how long any individual team was able to 
operate.  The intent, rather, is to illustrate the relative inability for these agents to 
successfully operate for any appreciable length of time when they did not enter enemy 
territory with RS Recovery Mechanism. 
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The land-based partisan groups entered the graph at the PV with RS established 
(see Figure 21).  This is because they were able to establish themselves on remote islands 
off the North Korean coast that had local sympathizers and support of friendly naval and 
air power.  While their actual presence was not necessarily clandestine, their intentions 
and operations enjoyed increased security.  They maintained a fairly steady state of RS 
Recovery Mechanism until October 1952 when North Korean forces were able to concentrate 
more efforts against partisan actions; although the ability of the partisans to operate freely 
from their islands to the mainland never dropped below ninety-percent (Haas, 2000, p. 
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Figure 21.   Authors’ RS Recovery Mechanism Graph for Partisan NAR Operations 
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While this is a good example of an RM exploiting the principle to maintain RS 
Recovery Mechanism, it also validates this thesis’ claim that RS Recovery Mechanism is necessary, but 
not always sufficient, for successful NAR operations.  The inability of these units to 
create viable networks in those areas where events were high emphasizes this point.  The 
timeline represented is quantitative for the entire length of partisan operations and does 
not reflect any individual team’s mission. 
3. Analysis of the NAR Principles for the Korean War 
a. Vision 
Unfortunately for the U.S., the shortsightedness of strategic policy-makers 
and military leaders led to a nonexistent PR capability at the onset of the Korean War.  
The disbanding and destruction of all facets of NAR infrastructure exemplifies the lack of 
vision by the strategic leadership of this period.  This was due, at least in part, to an over-
reliance on the U.S.’s newly acquired nuclear arsenal and strategy of massive retaliation. 
This inability to understand the concept of limited war, coupled with the political 
administration’s ignorance of the region’s impending crisis, meant that it did not consider 
establishing any type of NAR architecture in the period leading up to the Korean War.   
This lack of vision was probably the most crucial factor for the lack of RS 
Recovery Mechanism for the airborne infiltration teams.  Since nobody considered the need for 
such a network, there were no operational preparations made within the North Korean 
area of operations.  This led to the complete lack of any contacts, resources, and 
intelligence that would have facilitated network development within the area.  While the 
land-based partisan groups were able to achieve RS Recovery Mechanism despite the lack of 
vision, they did not work far into the regions of North Korean control. 
b. Simplicity (C4I) 
Neither the Partisans nor the infiltrators effectively fulfilled the principle 
of simplicity of command and control during the war.  Interagency rivalries, coupled with 
competition for resources created a confusing, inefficient, and inadequate command 
relationship for NAR operations.  CCRAK, JACK, FEF, FEAF, and the CIA constantly 
struggled for control of the program, which inhibited creation of a robust NAR program. 
The formation of CCRAK complicated the structure of the command and control 
relationships because it added another coordinating and reporting agency for field 
commanders, thereby reducing the simplicity of the chain of command. 
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Simplicity of communications was also violated, and grossly so for the air-
dropped infiltrators.  These personnel were typically unable to transmit their status or 
requirements to their support bases in the South.  It is unknown whether these teams even 
received any incoming transmissions from higher, for the same reasons.  With the land-
based partisans, communication with their support elements was sufficient to allow them 
to establish and retain RS Recovery Mechanism, but the lack of proper equipment did reduce 
their effectiveness in conducting NAR operations when IP events occurred.   
Intelligence in support of NAR operations was also quite poor during this 
period. Rivalries between Defense and Agency personnel in part explain this.  One 
officer stated, “every service was intent on running its own intelligence network” and 
“the differences filtered down and the result was we all worked independently” (as cited 
in Aldrich, 2001, p.281).  As the war progressed, policy-makers placed less emphasis on 
intelligence for ground forces and most resources went toward aerial intelligence for the 
bombing campaign.  The lack of interagency cooperation resulted in poorly coordinated 
collection and dissemination of critical intelligence.  While the concept of airdropping 
“locals” was arguably the fundamental reason for the lack of RS Recovery Mechanism with 
regard to that operation, poor intelligence did contribute to the inadequate performance of 
the land-based partisans. 
Overall, NAR participants violated the principle of simplicity of C4I the 
war.  The resulting failure of the airborne infiltrators was a clear indication of the impact 
this violation had on RS Recovery Mechanism.  Adherence to NAR principles did not 
necessarily contribute to the successful maintenance of RS Recovery Mechanism by the land-
based partisans.  Rather, other external influences, such as defensive support and 
communications with support elements, contributed to the maintenance RS Recovery 
Mechanism, although the performance of effective NAR activities still suffered. 
c. Trust 
The concept of trust, as defined by this thesis, is difficult to evaluate with 
regard to tactical operations in this case study.  Detailed reports of the infiltration agents’ 
attempts to construct NAR networks are unavailable.  The presence of the repressive 
North Korean regime, however, created an operational environment for NAR very low in 
trust.  It is obvious from the case study that these conditions made it extremely unlikely 
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that the formation of a NAR network in such an environment, without solid intelligence 
and reception resources, would be successful.  While it is possible that agents naively 
misplaced trust when recruiting agents for the network, it is equally likely that locals 
simply identified the agents as newcomers, and subsequently interrogated them.  The 
partisan groups, though, had more success in working with local populations.  This was 
primarily due to their better intelligence support and a greater density of sympathetic 
people along the coast (Schuetta, 1964, pp. 145-151). 
Operational placement of trust, on the other hand, did suffer from some 
deficiencies.  In the haste to quickly train and replace agents for infiltration, the NAR 
administration would reintegrate agents returning from the North into teams without 
intensive interrogation.  This led to the use of false information and mission sabotage by 
many agents who the Communist North turned to their side.  In one incident on 19 
February 1952, a double agent onboard a C-46 transport conducting an infiltration 
mission, tossed a grenade into the cabin as he jumped from the aircraft.  The aircraft and 
six personnel were lost due to the attack (Evanhoe, 1995, pp. 143-144).  
d. Security 
There are no clear indications that NAR participants grossly violated this 
principle during their operations.  While there are reports of individual compromises, 
none of these was significant enough to compromise the entire partisan NAR 
infrastructure.  One example of how RMs properly applied security occurred when the 
North Koreans ambushed a rescue attempt that a partisan group had coordinated.  The 
rescue force had followed all authentication procedures and the information was accurate, 
but the partisan group had recently defected to the Communists.  Suspecting this might be 
the case; CCRAK immediately put this group on the “suspect” list and then sent a follow-
on mission to determine that team’s status (Evanhoe, 1995, p. 141).  This careful 
application of security prevented further ambushes and misinformation that could have 
jeopardized the rest of the effort. 
Strategically, proper use of coded messages, compartmentalized access to 
source information, and strong counterintelligence measures helped ensure security.  
Shortfalls in the RS Recovery Mechanism and effectiveness of NAR operations, therefore, did 
result not from a lack of security, but from the violation of the other NAR principles. 
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e. Access 
 The infiltration teams had virtually no access to the information or 
resources required for their missions.  The CIA sent most teams into regions that they 
were not familiar with and received wholly inadequate briefings before deployment.  
Once on the ground behind enemy lines, these agents lacked reception committees, 
equipment, and contacts in order to survive, much less establish an effective NAR 
infrastructure.  This lack of access is clearly a factor in these teams’ inability to achieve 
or maintain     RS Recovery Mechanism.   
The partisan groups, on the other hand had excellent access to both 
information and resources.  As indicated, these units had the benefit of naval and air 
assets, communications gear, and timely intelligence.  This allowed them to achieve and 
maintain RS Recovery Mechanism throughout the war.  The lack of proper tactical 
communications equipment and limited access to only coastal recruits, however, did limit 
their effectiveness in the successful recovery of many IP and the development of a large-
scale NAR network. 
f. Flexibility 
The tactical flexibility of the infiltration teams is also difficult to assess 
due to the lack of data regarding their operations in North Korean.  The results of this 
case study, though, seem to point to the fact that the recruiting and training did not create 
NAR agents that were capable of adapting to the hostile environment they were entering.  
Many of these recruited agents were not volunteers, and represented those personnel 
considered expendable by regular Korean Army units.  The partisan units, though, 
seemed to exhibit adequate flexibility in conducting their operations.  The partisans 
exhibited this by continuing to conduct successful mainland operations when the tactical 
environment had changed in a disadvantageous manner. 
The strategic planners and decision-makers for NAR operations seemed to 
have significant problems with adapting to the hurdles that appeared in creating a viable 
network.  While the North Koreans were killing, capturing, or turning numerous 
infiltrators, and the partisans were unable to establish an extensive network, the  
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administrators seemed to freeze.   Most plans simply proceeded along the same avenue of 
approach and when revised courses of action were established, they generally represented 
a cosmetic change to plans already used. 
D. OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM 
1. Background 
In August 1990, Saddam Hussein occupied Kuwait after just over twelve hours of 
military operations.  The U.S. responded as part of a multinational military force with the 
intent of liberating Kuwait. A coalition offensive drove the Iraqi military out of Kuwait 
by March of 1991.  During the conflict twenty-four aircrew members that the North 
Koreans shot down survived.  Of those personnel, friendly forces recovered only five. 
The Iraqis captured the rest.  Of the five recovered, traditional combat search and rescue 
(CSAR) methods recovered two,55 ground forces recovered another two when they 
overran the IP positions, and naval forces recovered one from the Gulf.  Of the nineteen 
captured, fourteen were captured immediately after the shoot-down, and five evaded for 
periods ranging from three to forty-eight hours (Veda, 1997, pp. 28-29).  Vice Admiral 
Mayer, Commander of U.S. Joint Forces Command states that a total of sixty-three 
personnel became isolated during the conflict with twenty-five becoming prisoners of 
war.  He also states that the military attempted seven rescues, with only three being 
successful (Kennedy, 2001). 
This conflict, known as DESERT STORM, was the first major regional conflict 
for the U.S. since Vietnam and the largest military operation since World War II (Adams, 
2001, pp. 231-232).  While the Korean War and Vietnam created a renewed emphasis on 
PR operations, conventional approaches toward PR still prevailed among the top leaders 
who gained their experience during the Cold War.  Consequently, establishing an 
effective NAR program was not a priority consideration for military leaders during 
Operation DESERT STORM.   GEN Norman Schwartzkopf did not trust the capabilities 
of Special Operations (SO) forces and issued strict order that no such forces would cross 
into Iraq.  In his opinion, “they would only get into trouble and he might have to ‘divert 
forces from the real war to and [sic] bail them out” (p. 233).  Another reason for the lack 
                                                 
55 The term traditional was used over conventional because special operations forces flew the 
missions.  Several reasons are cited for this including Air Force Special Operations aircraft capabilities to 
penetrate enemy radar threats and inadequate conventional CSAR assets and resources (Anser, 2000). 
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of successful NAR cases is that the CIA suffered massive cuts to its program for 
clandestine operations.  Douglas Waller (2003) writes:  
By 1990 the SOG had practically been disbanded, the victim of domestic 
and international outrage over the agency's lethal meddling in other 
countries. Congressional and CIA budget cutters slashed money for the 
clandestine force, believing that billiondollar [sic] spy satellites collected 
intelligence more efficiently and without embarrassing the U.S. (p. 21). 
It appears then, that the Agency believed that sophisticated electronic gathering 
equipment offered lower risk; and although numerous sources point to CIA involvement 
with the Kurdish opposition, there is no supporting evidence that the agency exploited 
these relationships for PR. 
Following Desert Storm, the U.S. recognized that, although the numbers of IP 
were drastically lower than previous conflicts, the proportionate number of successful PR 
operations was still unacceptable.  During the period following DESERT STORM and 
operations in Mogadishu, the U.S. began a concerted effort to revitalize its PR program.  
One of the first steps was to formulate a memorandum of agreement (MOA) between the 
CIA and the Department of Defense (DOD) for PR.  This MOA was not limited to 
intelligence sharing, but encompassed the full spectrum of PR operations.56  This MOA is 
reviewed triennially to ensure that continued development of interagency cooperation 
(DPMO, 1999).  The next step was the implementation of the Missing Persons Act in 
1996.  This act consolidated the many functions and oversight of personnel accounting 
functions and PR under one office.  The Defense Reform Initiative #29 then created the 
first truly joint agent for all PR concerns.  The initiative named the Joint Personnel 
Recovery Agency as the executive agent under the U.S. Joint Forces Command.  Most 
recently, in 2001, The Defense Intelligence Agency created an analytic cell dedicated to 
PR support.  They established the cell in response to poor interagency coordination and 
dissemination of intelligence to Commanders and operators in the field (Book, 2002). 
The capture and recovery of Army Private Jessica Lynch provided one test of the 
revitalized PR mechanism. Her group became isolated from its convoy on the rapid 
march to Baghdad on 23 March 2003.  After coming under heavy attack in the city of An-
                                                 
56 The details of this agreement are classified SECRET, but may be obtained on SIPRNET at 
http://peacock.policy.osd.pentagon.smil.mil:8080/dpmo/pr/moa/ciadod.htm. 
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Nasiriyah, the Iraqis captured seven members of the company, including the seriously 
wounded Lynch.  Lynch remained at the hospital due to her injuries, while the Iraqis 
moved the other six prisoners to a secure location (Attack on the 507th Maintenance 
Company, 2003). 
Mohammed Odeh Al-Rehaief was an Iraqi lawyer from the city of An-Nasiriyah 
who opportunely discovered Lynch at Saddam Hospital, where his wife worked as a 
nurse.  Although not recruited to be part of a NAR network57 his actions as a surrogate 
who assisted in her recovery presents a case that can apply to this thesis’ model.   
On 27 March, Rehaief was becoming concerned for his wife’s safety and 
accompanied her to the hospital to coordinate a leave of absence.  While there, he became 
curious about a patient on the second floor who the staff rumored to be a very important 
governmental official.  His inquiries with his contacts in the hospital revealed that it was 
an American female soldier.  Rehaief waited for an opportunity to enter the room after 
the two guards for Lynch’s room conducted their shift change.  One guard left the area 
and the other subsequently fell asleep.  Rehaief entered the room and carefully peered 
through the window of the room where the Iraqis were holding Lynch.  He saw her lying 
on a hospital bed while two Iraqi men interrogated her.  Watching the interrogator beat 
Lynch, Rehaief decided that he must somehow get her out of there before she died from 
improper care or even the interrogations (Al-Rehaief, 2003, pp. 33-38). 
That same day, he set out on foot to reach the Marines who had encircled his city 
and report Lynch’s location to them.  This was a dangerous move.  Pockets of Fedayeen 
resistance groups were scattered throughout the city and killing suspected traitors on 
sight.  The leader of an Iraqi platoon interrogated Rehaief as he passed their position. 
Rehaief’s cover story was that he had to get to his house in the town of Zenawiya to get 
medicine and money for his daughter.  Major Ayoub was the man in charge of this 
platoon, and he threatened to shoot Rehaief if he did not turn back.  Rehaief then turned 
                                                 
57 On 15 April, CNN reported that Rehaief was a trusted asset recruited, paid, trained and employed by 
the CIA.  However, there is no confirmatory documentation available to support this claim.  The thesis 
therefore will simulate a NAR infrastructure with Rehaief and his contacts as the network; the organizers 
and administrators are comprised of the U.S. military members who tasked Rehaief following his initial 
contact (CNN American Morning (2003); Starr (2003)).  
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back until out of sight of that platoon and circled around them, continuing to move 
eastwards toward the American lines.  Here he ran into a full company of Iraqi soldiers, 
the last obstacle between him and the Americans.  The Major in charge of this group was 
Major Talib, and he told Rehaief to turn around as well.  Rehaief told Talib that he was 
Ayoub’s nephew and needed his help.  That story, combined with Rehaief’s ring and 
watch bought him passage through the lines (Al-Rehaief, 2003, pp. 139-144). 
When Rehaief reached the Marines, they treated him rather harshly.  The Marines 
had been subject to many suicide attacks by Iraqis coming from An-Nasiriyah.  
Therefore, American counter-intelligence agents, using Kuwaiti translators, aggressively 
interrogated Rehaief upon his arrival.  One of the Americans, Staff Sergeant Corey, 
actually spoke Arabic, but used the translator in a ruse to verify the validity of Rehaief’s 
statements.  After several hours of various interrogation techniques, Corey was satisfied 
that Rehaief was a trusted source; but they needed more information before they could 
initiate Lynch’s recovery.  Rehaief had to go back to An-Nasiriyah and gather more 
detailed information on the hospital, Lynch’s condition, and Iraqi security.  Corey 
instructed Rehaief not to write anything down, and he was to get his family out of the 
area to one of several Marine camps as enemy disposition allowed.  They also arranged 
signals in the form of clothing Rehaief would wear and a password to produce when 
encountering Marine troops to ensure his safety.  At 0730 on 28 March, Rehaief began 
the dangerous journey back into An-Nasiriyah (Al-Rehaief, 2003, pp. 145-155). 
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After getting back into the city, Rehaief discovered that the Fedayeen were aware 
of his activities and were searching for him.  They had already looted his house, but his 
family was safely at a relative’s house due to the efforts of a local Mullah, who the 
Fedayeen subsequently executed for his actions.  He linked up with his family at his 
father’s house and began to devise the plan to gather the required information.  He 
recruited his brother, Hassan, and his wife for the trip to the hospital.  His brother, a 
police Captain, was able to use his credentials to pass through the numerous Iraqi 
checkpoints established throughout the city.  His wife would attempt to access the room 
where the Iraqis were holding Lynch and collect the details on her identity and condition.  
Rehaief would map out the hospital floor plans and enemy troop dispositions.  He 
planned this operation to occur that evening, when he assumed security would be less 
stringent.  Unfortunately, the Iraqis increased security at night and there was no way to 
access the floor where Lynch’s room was.  Rehaief collected as much data as he could, 
using features of his hand to track the numbers of military personnel and vehicles as well 
as finding a helicopter landing area.  Fighting in the city was becoming more intense and 
Rehaief was concerned for his family’s safety, so he took them out of the city to a Marine 
camp that evening.  The authentication system Corey prepared Rehaief with worked and 
he left his family safely in American hands before venturing into the city one last time 
(Al-Rehaief, 2003, pp. 159-173). 
Corey had arranged for bombing to cease over Victory Bridge, the main route to 
the closest Marine camp, between 1300 and 1330 on 29 March, the next afternoon.  That 
was Rehaief’s window to cross to the Marine positions once his mission was complete; 
Corey directed that, under no circumstances, should Rehaief attempt another contact after 
dark.  Corey considered it blind luck that Rehaief made it to the Marine camp with his 
family alive that night, and could not risk losing his source to such folly.  Rehaief 
returned to the hospital.  He was able to walk each floor of the hospital and gain access to 
the roof to make sure it was not booby-trapped.  He also determined, in his best estimate, 
that the roof could support a helicopter.  His sister-in-law was a doctor there and she used 
her contacts within the hospital to produce some paperwork that authorized an 
electrocardiogram for Rehaief (EKG); the only EKG machine in the hospital was in 
Lynch’s room.  Once inside, they were able to confirm Lynch’s name and her condition.  
It was nearly 1400 when he was preparing to leave the hospital when one of the guards 
recognized Rehaief.  A chase ensued, that took Rehaief over Victory Bridge in the middle 
of a bombing campaign.  The bombing caused him to crash his vehicle, moderately 
injuring Rehaief, but also killing his pursuers.  On the far side of the bridge, the 
Jerusalem Brigade detained Rehaief as a suspected deserter.  He once again managed to 
escape after overpowering the guards (Al-Rehaief, 2003, pp. 172-193). 
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By the time Rehaief made it to the American lines, it was already dark.  Rehaief 
knew that time was of the essence, and elected to chance contact.  He happened to be 
wearing white shorts under his trousers that he borrowed from his father.  He then 
stripped down to them, showing he had no bombs, and stepped out toward the Americans 
when the firing had died down and successfully made contact.  Once behind American 
lines again, U.S. forces thoroughly debriefed Rehaief, who provided critical information 
to the rescue forces, including the fact that a Japanese company built the hospital.  The 
Marines were later able to download the building’s blueprints from the Internet.  In the 
late hours of 1 April, Special Forces soldiers conducted a raid of Saddam Hospital and 
based on the information provided by Rehaief successfully recovered Lynch (Al-Rehaief, 
2003, pp. 194-203).   
2. Analysis—Relative Superiority of the Recovery Mechanism 
The analysis of Lynch’s rescue begins with Rehaief’s decision to assist in Lynch’s 
recovery.  Unlike the previous cases, where the PV occurred with the insertion of RM 
personnel, this case represents a shift in the mindset of an indigenous person already 
established in the enemy’s territory.  The timeline in the RS Recovery Mechanism graph in 
Figure 22 represents the time from Rehaief’s decision until the successful rescue of 
Lynch.  Rehaief enters the graph with a high level of RS Recovery Mechanism due to several 
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Figure 22.   Authors’ RS Recovery Mechanism Graph for the Lynch Rescue. 
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First, he unilaterally made the decision to assist in the Lynch recovery, discussing 
the matter with no one else, which gave him good security at the outset.  Second, he had 
terrific access to the hospital and its personnel.  Third, his background as a lawyer and his 
knowledge of local customs allowed him a significant measure of flexibility in dealing 
with enemy security.  Finally, the enemy will could not counter the sympathetic 
determination of a locally respected individual with the vision to make a difference. 
Rehaief could not maintain or improve upon his RS Recovery Mechanism because of the 
speed in which he had to conduct his operations.  Knowing that time was critical, he 
traveled immediately to contact friendly forces.  His exposure to the numerous Iraqi and 
American threats during this journey showed a rapid decline in his level of RS Recovery 
Mechanism.  This decline illustrates the loss of security through exposure and loss of access 
since he moved out on his own.  While Rehaief never lost RS Recovery Mechanism, his 
advantage was slipping.  Once he linked with the Americans, providing critical 
intelligence, he developed some semblance of a NAR network.  He now had additional 
resources and support available, but only temporarily. 
When Rehaief had to return to the city, RS Recovery Mechanism again declined rapidly, 
almost past the RS line.  Without access to the resources of the Marines, or any other 
contact, and complete compromise of security, the Fedayeen nearly captured him.  His 
ability to adapt in order to move to an area of trust allowed him to hold on to any 
remaining RS Recovery Mechanism.  After reaching his trusted family in their safe house, and 
having access to their resources, RS Recovery Mechanism again began to rise.  This allowed 
Rehaief to return to the hospital and gather the necessary information to complete the 
mission.  His compromise at the hospital, however, was probably the most critical loss of 
RS Recovery Mechanism to come.  His resourcefulness, however, allowed him to regain contact 
with the Marines, passing the information that allowed them to reach the highest point of 
RS Recovery Mechanism achieved in the operation. 
As time went on until the rescue, information rapidly became dated.  There was 
no more communications with trusted sources within the hospital, and no chance of 
successfully infiltrating Rehaief again.  The graph, therefore, represents a steady decline 
in RS Recovery Mechanism as the RM became increasingly more ignorant of the condition of 
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Lynch and the situation at Saddam hospital.  The decline, however, was not significant 
enough to fall below the RS line, which is a strong determinant of mission success.  
Although time had passed, the planning occurred with sufficient priority to successfully 
execute a successful recovery. 
While this case does not represent a true NAR scenario and the recovery used 
relatively conventional means, it does provide a contemporary framework for the 
application of the principles proposed by this thesis.  It also highlights another 
consideration concerning NAR as a recovery tool.  While NAR is a mechanism designed 
for high-threat environments unsuitable for overt recovery methods, it may also be a 
powerful tool for the location and identification of personnel for other means of recovery.  
These NAR-facilitated scenarios may illustrate new doctrinal approaches to the 
clandestine methods of recovery. 
3. Analysis of the NAR Principles for OIF 
a. Vision 
The Lynch case does not itself support the principle of vision for RS 
Recovery Mechanism.  However, the multiple efforts described to create a strong PR capability 
over the past decade indicate that there is some visionary leadership in this endeavor.  
The high security with regard to contemporary NAR operations makes a detailed 
discussion of how this vision has affected OIF impossible.  Special Operations Command 
Central (SOCCENT) planner, Ms. Julia Coco, stated that there were eleven successful 
recoveries of IP during OIF due to the established NAR infrastructure (personal 
communication, November 13, 2003).  This conflict was also the first where there was 
one hundred percent accountability of U.S. personnel after hostilities ceased. NAR 
operations contributed significantly to this success (Baumgartner, 2003).  These 
indicators point to the application of solid vision in the formulation of PR plans for OIF. 
b. Simplicity (C4I) 
Command and Control was very simple for this operation.  According to 
Rehaief’s first hand account, Corey was the only contact to whom he reported and from 
whom he took orders.  Rehaief, then, represented the chief of operations within the city of 
An-Nasiriyah.  Although all of his witting contacts were family, Rehaief controlled the  
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execution of all collection and movements during this operation.  Corey knew that 
Rehaief was more knowledgeable about the situation within the city, and therefore, 
allowed him to work autonomously. 
Rehaief did not use any technological communication methods during the 
operation, but he applied the principle as much as possible under the constraints of the 
operational environment.  Security in the city was so strict that providing Rehaief with 
communication technology risked compromising the mission.  Rehaief had already once 
been summarily tortured after local authorities discovered he had a television satellite 
dish. (Rehaief, 2003, pp. 123-129).  Using visual identification and face-to-face 
communication, while dangerous, was probably the lowest risk method they could 
employ. 
The “network” directly used computers to achieve success for the first 
time in these case studies.  The simple use of the Internet to collect data on building 
specifications, as well as using computer programs to draw out the detailed maps that 
Rehaief and his wife had memorized, directly contributed to the success of the recovery 
mission.  This use of computers to simplify intelligence analysis helped consolidate 
information for the recovery force to ensure Lynch’s successful recovery.  
The “network” also employed intelligence effectively in this case.  While 
the U.S. has displayed a tendency to move away from the use of human sources in favor 
of electronic collection, this did not happen with Lynch’s recovery.  The Marines knew 
that Rehaief’s information was far superior to any signals or visual intelligence they 
could collect with their equipment.  Their recognition of the value of his simple methods 
of counting enemy forces and drawing mental maps created the most reliable intelligence 
on which to act. 
c. Trust 
Trust was the most difficult principle to apply in this environment but the 
“network” applied it very well to the recovery of Lynch.  Trust was obviously required if 
this mission were to be successful.  The Marines had to trust Rehaief, who in turn, had to 
trust his contacts.  Without trust between each of these players, the mission could not 
have succeeded. 
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The players also applied this trust judiciously.  The Marines ensured they 
properly vetted Rehaief’s information before accepting the operation and sending him 
back into the city.  Likewise, Rehaief had to limit his trust to the one group his culture 
taught him he could always count on, his family.  While he had many friends in his 
neighborhood, he illustrated his concern with trust when he said, “there was too much 
money on my head to trust them [people from his neighborhood]” (Rehaief, 2003, p.175).   
d. Security 
While the Rehaief applied security as rigorously as possible, the criticality 
of time forced some actions that nearly doomed the mission.  This was most evident in 
the two instances Rehaief nearly lost RS Recovery Mechanism.  In each case, his daylight 
movement through Iraqi occupied positions compromised his intentions.  The strength he 
exhibited with regard to the principles of flexibility, access, and trust explains why he did 
not completely lose RS Recovery Mechanism at these moments. 
The Marines, while having to send Rehaief back to the city, did take 
security very seriously.  If the Iraqis discovered Rehaief’s collaborative efforts, they 
would have immediately executed him.  The Marines, therefore, would not give Rehaief 
transportation back toward the city or provide him with any gear that could identify his 
contact with them.  They also gave him procedures for future contact with friendly forces, 
to ensure he was not accidentally mistaken for a saboteur.  The mission entailed high risk 
by its nature and, given the time available, security was a difficult principle to perfectly 
apply. 
e. Access 
Along with trust, the “network” applied access very well in this case.  
Rehaief’s access to key personnel in the hospital and the city was a key factor for the 
success of this mission.  Had his wife not worked there, he might never have discovered 
Lynch.  His brother’s credentials allowed him access through the checkpoints and his 
sister-in-law’s status as a doctor prevented the amputation surgery and gave him final 
access to Lynch.   
Establishing the connections with the Marines also was crucial to the 
successful execution of Lynch’s recovery.  Rehaief lacked the resources to get Lynch out 
of the hospital himself.  Even if he had such abilities, he most likely would not have been 
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able to deliver Lynch to friendly control himself.58  He needed access to the resources 
and trust of American forces, which he attained through face-to-face contact.  The 
combination of access to indigenous contacts, American support, and ground-truth 
information was important to the maintenance of Rehaief’s RS Recovery Mechanism. 
f. Flexibility 
The ability to adapt to constantly evolving threat situations was perhaps 
the most crucial principle that allowed Rehaief to maintain RS Recovery Mechanism during the 
course of events in this case.  Rehaief’s ability to continue planning operations at his 
father’s house, after the Fedayeen discovered his intentions, illustrates this flexibility.  
His ability to continue intelligence gathering when the Iraqis tightened security at the 
hospital, and later regaining access, also highlight this ability.  Perhaps the event most 
indicative of flexibility was when Rehaief missed his window to cross Victory Bridge.  
By overpowering his guards, and devising alternate means to contact the Marines after 
dark, he was able to maintain RS Recovery Mechanism just above the line. 
Rehaief’s anonymity with Iraqi military forces allowed him to adapt his 
cover stories with evolving situations.  Illustrating this was the incident where he adjusted 
his story in order to get past the Iraqi military forces that confronted him.  Later, when he 
was unable to find a means into Lynch’s room, he contrived the story of a heart condition 
to ensure completion of the final portion of the mission.  This ability to adapt, integrated 
with the other principles, allowed Rehaief to preserve RS Recovery Mechanism until mission 
completion. 
E. RELATIVE SUPERIORITY OF THE ISOLATED PERSONNEL 
This chapter again focused on the RS Recovery Mechanism because, in the case of 
Korea, an analysis of the lifespan of the line provides a more comprehensive analysis 
than a single IP event.  In the Lynch case, RS Isolated Personnel was not applicable since she 
was actually in enemy control.  The advantages of acquiring and maintaining RS Isolated 
Personnel is still important for NAR and the principles that lead to it do not differ from overt 
                                                 
58 Dr. Harith al-Houssona, who attended Lynch at the hospital, claims to have taken Lynch from the 
hospital for a transfer to Baghdad.  En route, however, he told the ambulance driver to take her to the 
nearest U.S. Marine camp.  When they approached the camp, the Marines, who suicide bombers had 
previously targeted with similar tactics, fired at the ambulance.  Houssona then took Lynch back to Saddam 
Hospital in An-Nasiriyah (Withers, 2003).  While Rehaief’s account does not corroborate this account, it 
does highlight how his access to the Marines was important. 
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recoveries.  Adaptability is timeless and remains a critical principle for RS Isolated Personnel.  
In Korea, the ability for American IP to blend in with the environment would have been 
highly dependent on camouflage and hiding techniques since the ability to overtly blend 
with the different cultural aspects of Asian people would have been nearly impossible.  
Similar limitations applied to those in the Middle Eastern environment of Iraq.   
The contemporary case studies also highlight shortfalls in communication.  
During the Korean conflict, allied forces tried to use electronic means to support Partisan 
NAR, but were unsuccessful because of equipment incompatibility.  Similarly, in OIF, 
resource constraints left a majority of the soldiers in Lynch’s company without personal 
radio equipment.  While these shortfalls may not apply for direct communications with 
RM, it is important to ensure prompt notification of an IP event to RM directors who can 
then activate the NAR network in a timely manner. 
Due to the lack of information from either theater with regard to details on 
individual NAR recoveries, the authors cannot offer an analysis of the Gonzales principle 
or the principle of exploitation in these case studies.  There is no reason to conclude, 
however, that these principles would be any less applicable for an IP attempting contact 














































IX. CONCLUSIONS  
A. SOF IN OVERT URBAN PERSONNEL RECOVERY OPERATIONS 
The development of the model for overt PR operations began by accepting 
McRaven’s model and theory of special operations.  This model, in and of itself, was not 
precise enough for the purposes of PR, however.  McRaven’s cases typically dealt with 
an objective that SOF needed to destroy or capture.  The PR model, however, brings in 
another variable not accounted for in McRaven’s analysis, the evader.  Unlike an 
inanimate target, or a hostage under enemy control, an evader can significantly affect 
operational conditions for both the recovery force and the enemy.  The recovery force 
must now concern itself not only with enemy actions and intent, but also with the 
considerations and actions of the isolated personnel (IP). 
This thesis hypothesizes that a recovery force is able to gain relative superiority 
(RS Recovery Forces) over their adversary by creating a simple plan, concealing critical details 
from the enemy, rehearsing in detail, and executing with speed, surprise, and purpose.  
Furthermore, IP can gain a similar level of RS (RS Isolated Personnel) by immediately adapting 
to their environment, communicating their situation to the recovery force, exploiting the 
opportunities and resources of their environment, and employing the Gonzales principle.  
Relative superiority is different for the RF and the IP but combine to contribute to the 
shared goal of successfully recovering the IP. 
With regard to the overt recovery force, the three case studies provide added 
validity for McRaven’s principles of special operations.  The cases chosen also illustrate 
how those participating in personnel recovery must accept it as another facet of warfare, 
and not just an altruistic pursuit.  Some people debate the cost-effectiveness and 
rationality of risking many lives to save only one or a few others.  Even more debate the 
logic of risking lives to recover those who are already dead.  This cost-benefit argument 
is irrelevant given the fact that the U.S. military will continue to aggressively pursue full-
spectrum PR despite the “bottom line accounting” figures.  If the U.S. sacrifices more 
lives during PR missions than it saves, questions may arise regarding the means and 
methods, but the effort will most likely continue.  The events in Mogadishu in 1993 
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highlight a new domestic environment where even allowing deceased soldiers to fall into 
enemy hands can have wide-ranging political and strategic implications.  Therefore, since 
the U.S. will continue to conduct such operations, regardless of the costs, they must 
conduct them as well as possible.  PR does not simply fulfill some philanthropic desires 
in those who participate in combat; rather, it is a key component of a larger view of 
warfare that ensures the realization of national objectives.  While PR advocates make 
every effort to ensure larger numbers of soldiers do not fall prey to the same fate as the IP 
they are sent to recover, it has become or is seen by military and civilian leaders as an 
acceptable risk. 
One might argue that the culturally varied urban areas of the world may affect the 
conditions under which SOF exercises the principles of PR, but the principles will remain 
necessary for success, and may be applicable to urban areas not considered in this thesis.  
Analysis of the three case studies from Somalia showed how the application of 
McRaven’s principles contributed to the RS Recovery Forces.  The Tiger Company recovery 
forces were able to maintain RS Recovery Forces throughout the engagement because they 
applied the model’s principles in addition to their ability to bring considerable firepower 
to bear.  While there were varying levels of success, recognizing the limitations available 
with regard to some of the principles allowed the teams to compensate and still maintain 
a high level of RS Recovery Forces.  Task Force Ranger was a good example of how it is 
nearly impossible for a force to regain RS Recovery Forces once it is lost.  Unfortunately, 
when the PR event occurred, the organically tasked recovery force quickly lost RS Recovery 
Forces.  Their ability to affect a recovery of the IP was impossible until outside forces were 
able to arrive and provide RS Recovery Forces over the enemy. 
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The introduction of the concept of RS Isolated Personnel shows the necessity to develop 
a comprehensive model that takes both the recovery force and IP into consideration when 
developing a PR plan.  It also shows how difficult it is for an IP to attain and sustain RS 
Isolated Personnel in the urban environment.  One lesson derived from these case studies is that 
RS Isolated Personnel requires all four principles, but that the IP’s ability to adapt to the 
environment is the strongest influence.  This trait of becoming invisible to the enemy 
seems to be a consistent trait in determining where an IP can achieve RS Isolated Personnel.  
Just as a recovery force will have difficultly regaining RS once it is lost, so will an IP.  
As illustrated in the case studies, movement and exposure, at the wrong time and under 
poor conditions, can result in losing RS Isolated Personnel.  While there are historical instances 
of bold acts of overt movement that allow a person to blend, they are rare compared to 
the number of those that the enemy have captured or killed because of such acts.  The 
decision, therefore, remains with the IP as to when movement will facilitate a rescue or 
lead to failure.  The correctness of this decision lies in the IP’s ability to communicate 
with the recovery force and exploit the opportunities provided by the environment.  
Finally, the IP’s must found his or her decisions and actions in a composed warrior 
mindset that is developed, enhanced, and matured through intensive and realistic training, 
in accordance with the Gonzales principle. 
The case studies also illustrate what is arguably the most important lesson for PR 
operations in urban terrain: gaining RS Recovery Force using overt methods for recovery is 
extremely difficult and costly.  One reason for this is the United States’ well-published 
and historically proven intent to retrieve IP despite the tremendous resources required to 
do so.  In many cases, once an IP event has occurred, the enemy is aware of this fact and 
expects some type of recovery operation to follow.  This greatly diminishes the recovery 
forces’ ability to employ the principle of surprise.  This is why it is so important for an IP 
to achieve and maintain RS Isolated Personnel during the event.  Since RS Isolated Personnel is 
heavily dependant on adapting to the environment, the recovery force can then maintain 
some level of surprise on exactly where the recovery efforts will focus.  The ability of the 
IP to maintain RS Isolated Personnel will also allow recovery forces to achieve a similar 
amount of surprise as to the actual timing and means of recovery.  The enemy will 
typically assume that the recovery force will attempt a rescue as soon as possible, but if 
the IP achieves RS Isolated Personnel, the modus operandi of the RF can be more flexible. 
147 
Another important lesson to garner from these case studies involves the use of 
helicopters in the urban environment.  The events in Mogadishu, and most recently in 
Iraq highlight that the use of large, slow moving platforms at low altitudes provides easy 
targets for the enemy to engage and exploit.  Typical recovery platforms such as the 
HH/MH-60 and MH-53 seem to provide easy targets for the enemy, and hence raise the 
potential for more IP events, in the urban environment.  The large size and inability to 
land of these helicopters creates situations where extended hovering is necessary, and that 
is where the helicopter is most vulnerable to low-tech weaponry.  While retaining a 
vertical-lift platform, as a means of transport from this environment, may be beneficial in 
terms of redundancy for ground vehicles, or simply as an expedient, the use of other 
airframes may be in order.  The MH-6 offered a more difficult target and could land in 
the narrow streets of Mogadishu due to its agility and size.  Perhaps further research into 
its use, or the development of similar helicopters dedicated to PR in an urban 
environment is in order. 
McRaven also proposes several additional means for special operations forces to 
reduce their area of vulnerability and maintain RS until mission completion.  One of 
these methods is to move the point of mission completion closer to the point of 
vulnerability by limiting the objectives.  Figure 23 shows a basic illustration of this 
concept.  This is very difficult to translate to PR operations because it implies leaving 
personnel behind, which is contrary to the very essence of the U.S. military culture.  Part 
of the Ranger creed is to not let a fallen comrade fall into the hands of the enemy. The 
discussion of this point does not intend to advocate selective recovery of U.S. personnel, 
but to provide an avenue of thinking for mission planners approaching PR operations.  
An example of this could occur when RF are directed to recover only living personnel 
until a follow-on mission can be assembled that can bring absolute superiority to the 
battlefield to recover the deceased (through massed firepower or other means).  Another 
way to reduce the time and vulnerability is to introduce multiple small forces, distributed 
within the battlespace, each with limited objectives.  The difficulty with these options is 
balancing the size of the operation with the inherent complexity and difficulties with 
security. 
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Comparing this concept with the events of TF Ranger on 3 October (illustrated in 
Figure 9), one could see that by restricting the objectives to living IP, the recovery forces 
could have reduced their area of vulnerability significantly by leaving crash site number 
one up to three and a half hours earlier.  This does imply that the decision to remain was 
an incorrect one.  Rather, the point is to merely illustrate another method of increasing 
the probability of mission success.  The elements that define tactical mission success still 
reside with the commanders and soldiers who are on the ground conducting operations.  
It will be up to these people to determine what actions to take in order to reduce the area 
of vulnerability under the environmental constraints they face, and whether the 




Figure 23.   Example of Limiting Objectives & What Constitutes Mission Completion.  (From 
McRaven, 1996, p. 386). 
  
McRaven also states that moving the point of vulnerability can reduce the overall 
area of vulnerability during an operation.  Figure 24 illustrates this concept.  This method 
presents PR planners with less of a dilemma than attempting to alter the conditions for 
mission completion.  With this method, planners can use innovative methods and careful 
analysis to determine weak points in the enemy’s defense and exploit them.  In the urban 
environment, this could be as simple as using routes through sympathetic neighborhoods 
to get as close to the objective as possible before engagement, using indigenous vehicles 
to forestall identification as recovery forces, or using diversionary attacks to allow lift 





Figure 24.   Example of Moving the Point of Vulnerability. (From McRaven, 1996, p. 385). 
 
B. NONCONVENTIONAL PERSONNEL RECOVERY OPERATIONS 
This thesis postulates that a recovery mechanism (RM) can only hope to achieve 
and maintain RS Recovery Mechanism in the conduct of NAR operations by adhering to six 
basic, yet specific, principles.  These principles include the dedication of visionary 
leaders and operators and the development of a simplified and effective command, 
control, communications, and computer infrastructure.  These principles comprise the 
strategic and operational base, respectively, upon which the other principles rest and 
directly affect how much RS Recovery Mechanism will exist at the point of vulnerability. The 
other four principles are critical for maintaining RS Recovery Mechanism and achieving mission 
success at the tactical level.  These principles include: security measures that protect the 
network without impeding its effectiveness, properly allocated trust to agencies and 
members of the recovery mechanism, access to resources and opportunities to effect a 
recovery, and flexibility of the members of the RM to adapt to a fluid environment.  The 
boundaries (strategic/operational/tactical) between these principles is a permeable one, 
because security is also crucial prior to the point of vulnerability, and the importance of 
trust extends to interagency relationships that initially form the RM prior to combat 
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operations.  They model merely depicts where the majority of each principle’s impact 
generates the most significant effect. 
The IP, just as in the overt recoveries, must also be able to maintain RS Isolated 
Personnel throughout his isolation until he or she is absorbed into the network.  At this point, 
the IP is under the control of the mechanism designed to bring him or her out and has 
negligible impact on his or her own recovery.  The four principles that lend to the RS 
Isolated Personnel are no different than for overt recoveries, and will have the same impact on 
his or her recovery.  Planners must design NAR infrastructure and operations to ensure 
that a lapse in RS Isolated Personnel, particularly when close to the contact phase, will not have 
a negative affect on the RS Recovery Mechanism.  The continued ability to perform clandestine 
activities that allow it to effectively recover IP’s in their area relies heavily on RS Recovery 
Mechanism.  RS Isolated Personnel involves remaining out of enemy control.  Sustaining both 
levels of RS until contact between the RM and IP is achieved will increase the likelihood 
of successful recovery. 
The authors did not design the four tactical principles of access, flexibility, trust, 
and security to be “cookie-cutter” planning templates for successful NAR operations.  
Rather, they provide basic guidelines for tactical consideration when planning the 
development and execution of recovery methods.  Security and trust have balancing 
qualities; security provides for the continued existence of the network, while trust ensures 
its effectiveness.  Extending too much trust can reduce the level of security; conversely, 
imposing too much security will limit critically required reciprocal trust.  Similarly, 
flexibility allows the network to exist clandestinely within the enemy territory, while 
access to resources and information allows the network to fulfill its functions.  Access 
and trust create some form of exposure of the network, and the countervailing principles 
of flexibility and security prevent this exposure from compromising the network to 
exploitation or destruction by the enemy.  This balance keeps the pyramid in its proper 
form, and rests on the operational and strategic strengths of the model’s base, simplicity 
of C4I and vision. 
In discussing the operational principle of simplicity of C4I, it is important to 
remember that NAR planners and executors should not pursue simplicity at the expense 
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of effectiveness.  There is no overarching diagram illustrating a standard practice 
applicable in all theaters of operations at all times.  Rather, each theater NAR manager 
must take into account the available resources, ability of his or her recovery mechanism 
directors, the ability of the personnel operating the recovery mechanism, and the overall 
threat level.  While portable communications devices may be appropriate in one theater, 
perhaps only courier communications are appropriate in another.  In another example, 
one mechanism may warrant having complete autonomy for resource allocation and 
recruitment, while another may require more oversight and control until it matures.  
Although centralized coordination and decentralized execution are arguably the most 
effective means of operations, it will be incumbent upon the leaders of each mechanism 
to determine if such an approach is appropriate for the time and place they find 
themselves.  The goal is to create a C4I structure that is as simple as possible given the 
operational environment, and maximizes effectiveness while supporting the tactical 
principles that lead to successful execution. 
While the U.S. has come a long way since the complete destruction of MIS-X and 
its resources, there is still room for improvement.  It is probably infeasible to expend the 
resources required to establish dedicated NAR infrastructures throughout every global 
area of strategic concern.  However, leaders in the PR community can create 
infrastructures in the areas of highest priority.  In addition, utilizing these networks to 
provide support for other national and military interests during periods where PR events 
are not likely to occur can provide several benefits.  One of these benefits is to 
continually assess the loyalty and reliability of the network’s members, resulting in a 
more trusted source over time.  Another benefit is the conservation of resources.  Using 
these networks to provide information while not involved in NAR activities can free up 
other assets typically required for such tasks.  Finally, the conditions for a person to 
become isolated are not restricted to periods of conflict.  Americans worldwide are 
susceptible to isolation or capture by elements belligerent to their government’s policies 
at any time.  The existence of NAR networks in these areas can greatly facilitate the 
U.S.’s national interests by providing a capability to return these people to friendly 
control without costly conventional military intervention. 
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C.  RECOMMENDATIONS 
Vision without resources is similar to having a place to go but no way to get there. 
Unfortunately, the U.S. military is highly dependent on technical resources for 
intelligence gathering and ground-truth analysis.  Exorbitant expenditures go into highly 
technical weapons platforms and surveillance equipment, as compared to those that the 
U.S. spends on the human capital that are arguably better exploited against its adversaries 
implementing asymmetric means.59  Until key leaders and policy-makers embrace the 
benefits provided by NAR networks, and provide the funding necessary to exploit them 
to their fullest capacity, the U.S. will not realize the vision of the PR “industry leaders.”  
This also applies to overt funding programs.  The development of the OV-22 osprey as a 
special operations platform will not provide more, and possibly, less, PR capabilities in 
the urban environment than existing vertical lift platforms.  The contending replacements 
for the HH/MH-60, AgustaWestland’s US101 and Sikorsky’s S-92, also do not appear to 
be viable platforms in such an environment.  As continued conflicts arise in such areas, 
the U.S. should explore and balance suitable technical and human capital resources, to 
maximize effectiveness on the urban battlefield. 
Additionally, the U.S. should reconsider current doctrinal paradigms in 
accordance with historical and contemporary lessons learned with regard to PR.  The use 
of overt forces has gained large favor with military planners since Vietnam, when large 
force packages could escort the rescue forces and “soften up” the target area of hostile 
forces.  The urban environment removes the ability for large strike packages to create a 
corridor for recovery forces to safely enter the area.  This is because of the issue of 
collateral damage as well as the restrictive nature of urban areas.  Even in the age of 
precision strike capability, the natural camouflage of such an environment would still 
reduce the ability to protect an overt recovery force.  If overt forces are required to 
conduct a recovery, military leadership should consider other innovative means of 
                                                 
59 An emphasis on asymmetric means to offset U.S. military capability has emerged as a significant 
trend among potential threats, and has become an integral part of adversaries’ principles and tactics.  
Asymmetry results when one opponent has dissimilar capabilities—values, organization, training, or 
equipment—that the other cannot counter. It is not a new concept.  It naturally evolves from a sound 
mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, time available, civil considerations 
(METT-TC) analysis by an intelligent, freethinking, and adaptive threat.  These asymmetric approaches 
will include the most advanced, commercially available technology innovatively applied and mixed with 
crude, simple, and unsophisticated weapons, tactics, techniques, and procedures (FM 3-06, 2003, p. 3-2). 
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securing their safety.  Some areas to explore should include deception operations, 
unmanned lift platforms, and versatile ground vehicles capable of urban navigation under 
fire.  Of course, clandestine forces enjoy the ability to use the environment to the same 
advantage as the enemy.  While this does not negate the extreme risk such personnel 
operate under, it does offer greater chances for successful IP recovery in the urban 
environment.   
This thesis does not recommend the dismantling of the U.S.’s overt means of PR.  
While many urbanized areas exist across the world, there are also many rural or 
unpopulated areas.  In these less populated areas, overt methods will continue to be 
highly effective, particularly during the opening phases of a conflict.  Downed airmen 
who can coast their aircraft to less populated areas, or convoy members who break down 
in hostile rural areas, will still create a demand for this type of operation, which is a 
wholly appropriate means of recovery in such circumstances.  As conflicts continue, 
however, an adversary will realize that the sanctuary of his own urban areas provides an 
effective defense to potentially stall or turn the tide of a conflict.   As the battle closes on 
these cities, there is an increased probability of IP events occurring beyond the 
capabilities of overt recovery forces.  Based on this analysis, then, the U.S. should 
concentrate NAR infrastructures in urban areas where the enemy would most likely 
collapse his forces to as he loses the initiative on the battlefield.  The advantage to 
maintaining urbanized NAR infrastructures is that they will still have extended reach 
throughout the region.  The informal networks of occupational, familial, and 
entrepreneurial groups are easier to facilitate between urban areas due to increased 
communications and movements between such areas. 
In short, the U.S. PR organizations should be a proper mix of overt and 
clandestine forces, established in and dispersed to areas suited to their individual 
strengths.  These forces guide themselves by overarching principles that encompass the 
responsibilities of the commanders and their staffs, recovery force, and the isolated 
personnel.  The adherence to these principles will provide the best chance of each 
element attaining RS in their portion of the effort and hence, leading to overall situational 
superiority that ensures the greatest probability of successful recovery efforts. 
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APPENDIX A. THE ROLE OF SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES 
Although the U.S. has conducted many combat operations in urban environments, 
they have conducted relatively few personnel recovery (PR) missions of isolated 
personnel (IP) in urban terrain.  In only one of the five known or available modern cases 
have personnel recoveries been effected prior to capture.  The authors argue that special 
operations forces (SOF) are ideally suited to increase the probability of success of these 
operations in the high-threat arena of the urban environment.  Currently, the individual 
services have PR capabilities that are doctrinally limited to low or medium-threat 
environments.  However, even in the medium-threat environment, the services require 
large numbers of supporting forces to conduct those operations.  SOF, using relatively 
small forces to attain relative superiority (RS Recovery Forces) for quick operations, offer the 
greatest probability for mission success in high-threat environments, especially in urban 
areas.  Figure 25, derived from the SOF PR doctrinal manual, illustrates the level of risk 
with regard to employed methods of recovery.60 
In addition to NAR capabilities, SOF forces also have other unique capabilities 
that facilitate a higher probability of success in recovery operations associated with the 
high-threat urban environments.  DA missions conducted by SOF have widely been 
considered nothing more than hyper-conventional operations—where it is the unit, and 
not the mission, that is special because of the unique equipment and high proficiency.  
Even conducting “essentially ordinary conventional warfare activities” SOF offers a 
higher probability of success in the conduct of PR missions (Adams, 1998, p. 304).  In 
this context, Figure 25 shows that joint conventional forces should be employed in JPR 
operations of increased risk, until the point where the risk reaches a level requiring 
enhanced capabilities and proficiency, when SOF forces would be better suited, or offer a 
higher probability of mission success.   
                                                 
60 While the authors adopted Figure 25 from current SOF doctrine, they made the following 
refinements to coincide with the thesis: the term JPR (joint personnel recovery) replaces JCSAR (joint 
search and rescue) in accordance with joint doctrine; under JPR, the mission was divided into joint 
component and SOF assets in order to demonstrate the proper use of SOF’s unique capabilities in relation 
to increased threat; finally, under NAR, the terms “DOD and OGA” were replaced with “SOF and OGA” to 
illustrate that SOF is the only DOD agency that manifests that capability.   
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Figure 25.   Personnel Recovery Spectrum.  (After FM 3-05.231, 2003, p. 1-11). 
 
In contrast to Adams’ view of traditional SOF missions, Susan L. Marquis (1997) 
noted: 
American special operators, like special operations forces throughout the 
world, have developed unique operational capabilities and missions that 
distinguish them from their conventional counterparts.  Each group 
performs missions and meets requirements that more conventionally 
trained or organized forces cannot adequately address (p. 7). 
In short, SOF is unique because it can provide capabilities that are distinctive, forces that 
are uniquely proficient, or both.61  These characteristics make SOF better suited for 
missions in high-threat environments that exceed the capabilities of conventional forces.  
Recovering personnel located in urban environments represents just one example of such 
a mission, but it is this situation explored by this thesis.  Moreover, situational superiority 
(SS) is arguably most difficult to achieve in this environment. 
SOF, as one element of JPR, typically operates in a medium to high-threat 
environments, with high levels of training and proficiency, using sophisticated hardware.  
                                                 
61 Even by USSOCOM’s own account, “SOF offers DoD an additive and unique capability to achieve 
objectives.  SOF perform tasks that no one else in DoD does, and we perform tasks that others do, but 
conduct them to a unique set of conditions and standards” (USSOCOM Memorandum, 2003, p. 5).   
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The hostile operating environment presents adversary forces over a wide area of 
coverage, usually including a densely concentrated and rapidly reconstituted ground 
order of battle (GOB), a look-down/shoot down capable air threat, and a highly 
concentrated integrated air defense system (IADS) with modern ground-based radars 
(GBR), early warning systems, electronic counter-countermeasures, command & control 
(C2) networks, electronic warfare (EW) capabilities, advanced or late generation surface-
to-air missiles (SAMs), and antiaircraft artillery (AAA).  Highly concentrated IADS 
virtually prohibit air operations without large-scale combat protection packages and/or 
high-risk capable62 SOF platforms, since detection by modern GBRs and/or passive 
detection systems would otherwise result in a lethal engagement.  SOF posses unique 
equipment, procedural expertise, and organic capability for JPR, but doctrinally perform 
combat search and rescue (CSAR) in support of SOF missions only.  SOF claims to 
perform CSAR in support of other components on a case-by-case basis, not to interfere 
with the readiness or operations of core SOF missions, but recent history shows that this 
is not necessarily the case.  As of May 2003, however, the U.S. Special Operations 
Command (USSOCOM) no longer considers PR to be a collateral special operations 
activity.63  
After analyzing conventional recovery capabilities, overt SOF PR capabilities 
may be more appropriate in situations where air superiority is denied, the priority for 
recovery of IP is sufficiently high to warrant a special operation, or access is beyond the 
capability of traditional component CSAR platforms.  There are also other key 
differences in operational mindsets not accounted for under the umbrella of JPR activities 
that make SOF more suited to the mission.  JPR missions for the components or services, 
similar to CSAR, are more reactive and ad hoc operations built on the premise of quick 
and timely response.  U.S. Air Force pilots, typically associated with PR due to historical 
ties to the mission, tend to focus on the third dimension of airspace, and not on the 
                                                 
62 Aircraft specifically designed to perform low-level, long-range, undetected deep penetration 
missions into denied areas with heavily defended airspace, day or night, in adverse weather, for infiltration, 
extraction and resupply of special operations forces.  
63 From USSOCOM Memorandum, DTG 202013ZMAY03, Subject: Changes to the Missions of 
Special Operations Forces (SOF).  After changing the name of SOF’s “principle missions” to “core tasks,” 
this memorandum directed that SOF discontinue the use and discussion of SOF “collateral activities.”  
Before this directive, PR was one of SOF’s collateral activities.  USSOCOM’s desire was simply to focus 
priorities, training, and resources on the newly-termed core tasks.   
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ground where the actual CSAR takes place.  While conventional rescue pilots tactically 
execute CSAR missions with a warfighter mentality, the conventional rescue community 
considers the role of CSAR as an altruistic defensive mission with the purpose of 
preserving the force structure.  In contrast, the SOF community treats PR missions as 
offensive operations under the umbrella of direct action (DA) missions, and with fewer 
and more specialized assets available to commit, attacks the problem with a more 
deliberate and precise planning process with judicious risk analysis.64  PR missions for 
SOF are treated as special operations DA missions characterized by detailed planning, 
preparation, and rehearsals, more time required and available to plan and execute, 
thorough intelligence analysis, and often incurring more political risks.  The model and 
SOF principles for PR in the high-threat urban environment are grounded within the 



















                                                 
64 SOF combat search and rescue missions (SOF CSAR; also doctrinally referred to as SOF PR 
missions under the umbrella of Joint CSAR (JCSAR)) resemble a special operations direct action (DA) 
mission in that they are characterized by detailed planning, preparation, and rehearsals; more time required 
and available to plan and execute; thorough intelligence analysis; and often incur more political risks.  
Correctly and sufficiently applying McRaven’s principles of special operations and his theory of special 
operations as the model, since it is tailored to DA or strike operations very similar to SOF CSAR 
operations, one can expect to increase the probability of mission success for SOF.   
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APPENDIX B. DETAILED TIMELINE OF THE EVENTS OF 3-4 
OCTOBER 1993 
1324 hours (Sunday, 3 October 1993) - Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) agent 
Garrett Jones received HUMINT indicating that several of General Mohamad Farah 
Aidid’s lieutenants would be meeting near the Olympic Hotel.65  Since Jones was already 
at a meeting with MG Garrison at the airfield, he quickly passed this initial intelligence to 
TF Ranger (Loeb, 2000, p. W6).   
1330 hours – For the next two hours, the TF Ranger JOC’s “intelligence fusion 
cell” frantically managed, redirected, and orchestrated collection and surveillance assets 
trying to determine the credibility of the information.  In order to determine the exact 
location of the meeting, the JOC intelligence chief asked his CIA liaison, a case officer 
code-named Wart Hog, to radio a request via the HUMINT source’s case officer who was 
code-named Cheetah.  TF Ranger requested that the HUMINT source use some means of 
non-technical communication to refine the target house (Loeb, 2000, p. W6; Faust, 1999, 
p. 50). 
1414 hours - TF Ranger Joint Operations Center (JOC) notified the UNOSOM II 
LNO, Captain Donahue, and the UN QRF Brigade TOC, that certain sectors of central 
Mogadishu were off-limits to UNOSOM II air and ground forces.  TF Ranger planned on 
conducting operations within the sectors designated as grid reference graphic (GRG) 24, 
29, 30, 35, and 36.66  Simultaneously, TF Ranger relayed another message through 
Cheetah, requesting that the HUMINT source identify the target again.  The Somali 
                                                 
65 Also referred to by different spellings of his name: Mohammad and/or Farrah, and/or Aideed.  I am 
using the spelling from an official memorandum personally signed by him in 1993.  As for the actual target, 
it is often incorrectly identified as being the Olympic Hotel itself.  Actually, the target on 3 October 1993 
was a squared-off, three-story, pure-white house on Hawlwadig Road (Initially thought to be at GRG Sheet 
24, 12.8/M.8; UTM NH36122665, but later revised before launch to GRG Sheet 24, 12.9/M.5) in the Habr 
Gidr section of town (one of the Hawiye clan’s ten main subclans), about one block north of the hotel.  The 
HUMINT source said that Omar Salad Elmi, Aidid’s principle political advisor, Issa Mohammad Siad, and 
possibly COL Abdi “Qeybdid” Hassan Awale, the alleged Minister of Interior were at the meeting site.  
Thus, the actual target was the Salad House or the Salad Meeting House, and not the Olympic Hotel.  
Actually it was Salad and Mohammed Hassan Awale, who was soon to be named as Aidid’s Foreign 
Minister, who was at the meeting.   
66 “The GRG is a grid reference system superimposed on the top of either satellite or other overhead 
photography, giving an overhead picture of a topographic feature (in this case Mogadishu) broken down 
into smaller referenced sections providing greater detail” (Casper, 2001, p. 24). 
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wanted no part of the request, but was finally convinced to mark the target for a second 
time.  Reconnaissance assets were on station to observe the signal, but quickly realized 
that the location was vastly different from the description initially provided by the source.   
1415 hours - The HUMINT source feigned car trouble near the target building, 
but none of TF Ranger’s reconnaissance assets had observed the signal (Loeb, 2000, p. 
W6; Faust, 1999, p. 50). 
1447 hours - The TF Ranger JOC was starting to become skeptical of the 
credibility of the source and the information,67 Cheetah relayed that the source could not 
safely mark the target house because of local security.  Informed that the actual target 
was at the opposite end of the block, TF Ranger redirected assets to watch the house at 
the end of the block.  Almost immediately, reconnaissance assets identified a vehicle 
reportedly associated with Salad (Loeb, 2000, p. W6; Faust, 1999, p. 51).   Satisfied that 
he had actionable intelligence, MG Garrison approved the mission launch. 
By 1500 hours - After quickly replanning the mission based on the updated target 
location, MG Garrison had finished briefing TF Ranger’s “operators” and leadership on 
the mission.   
By 1505 hours - MG Garrison had informed MG Montgomery of the pending 
mission’s location and target, confirmed that no NGOs were operating in the vicinity of 
the target area, had given the UN QRF a “be prepared to” mission of securing the ground 
                                                 
67 “In late September, a wing of [Aidid]’s Habr Gidr subclan known as the Suleimans showed up at the 
embassy compound.  They were tired of having their neighborhood shot to pieces.  And they wanted one of 
their leaders, a former Somali National Alliance politician now opposed to [Aidid], removed from the Tier 
One list.  [The CIA agents] ultimately agreed, convincing the Suleimans that they had just been handed a 
huge favor.  [The CIA] seized the moment, gave them a radio and started organizing surveillance Team 
Three. ...On October 3… [CIA case officer, code-named Cheetah] radioed in a tip from the CIA station 
across town. …[their] newest asset, the ex-SNA leader, had just arrived with word that a cadre of top 
[Aidid] lieutenants, including two from the Tier One list…would be meeting that afternoon inside a 
compound 50 yards down Hawlwadig Road from the Olympic Hotel near the Bakara market, the heart of 
[Aidid] country.  [Aidid] might be there, too, the asset advised” (Loeb, 2000, p. W6). 
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extraction route, and had deconflicted all airspace.68  MAJ Craig Nixon notified the QRF 
of their “be prepared to” mission of securing the ground extraction route, via a secure 
phone at JOC, since the habitual TF Ranger liaison officer to the QRF was currently 
located at the JOC.   
After this initial notification, MG Montgomery immediately started coordinating 
additional support, even though he had no reason to think that TF Ranger would require 
it.  Upon committing the QRC, MG Montgomery began thinking ahead, trying to predict 
what else recovery forces might need.  An armor officer by trade, but with no U.S. armor 
or heavy forces at his disposal, MG Montgomery called the Pakistani commander, who 
had four operational M-48 tanks that the U.S. had given to them already on call at the 
airport, and told him that he might need the tanks.  The Pakistani commander agreed to 
provide his extremely old and limited assets with no night vision capabilities; they were 
poised when the QRF ran into a tough fight attempting its first recovery.  At that point, it 
was clear to MG Montgomery that if recovery forces were piecemealed into the fight, 
they would suffer additional casualties, so he determined that additional heavy forces 
would be required.  The Malaysians had some older wheeled armored personnel carriers, 
so MG Montgomery informed the MALBATT commander that he might need to commit 
the Malaysian battalion.69  The Malaysian commander did not hesitate in offering his  
                                                 
68 That morning MG Thomas Montgomery had been in western Somalia with the German contingent, 
representing the Force Command.  MG Montgomery arrived back at his headquarters at about three in the 
afternoon.  Upon his return, his staff informed him that that TF Ranger was about to launch on an 
operation, and gave him the information that was available at that time.  He then talked to MG Garrison, 
and then ensured the UNOSOM II Commander, Turkish Lieutenant General Cevik Bir, knew what was 
happening.  While MG Montgomery was away, TF Ranger’s alert had gone to COL Ed Ward, the 
UNOSOM Operations Officer (U3), and everything that needed to happen to support TF Ranger had 
already been done. The QRF had been alerted, and was being prepared to support TF Ranger if called upon 
(from Frontline: Ambush in Mogadishu interview with LTG (Ret.) Thomas Montgomery; personal 
communication, LTG (Ret.) Thomas Montgomery, April 10, 2004). 
69 The Malaysians were a capable force, and the UN had already designated the Malaysians as the next 
UN QRF force to assume the QRF mission from the U.S. at some point in the future.  MG Montgomery did 
not call solely for APCs.  The decision to ask the Malaysians for only their APCs came later when BG Gile, 
COL Casper, and LTC David were working out a plan at the TF Ranger JOC.  While those leaders decided 
that they did not want to use the entire Malaysian Battalion, they did want to use their APCs.  The 
Malaysian commander would reluctantly accept the proposal to replace the Malaysian infantry soldiers 
with U.S. forces, provided that the vehicle commanders, drivers and gunners were his (personal 
communication, LTG (Ret.) Thomas Montgomery, April 10, 2004). 
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support (from Frontline: Ambush in Mogadishu interview with LTG (Ret.) Thomas 
Montgomery; personal communication, LTG (Ret.) Thomas Montgomery, April 10, 
2004). 
Only then did MG Montgomery make a request to the Italians for the support of 
their regiment of approximately fifty modern tanks, but at the time, they were located 
several hours northeast of Mogadishu in the town of Balcad.  After conferring with 
Rome, the Italian commander agreed to support, and directed his tank crews to move to 
an assembly area on the outskirts of Mogadishu.  MG Montgomery wanted them 
available in the morning if forces had not been able to break through to TF Ranger's 
soldiers.  The Italians got to Mogadishu at about 0300 hours after a long road-march.  
They were placed in a field location and refueled, but were never employed (“Ambush in 
Mogadishu;” personal communication, LTG (Ret.) Thomas Montgomery, April 10, 2004; 
Casper, 2001, p. 44).  "I will only use your force if I have Americans in extremis," 
Montgomery promised (Atkinson, 1994, p. A01).  
After coordinating with the Italians, MG Montgomery also called the Indian 
Brigade commander.  The Indians were still in the process of moving their units to 
Mogadishu, but had several T-72 tanks.  MG Montgomery asked the Indian commander 
for assistance if the Americans were still in trouble after employing the Pakistanis, 
Malaysians, and Italians.  The Indian commander agreed to help, even though his unit 
had not even completed its deployment to Mogadishu (personal communication, LTG 
(Ret.) Thomas Montgomery, April 10, 2004). 
1532 hours - After finalizing the plan, preparing for combat, and loading the 
aircraft, TF Ranger launched the assault force of eight AH/MH-6 and eight MH-60L 
helicopters.  The task force had taken no time to conduct “mission specific” actions on 
the objective rehearsals, due to the timeliness of the actionable intelligence.   
1535 hours - TF Ranger’s vehicle convoy, or ground reaction force one (GRF-1), 
of 56 personnel in nine HMMWVs and three 2½-ton trucks departed the airfield. 
1537 hours - QRF headquarters alerted the Quick Reaction Company and 
designated it at REDCON 1.   
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1542 hours - Helicopters begin inserting the blocking force and assault elements 
at the target location.   
1545 hours - GRF-1 had positioned itself in its staging area or holding point, and 
awaited the signal to move forward to the target location.  TF Ranger JOC notified the 
QRF TOC that cordon and search elements were on the objective in the Bakara Market 
area. 
1553 hours - GRF-1 began movement from their holding position towards the 
link-up point at the target building.   
1555 hours - As the mission was progressing as planned on the target itself, TF 
Ranger helicopters began to notice increasing hostile activity by the local inhabitants, and 
AH-6’s fired on some antagonistic Somalis for first time during the raid. 
1558 hours - Somalis gave TF Ranger its first casualties when they hit a 2½-ton 
truck with an RPG while it was en route to link-up with the assault force at the target site.   
1602 hours - TF Ranger has secured the target building and detained twenty-four 
Somalis.   
1604 hours – The link-up of the assault force and GRF-1 at the target house was 
complete.  The TF Ranger assault force began consolidation at the point of extraction in 
order to begin the process of withdrawing.   
1613 hours - One seriously wounded Ranger departed for the airfield with one 
cargo and two “gun” HMMWVs.  All of the Somali detainees departed shortly thereafter 
in the two remaining 2½-ton trucks, escorted by some assault element personnel back to 
the airfield.   
1620 hours - Somalis used a RPG to hit and down a MH-60L, callsign Super 61, 
“Thunderstruck,” at what the location referred to as the northern crash site, or crash site 
#1.  The pilot, CW4 Clifton P. Wolcott had the presence of mind to alert the crew via 
radio to brace for impact while the helicopter spun out of control toward the street below.  
This radio report alerted friendly forces that there were now isolated personnel on the  
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battlefield.  The other helicopters in the area visually observed the crash, so the location 
of the aircraft was a known point; the aircraft smashed into an alley about 500 yards 
northeast of the target.   
Unknown to the task force, Aidid brought in fundamentalist Islamic soldiers from 
Sudan, experienced in downing Russian helicopters in Afghanistan, to train his men in 
RPG firing techniques.70 
1624 hours - An unarmed MH-6 (callsign Star 41) piloted by CW3 Karl Maier 
and CW3 Keith Jones landed in the narrow street.  CW3 Maier fired on approaching 
Somalis from the cockpit with a Heckler and Koch MP-5 light submachine gun in his 
right hand, while he simultaneously maintained the aircraft at a hover with his left hand.  
The alley was so narrow that the rotor blades barely cleared the houses on both sides. 
1626-1629 hours - The TF Ranger JOC first notified the QRF that problems were 
developing on the objective, and that they might need assistance.71   
1627 hours - COL Ed Ward, the UNOSOM II Operations Officer (U3), directed 
COL Casper to place two scout weapons teams (SWT) from the QRF’s aviation task 
force at REDCON 1.  Only two minutes earlier, the QRF had already determined that it 
had two SWTs ready to fly (two OH-58A’s, and five AH-1F’s) in support of TF Ranger, 
and had proactively placed the crews on alert.   
1628 hours - A six-man Ranger squad from blocking position #2, led by 1LT 
Thomas Di Tomasso, arrived at the crash site.   
                                                 
70 Captain Haad, a sector commander for Aidid’s militia, had 30 militiamen under his authority on 3 
October 1993.  With more than ten years of fighting experience, he had received military training in Libya.  
In an interview with Frontline, he stated that almost all of his militia had been trained in either Libya or in 
other Islamic countries, and admitted that Aidid had received foreign help (from Frontline: Ambush in 
Mogadishu interview with Captain Haad).  Based on evidence developed in its investigation of the 1998 
bombings of two American embassies in Africa, the U.S. Justice Department indicted Osama bin Laden for 
conspiring to kill Americans.  The 238-count indictment on 4 November 1998 included several references 
to Al Qaeda’s training of militias and support to Somali fighters who attacked American soldiers in 
Somalia in 1993.  One of the suspects charged, Fazul Abdullah Mohammad Saddiq Odeh, admittedly 
trained in Al Qaeda camps in Afghanistan in 1992, and helped train Somali Islamic militants who opposed 
the UN peacekeeping mission there.  The Jordanian-born Palestinian “boasted of providing the rifles and 
rocket launchers” and “told Pakistani intelligence officials upon his capture that Saudi millionaire Osama 
bin Laden, in an effort to expand his worldwide anti-American terror network, had helped bankroll [Aidid] 
and provided weapons [specifically lots of RPGs] in 1993" (Vick, 1998, p. A01; Casper, 2001, p. 49).  
71 During a secure phone call from BG Gile, who was collocated with MG Garrison at the TF Ranger 
JOC, BG Gile told COL Casper that Garrison, “wanted the QRC now!” BG Gile had only arrived in 
Somalia five days earlier to participate in COL Casper’s Change of Command (Casper, 2001, p. 28). 
164 
1629 hours - COL Casper directed LTC Bill David and his QRC, garrisoned at 
what was left of the University Compound, to move to the airfield where TF Ranger’s 
JOC was located.  COL Casper directed LTC David to use the Main Supply Route (MSR) 
bypass (see Figure 26), instead of the shorter, more direct route to the airfield (MSR-2), 
fearing that another ambush might await the QRC72 (Casper, 2001, pp. 28-29).  At this 
point, the QRF was staging the QRC at the airfield as a precaution.  TF Ranger still 
believed that they could handle the situation on their own; it was not until the second 
helicopter went down that the QRF mission took on a greater sense of urgency.  At that 
point, the QRC was already committed to the MSR bypass. 
1631 hours - CW3 Jones confirmed that both CW4 Wolcott and CW2 Donovan 
L. Briley died upon impact while he assisted two WIA snipers onto the MH-6 for 
extraction (Rysewyk, 1994, p. 10).  Unfortunately, only SFC Jimmy Smith made it back 
alive as the other sniper, SSG Daniel Busch, died en route to the airfield from injuries 
sustained defending the crew of Super 61.   
   Shortly after Star 41 departed, CW3 Dan Jollota and MAJ Herb Rodriguez, in 
CSAR MH-60L (callsign Super 68), inserted fifteen CSAR personnel via fastrope.  
Commanded by CPT Bill Coultrup, the CSAR personnel would assist in securing the 
crash site and treat the wounded.  Somalis struck Super 68 with an RPG while the CSAR 
team was still on the ropes, but the pilots held the aircraft steady as the last of the soldiers 
made it to the ground.  The pilots managed to make it back to the airport, where they 
made a “hard landing” on the runway, and then transloaded onto a spare MH-60L. 
                                                 
72 The MSR bypass was also referred to as MSR-3, or MSR “Tiger.”  Unlike UNITAF, UNOSOM II 
never used MSR 1, since it went through a highly congested market area.  The use of UNOSOM II’s 
primary MSR (MSR-2) greatly diminished when, on 8 August 1993, Somali guerrillas used a command-
detonated mine to destroy and kill four U.S. military policemen and their HMMWV along that route on 
Jaalle-Siaad Street.  As a result of the 8 August ambush, the more secure MSR 3 (or bypass) was created to 
reduce the possibility of similar ambushes in the future.  Thinking that COL Casper had better situational 
awareness on the big picture that he did at that point, LTC David asked COL Casper what he believed to be 
the best route given the tradeoffs involved.  Both leaders agreed that using the original MSR 2 was a more 
direct route through the heart of the SNA-occupied city near the K-4 circle, but had a higher possibility for 
making contact or being ambushed, and then being bogged down.  Additionally, COL Casper’s intelligence 
officer, CPT John McPherson, adamantly warned of going near the K4 circle since it was “the gateway to 
Aideed [sic] territory, and [Aidid’s] followers surrounded the traffic circle.  MSR-3, while a longer route, 
had a much lower probability of contact.  UN forces rarely drove MSR-1 or MSR-2 when there wasn't any 
shooting in the city, so it didn't make any sense to do so when there was.  In the end, both leaders agreed 
“the additional time to traverse the bypass road far outweighed the possibility of the QRC being ambushed 
before it got to the airport” (Casper, 2001, pp. 28-29, 44; personal communication, BG (Ret.) Dill David, 


















Figure 26.   MSR routes and average times to the TF Ranger JOC.  (After personal 
communication, LTC Michael Whetstone, April 16, 2004). 
 
1641 hours - Somalis struck and downed a MH-60L, callsign Super 64, 
“Venom,” with a RPG at a location referred to as the southern crash site, or crash site #2, 
approximately 800 meters south of Super 61.  As command and control aircraft loitered 
overhead, they witnessed Super 61 going down—just as pilots CW3 Michael J. Durant 
and CW4 Raymond A. Frank reported their dilemma over their radio.  While two of the 
AH-6’s orbited the position to provide cover fire, LTCs Harrel and Matthews finally 
authorized MH-60L (callsign Super 62) pilots CW3 Mike Goffena and CPT Jim Yacone, 
to insert two snipers (MSG Gary Gordon and SFC Randy Shughart) after their third plea 
to provide protection for the crew as they watched Somali crowds close in on the 
position.  Super 62 inserted the 2-man recovery force within minutes of the crash, but 
they ran out of ammunition before additional recovery forces could arrive, and there was 
nothing more they could do.  Though unknown to the task force, with the exception of 
CW3 Durant, all of the wounded crew (including crew chiefs SSG William D. Cleveland, 
Jr., and SGT Thomas J. Field), and both of the snipers were overrun and killed by the 
Somalia mob within twenty minutes of the crash (Durant, 2003, pp. 35-37).  Immediately 
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after Somalis shot down the second MH-60L, MG Garrison gave MAJ Nixon the 
Warning Order (WARNORD) to be prepared to assemble and deploy a second ground 
reaction force (GRF-2) to conduct a recovery mission.   
1645 hours - LTC David departed for the airfield with the QRC and his TAC CP.  
Before departing, he placed Company A “Terminator Company” of TF 2-14 at REDCON 
1.  Company A had been on the support mission cycle, but LTC David felt that it was 
prudent to have a company on standby.73  As a part of normal support requirements, 2nd 
Platoon had tasked one squad to augment the airfield’s internal quick reaction forces.  
The squad chosen to perform the mission was 2nd Squad, led by SSG Psonis.  Because 2nd 
Platoon was missing one rifle squad, CPT Meyerowich assigned the company’s attached 
engineer squad to the 2nd Platoon leader, 2LT Mark A. B. Hollis in order to make up the 
difference, at least numerically. 
1647 hours - Just after LTC David departed University Compound, the TF 
Ranger JOC informed the QRF TOC that Somalis had shot down one TF Ranger aircraft 
at 1620 hours.   
1649 hours - TF Ranger JOC informed the QRF TOC that Somalis had shot down 
a second TF Ranger.  The JOC provided no locations for either aircraft. 
By 1700 hours - Company A lined up and ready to move to the airfield.  
1703 hours - GRF-2 departed the airfield with 27 soldiers from TF Ranger, three 
2½-ton trucks, and five HMMWVs—bound for crash site #2.   
1711 hours - COL Casper, physically located at the QRF TOC, informed LTC 
David via radio that he and his battalion would be OPCON to MG Garrison.74 
                                                 
73 In order not to burn-out his soldiers, LTC David established a nine-day rotation for the companies 
of TF 2-14.  Each company would spend three days on support (fulfilling miscellaneous requirements, 
patrols, or cordon and searches), three days as the QRC, and three days on MSR guard (personal interview, 
BG (Ret.) Bill David, November 19-20, 2003). 
74 BG (Ret.) Larry Casper later wrote, “The control of David and his QRC was transferred, or 
‘chopped,’ to TF Ranger.  This had been directed previously by UNOSOM II Headquarters at the urging of 
TF Ranger and the approval of U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) headquarters.  The brigade staff was 
aware of this command and control lash-up, but I had been in country a couple of weeks and somewhere 
during the in-briefs I missed it.  I didn’t like it, and I immediately called Colonel Ward. …He shared my 
concern, but stated that this was agreed to weeks before and now was not the time to change.  I was angry, 
but he was right, so I acquiesced” (Casper, 2001, p. 29). 
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Between 1710 and 1724 hours – The QRC and TAC CP arrived at the TF 
Ranger JOC.  MG Garrison and his staff quickly briefed LTC David on the situation, and 
gave him his mission of moving to the southern crash site (site #2, where MH-60L, 
callsign Super 64 crashed) to secure the crew and any TF Ranger personnel.  Garrison’s 
staff informed LTC David that approximately 100 Rangers had inserted by air and 
ground into an area near the Bakara market, and that TF Ranger had successfully 
detained 24 Somali individuals.  However, the staff also informed David that after 
Somalis downed the first aircraft, the Rangers converged on that site to secure the crew 
and aircraft.  In doing this, the task force continued to experience heavy enemy fire and 
resistance, and became pinned down near the northern crash site.  The staff also informed 
David that TF Ranger had approximately 20 WIA, and 3 to 4 KIA at the northern crash 
site alone.  Shortly after arriving at the JOC, CPT Whetstone watched a live video feed in 
the JOC, provided by one of TF Ranger’s aerial reconnaissance platforms focused on the 
southern crash site.  Together, he and MG Garrison watched the Somali crowd of 
hundreds overwhelm, and literally overrun, the MH-60.  As CPT Whetstone departed the 
JOC, MG Garrison turned away from the monitor while shaking his head in disgust; with 
his ground forces immobilized, he was virtually powerless to affect the battle (personal 
telephone interview, LTC Michael Whetstone, April 7, 2004). 
1723 hours - The GRF-1 Commander, LTC Danny McKnight, reported to the 
JOC that he had numerous casualties, had lost a second 2½-ton truck to enemy fire, and 
that he had no choice but to return to base with GRF-1.   
1727 hours - MH-60L, callsign Super 62, landed in the New Port area after 
Somalis hit it broadside with an RPG after missing on at least ten prior attempts.   
1730 hours - TF Ranger’s medical evacuation (MEDEVAC) MH-60L launched 
from the airfield to the New Port area.  At the University Compound the QRF’s scout 
platoon, combat trains, and PSYOPs elements were lined up behind Company A, and 
ready to move (Ferry, 1994, p. 25).  LTC David recalled Company B from a location 
north of the city where they had been conducting training, and directed them to proceed  
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directly to the New Port (personal interview, BG (Ret.) Bill David, November 19-20, 
2003).  Evening twilight quickly approached as the remainder of TF 2-14 awaited 
instructions.   
Between 1735 and 1747 hours - After assembling and briefing the QRC, LTC 
David’s QRC departed the airfield with their TF Ranger liaison, MAJ Craig Nixon, en 
route to crash site #2 (see Figure 27).  TF Ranger aircraft were to provide air cover for 
the QRC, but TF Ranger air cover was not yet in a position to provide support since there 
were initial communication problems between TF 2-14 and the TF Ranger aircraft.  COL 
Casper directed a SWT from TF 2-25 to support TF 2-14, but at about that time, the TF 
Ranger aircraft arrived on station, and the TF 2-25 aircraft remained at the airfield at 
flight idle for an immediate response.   
1740 hours - Both GRF-1 and GRF-2 returned to the airfield after failing to reach 
any of the trapped soldiers. 
Between 1745 and 1754 hours - LTC David reported via radio that the QRC was 
in an ambush by cross-fire from both sides of the street, approximately 300 meters north 
of the K4 traffic circle on Via Lenin,75 and that air cover was not yet on station.  The 
QRC lead elements had passed through the ambush site, and the convoy continued to 
suppress the Somali positions as it kept moving.  The TAC CP’s two HMMWVs and the 
five 2½-ton trucks carrying the QRC were easy and vulnerable targets for Somali gunmen 
with RPGs, even though the bed and sides of the trucks were protected with an additional 
three layers of sandbags.   
1757 hours - LTC David reported that Somalis had hit and disabled a TF Ranger 
HMMWV north of the K4 traffic circle. 
1800 hours - Darkness had fallen on Mogadishu.   
1802 hours - LTC David reported that Somalis hit and disabled a second TF 
Ranger HMMWV north of the K4 traffic circle as the convoy reached National Street.  
The convoy again came under heavy Somali fire from the east, but could not turn onto 
National Street because Somalis had blocked it with stacked crushed cars, and burning 
                                                 
75 K4 traffic circle is “a traffic circle forming the nucleus of five main boulevards, which spanned the 
city like the spokes of a wheel” (Casper, 2001, pp. 28-29).   
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tires set three tires deep.  Instead of turning east, the convoy continued north while 




Figure 27.   QRC route: Failed attempt to reach crash site #2 from the airfield (dashed line) 
__________________________________________________________________________ 
Reprinted with permission from the personal files of LTC Michael Whetstone 
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1821 hours - While collocated with MG Garrison purely by happenstance, BG 
Greg L. Gile (10th Mountain Division Assistant Division Commander for Operations 
(ADC-O), callsign Mountain 05) directed COL Casper to have LTC David break contact 
with the enemy at the direction of MG Montgomery.  MG Montgomery was located in 
the old U.S. embassy building using a secure telephone to communicate with MG 
Garrison and BG Gile.  LTC David immediately directed CPT Whetstone to break 
contact, and to return to the airfield as soon as possible.   
By 1830 hours - MG Montgomery, in his capacity as the Deputy Commander of 
UNOSOM II, directed the Pakistani contingent to relocate their four M-48 tanks from a 
position near the airport to the New Port.   
1838 hours - MG Montgomery again contacted BG Gile, and directed him to 
serve as both his personal representative at the JOC and the lead tactical planner for the 
QRF.76  He also directed BG Gile to “chop” LTC David and his unit back to the QRF 
headquarters.  BG Gile immediately radioed COL Casper to relay the messages (Casper, 
2001, p. 46; personal communication, LTG (Ret.) Thomas Montgomery, April 10, 2004).   
1840 hours - After surviving the better part of five ambushes, LTC David 
reported that CPT Whetstone’s element had consolidated vehicles and personnel in two 
covered areas southwest of the K4 traffic circle, and was retreating with heavy casualties 
to the airfield to regroup.   
1845 hours - LTC David requested air cover for CPT Whetstone while two of his 
dismounted platoons checked the disabled HMMWVs.  COL Casper directed LTC Gore 
to launch a SWT to support TF 2-14.   
                                                 
76 MG Montgomery decided that since BG Gile was already located at the JOC, and would be 
representing MG Montgomery at the TF Ranger headquarters, it only made sense to use BG Gile’s Infantry 
background to spearhead such a ground assault.  BG Gile was already co-located with MG Garrison, he did 
have a direct land-line with MG Montgomery, and he was the 10th Mountain Division’s ADC(O)—who the 
Aviation Brigade habitually reported to (personal communication, LTG (Ret.) Thomas Montgomery, April 
10, 2004; personal communication, BG (Ret.) Larry Casper, April 6, 2004).  Also factoring into MG 
Montgomery’s decision was the fact COL Casper had assumed command only three days before the battle. 
By all accounts, BG Gile kept his cool during the entire operation, and did not exert his presence or 
position any more than was necessary. 
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1849 hours - The SWT arrived to cover TF 2-14’s egress to the airfield.77   
1858 hours - COL Casper directed LTC David to recall CPT Whetstone’s 
dismounted platoons, and return to the airfield.  COL Casper stated that David did not 
need to search the vehicles because TF Ranger had accounted for all personnel at that 
location.   
Approximately 1900 hours - While awaiting LTC David’s return, BG Gile and 
COL Casper discussed the task organization for the follow-on operation, at about the 
same time that the Pakistanis and Malaysians began to close in on the New Port. 
1905 hours - As he approached the airfield, LTC David directed MAJ Randy 
Munch, the TF 2-14 executive officer, to move the remainder of the battalion and combat 
trains to the airfield, and to be prepared to conduct further combat operations.  The 
battalion did not have sufficient assets readily available to move the remainder of TF 2-
14 at the same time, so Munch directed that the movement be conducted in convoy 
serials, with ten minutes between serials, and using the same MSR bypass that the QRC 
had used earlier.  The one-way trip at night, driving with night vision goggles (NVGs) 
under blacked-out conditions took about forty-five minutes (Ferry, 1994, p. 26). 
1907 hours - LTC David and his TAC CP returned to the TF Ranger JOC. 
1912 hours - TF Ranger placed their second Ground Reaction Force element 
(GRF-2), still under the control of JOC operations officer LTC Lee VanArsdale, OPCON 
to the QRF.78  Its stated mission was to secure National Street with the Pakistani tank 
platoon.   
                                                 
77 CPT Bill Metheny (callsign Coyote 06) led this SWT in an OH-58 scout aircraft.  Pilot CW4 Dave 
Coates (callsign Raven 33), and his copilot and gunner CW2 Eric Jacobsen flew the lead AH-1F Cobra.  
CWO Scott MacDonald (callsign Coyote 25), flew the wingman position in the other AH-1F Cobra.  The 
three aircraft took up a racetrack pattern over the southwest portion of the city (Casper, 2001, pp. 29-30). 
78 The exact composition of the GRF-2, and time that it was actually OPCON to the QRF is difficult to 
determine with any precision due to conflicting records.  One official record stated that the GRF-2 was 
OPCON to the QRF at 1800 hours, and was comprised of sixty personnel divided into three elements, with 
three 2½-ton trucks and six HMMWVs.  Another personal experience monograph written by the Ranger 
Company’s executive officer, stated that the reconstituted force consisted of 56 personnel and seven 
HMMWVs (Rysewyk, 1994, p. 11).  QRF records state that the GRF-2 was a platoon-sized element of 
approximately forty Rangers with four HMMWVs (Appendix F).  Given the timing of other events, 1912 
hours seems more accurate and plausible.    
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By 1914 hours – The QRC returned to the airfield, and had immediately began to 
rearm at TF Ranger’s ammunition supply point (ASP).   
1922 hours - TF Ranger JOC informed the QRF headquarters that the Rangers 
had consolidated and become pinned-down near grid coordinate NH36242679.   
1935 hours - COL Casper, his battle staff, and his LNOs boarded helicopters to 
move to the TF Ranger JOC (airfield) in order to plan the rescue. 
2000 hours - MH-60L, callsign Super 66, conducted an aerial resupply to the 
stranded elements of TF Ranger; Somali ground fires damaged it in the process.   
2025 hours - COL Casper and his staff arrived at the JOC to begin parallel 
planning with TF 2-14 
Between 2020-2030 hours - Company A, TF 2-14 arrived at the airfield.   
2030 hours - MG Garrison, BG Gile, COL Casper, LTC David, and LTC Gore all 
met in the JOC to discuss the concept of operations and link-up procedures with the 
Rangers on the objective.  Then, QRF leadership conducted initial mission analysis on 
the hood of LTC David’s HMMWV, and planned the route for the movement to the New 
Port.   
2052 hours - LTC David directed elements of TF 2-14 and GRF-2 to move to the 
New Port.  The column began movement with CPT Whetstone’s company and elements 
of TF Ranger in the lead, followed by CPT Meyerowich’s company.  Upon arrival at 
New Port, the units conducted final pre-combat inspections (PCI’s), and issued more 
ammunition.  Shortly after the order to move to New Port, the QRF Intelligence Officer 
(S-2) reported the grid locations for downed aircraft as follows: Site #1, grid coordinate 
NH36142685; site #2, grid coordinate NH36402625.   
2056 hours - Company B, as well as the remainder of TF 2-14, arrived at the 
airfield (Ferry, 1994; personal communication, BG (Ret.) Larry Casper, April 7 and April 
9, 2004).   
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2100 hours - BG Giles gave COL Casper a change of mission—to effect link-up 
with the Rangers at the northern crash site first (site #1, where MH-60L, callsign Super 
61 crashed), then, if the tactical situation permitted, to proceed to the southern crash site 
to rescue survivors or recover bodies.   
2100-2130 hours - COL Casper and his battle staff traveled to the New Port to 
continue planning the operation, and to conduct initial coordination with the Malaysians 
and Pakistanis.   
By 2130 hours - LTC David had linked-up at the New Port with all assets under 
his control, including the Malaysian and Pakistani forces.  When David arrived, all forces 
had arrayed themselves administratively, and were neither task organized for combat, nor 
marshaled in proper order of movement.  After fleshing out the plan, LTC David briefed 
the QRF LNO to the Pakistanis, 1LT Ben Mathews, and the QRF LNO to the Malaysians, 
1LT John Breen, on what he expected. 
LTC David’s initial plan was simple—Pakistani tanks would lead the convoy of 
Malaysian German-built Condor APCs carrying TF 2-14 soldiers.79  As Combat Team 
Alpha, TF 2-14’s Company A would spearhead the attack to break through to TF Ranger 
at the northern crash site in APCs assigned to MALBATT’s Company B.  Combat Team 
Bravo, the TF 2-14 TAC CP and TF Ranger attachments, would remain at Release Point 
Yankee approximately 1200 meters past Pakistani Strongpoint 207 on National Street.  
As Combat Team Charlie, TF 2-14’s Company C, in APCs assigned to MALBATT’s 
Company A, would pass through the release point, and attack to break through to the 
southern crash site.  TF 2-14’s Company B, would stage at the airfield to serve as the task 
force reserve (see Figure 28).  The attacking elements were to move as far as possible  
                                                 
79 LTC David was placed in charge of an ad hoc task force, and given what seemed to everyone to be a 
mission that could not be accomplished.  At the outset of the operation, it appeared to have the makings of 
another Task Force Smith, an ad hoc organization that also lacked interoperability between coalition forces, 
detailed intelligence on the enemy disposition, and time to sufficiently plan a complex operation.  LTC 
David’s ad hoc task force, sometimes referred to as “Task Force David,” consisted of two organic rifle 
companies, 113 personnel from two Malaysian mechanized companies in 28 “Twin GPMG” and six 
“20mm Oerlikon cannon” Condor APCs (with vehicle commanders, drivers and gunners only), a composite 
platoon (+) from TF Ranger, one Pakistani tank platoon, UN LNOs, an anti-armor platoon from 3-C/1/87th 
Infantry, and two aviation task forces from both TF 2-25 and TF Ranger.  By operation's end, "Task Force 
David" had successfully achieved what many believed to be impossible.  The fact that so few casualties 
were sustained by this ad hoc organization, in the execution of a near insurmountable task, was nothing 




Figure 28.   Route from the New Port to the objectives, and then to Pakistani Stadium (dashed 
line) 
__________________________________________________________________________ 
Reprinted with permission from the personal files of LTC Michael Whetstone 
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while mounted, dismounting only when reaching the assigned objectives (Hollis, 1998, p. 
29; personal interview, MAJ Mark Hollis, November 17, 2003; Zakaria, 2000, p. 28). 
CPT Meyerowich task organized Company A as follows (Ferry, 1994): 
 
1st Platoon   2nd Platoon   3rd Platoon   Company HQ 
Mortar Squad  Engineer Squad Medic   FMTT (Surgical Tm) 
Fire Support Squad Medic   3 x Malaysian APCs FLA 
Medic   3 x Malaysian APCs    Surgeon 
3 x Malaysian APCs       1 x HMMW  
         4 x M-48 Paki Tanks   
 
2LT Hollis task organized his platoon in the following manner:  
 
1st Squad   3rd Squad    Platoon Headquarters 
SGT Hollis (SL)  SSG Morrison (SL)  2LT Hollis (PL)  
1st Malaysian APC  SSG Roberts (PSG)  RTO (Radio Operator)  
    M-60 Team #2  M-60 Team #1  
    Platoon Medic   Interpreter (Somali) 
    Engineer Team #2  Engineer Team #1 
    3rd Malaysian APC  2nd Malaysian APC  
 
 
When CPT Meyerowich returned from his mission briefing from LTC David, 2LT 
Hollis, the 1st Platoon Leader (2LT Damon Wright), and the 3rd Platoon Leader (2LT 
Curtis Crum), were all waiting at the commander’s HMMWV.  CPT Meyerowich briefed 
everyone on their unit’s task and purpose, but there remained some confusion as to the 
actual route to the objective.  The platoon leaders had enough information to begin 
loading the vehicles, and assumed more details would follow, especially concerning the 
route.  After loading the vehicles, 2LT Hollis went back to CPT Meyerowich in order to 
get more information concerning the exact route.  CPT Meyerowich told him not to 
worry about the route, because the Malaysian drivers knew the route to the objective.  
Satisfied that his commander had the situation under control, 2LT Hollis returned to and 
loaded his APC.  He positioned himself directly behind the Malaysian driver, with his 
RTO seated next to the side door, which offered a small view port.  From this position, 
2LT Hollis had limited observation of what was to the front and one side of his APC 
(Hollis, 1998, p. 29; personal interview, MAJ Mark Hollis, November 17, 2003).   
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2130 hours - COL Casper flew to the TF Raven headquarters to refuel and pick 
up LTC Gore. 
2200 hours – COL Casper returned to the New Port (personal interview, BG 
(Ret.) Bill David, November 19-20, 2003; personal communication, BG (Ret.) Larry 
Casper, April 9, 2004).   
2256 hours - COL Casper reported problems with the Pakistanis and the order of 
movement.  With their better knowledge of the area, the Pakistani-driven M-48 tanks 
were supposed to lead the column the entire way to the Rangers.  The Pakistanis no 
longer wanted to lead without NVGs since they would have to use their white lights to 
navigate, which would make them easy targets for the Somalis.  This forced LTC David 
to change his plan—the Malaysians would now lead with two APCs, with the Pakistanis 
immediately following.  Just before departing the New Port, the plan changed again, 
whereby the Pakistanis agreed to lead the convoy along the secured UN route as far as 
their first strongpoint along the route, Strongpoint 69.  Turning west on National Street, 
the Malaysian-driven Condors were to take the lead.  CPT Meyerowich had not briefed 
2LT Hollis on any of these changes to the originally briefed plan, and 2LT Hollis was 
still under the impression that the Pakistanis were leading the entire route (Hollis, 1998, 
p. 29; personal interview, MAJ Mark Hollis, November 17, 2003).   
Between 2310-2324 hours - TF David departed the New Port en route to the two 
crash sites.  LTC Gore continued to coordinate the direct fire air support, and deconflict 
air space between TF Ranger and TF 2-25 helicopters.  TF 2-25’s SWT guided and 
covered the convoy’s movement up to Strongpoint 207, and then handed-off 
responsibilities to TF Ranger.  About one kilometer outside of New Port, the Pakistani 
tanks encountered a roadblock, and the Pakistani commander refused to go through 
fearing Somalis had mined it.  Mathews fired a magazine of 5.56mm ammunition into the 
roadblock, and told the commander to go through.  The Pakistanis reluctantly complied.  
The convoy continued east to Checkpoint 77, and then turned north to Checkpoint 69.  At 
Checkpoint 69, the Pakistani brigade commander informed the battalion commander that  
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he could no longer lead the column because they did not have NVGs.  Two of the three 
Malaysian APCs containing 2LT Hollis’ personnel then unknowingly assumed the lead 
of the convoy (Casper, 2001, p. 69). 
As the lead APC went 200 meters west down National Street to Strongpoint 207, 
the beginning of Habr Gidr territory manned by a UNOSOM M113 APC and a 
sandbagged position, all hell broke loose.  The Somalis began firing huge quantities of 
small arms and RPGs at the convoy.  The Somalis had once again initiated a deliberate 
ambush using extremely heavy rocket, mortar, and automatic weapons fire.  LTC David’s 
subordinate leaders, clearly understanding the gravity of the situation and their 
commander's intent, immediately returned fire and continued to slowly advance down 
National Street’s gauntlet of destruction.  For roughly three hours, TF David fought a 
vicious battle until they reached their respective release points, and finally broke through 
to their objectives.  2LT Hollis heard numerous explosions outside his APC, and felt the 
shrapnel hitting the vehicle.   
By 2350 hours - The TAC CP had reached the holding area and release point 
about 1200 meters past Strongpoint 207 on National Street (Hollis, 1998, p. 29).  The 
lead Malaysian drivers reacted to the increased fire by erratically jerking the vehicle 
forward in an almost convulsive motion.  This caused all of the U.S. passengers in the 
back of the APC to be tossed about violently.  The limited land navigation that 2LT 
Hollis had been able to maintain up until that point in time then became next to 
impossible, because every time he tried to look out the small port, he would be thrown in 
a different direction.  Suddenly, and without warning, the APC increased its speed, and 
began to scale curbs and other obstacles in the road, which again threw the U.S. 
passengers around the back of the vehicle.  The Malaysians’ Platoon Commander, LT 
Zunaidi bin Hassan, had ordered the two APCs to move through the “kill zone” 
established by the Somali ambush.  Unknown to 2LT Hollis at the time, both he and SGT 
Hollis’ APCs were breaking contact with the rest of the column.  LT Hassan, unable to 
pass the tanks that were blocking the narrow road, and unable to see the lead APCs, got 
on the radio and told them to turn towards the objective (Hollis, 1998, p. 29; personal 
interview, MAJ Mark Hollis, November 17, 2003; Zakaria, 2000, pp. 33-34).  
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Fortunately for the convoy, CPT Meyerowich’s HMMWV placement as the third 
vehicle in the convoy was arguably the only thing that prevented the other Malaysian 
drivers from following the lead of the two runaway APCs.  CPT Meyerowich knew the 
APCs had broken contact, but decided to continue on to his objective (Ferry, 1994, p. 28).  
This unfortunate reaction by the Malaysian drivers effectively separated the two lead 
APCs from the remainder of the convoy.  2LT Hollis could not accurately maintain his 
bearing while being bounced around in the back of the APC, and coupled with the 
explosions outside, communications with his commander were virtually impossible.  
Totally disoriented, and still unaware that they were now on their own, 2LT Hollis and 
his lead squad would not link up with their company until the next morning.   
2359 hours - Plagued by confusion and a language barrier, the Lost Platoon’s two 
APCs continued west on National Street, then took a wrong turn after receiving heavy 
fire from the vicinity of the Olympic hotel.  They continued moving south instead of 
north, probably attempting to return to the New Port facility (Hollis, 1998, p. 30; personal 
interview, MAJ Mark Hollis, November 17, 2003).  On National Street, and back in the 
lead since the two Malaysians took the wrong turn, the Somalis ambushed the Pakistani 
tanks with machine guns and 7-10 RPG rounds.  The tanks stopped to return fire, and it 
took several minutes for 1LT Mathews to get the column moving again.  The Pakistanis 
passed the road leading to the crash site, and secured the far west end of National Street.   
0005 hours (Monday, 4 October 1993) - The Lost Platoon’s two APCs 
proceeded south roughly one kilometer beyond the southern crash site, when they entered 
a Somali ambush near the Italian Compound, or Villa Italia.  RPG fire first impacted the 
lead vehicle directly into the driver’s compartment, mortally wounding the Malaysian 
driver.   
0007 hours - Somalis disabled the second of the Lost Platoon’s two APCs with an 
RPG round placed into the engine compartment, on the right-hand side of the vehicle 
front.  The damage to the APCs also resulted in the Malaysians losing radio contact with 
their company headquarters.  
0011 hours - 2LT Hollis instructed SGT Hollis to assist in establishing security 
upon dismounting the APCs.   
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0015 hours - 2LT Hollis led his platoon headquarters group and engineer team 
north.  After passing only two buildings, small-arms fire originating from the direction of 
travel began to intensify.  With the enemy fires intensifying the farther away he moved 
from SGT Hollis’ position, and with the fear of Somalis potentially dividing his forces, 
2LT Hollis decided to return to SGT Hollis’s position.  SPC Keller continued to have no 
success at reaching any friendly forces over the radio.   
0020 hours - 2LT Hollis led his element back to its initial position, and 
reestablished local security.  Desiring to improve his unit’s level of security, 2LT Hollis 
then turned to the engineer squad leader, SSG Maxwell, and while pointing to a wall, 
asked if he could make a hole in the wall surrounding an adjacent cluster of houses.  
Upon Maxwell’s affirmation, 2LT Hollis contacted SGT Hollis, telling him of his plan to 
produce a hole in the compound, in order to establish security positions within the more 
protected compound.   
0030 hours – After blowing a whole in the wall of a nearby compound, the Lost 
Platoon entered the courtyard and established security.   
0050 hours - CPT Whetstone reported he was 300-500 meters past Checkpoint 
207.   
0056 hours - A TF Ranger OH-58D, callsign King 57, reported that there was no 
friendly activity observed near the southern crash site.80   
0103 hours - LTC David gave CPT Whetstone the order to depart the release 
point and move towards the southern objective after linking up with his guide OH-58D 
and after passing the vehicles parked to his front (personal communication, LTC Michael 
Whetstone, April 11, 2004). 
0130 hours - 2LT Hollis transmitted unsecure to establish communications with 
LTC David. 
                                                 
80 Shortly after TF Ranger's arrival, TF Raven chopped the Fort Hood-based OH-58Ds to TF Ranger.  
The OH-58D’s unique mast-mounted optics and FLIR could be “down-linked” directly to TF Ranger’s 
JOC (personal communication, BG (Ret.) Larry Casper, April 6, 2004). 
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0134 hours - CPT Meyerowich reported that he was working his company onto 
the northern objective with assistance from OH-58D, callsign King 57, and their infrared 
(IR) laser’s “sparkle.”   
0138 hours - CPT Meyerowich reported that he was within 100 meters of the 
northern objective.   
0142 hours - CPT Whetstone reported that Somalis had disabled two of his APCs 
near crash site #2, which had caused him to dismount under fire.  He reported that one 
APC was burning, while he reported the other as inoperable.   
0145 hours - CPT Whetstone then reported completing his mounted movement to 
his dismount point.  
0145 hours – After LTC David directed 2LT Hollis to contact CPT Whetstone on 
Company C’s assigned radio frequency, 2LT Hollis and Whetstone first made contact on 
the radio, but suppressing the Somalis who had just disabled two of his APCs had 
Whetstone occupied.   
0155 hours - CPT Meyerowich reported linking-up with the Rangers at the 
northern crash site.   
0158 hours - CPT Whetstone reported that he was 100 meters away from the 
southern objective [Super 64].   
0226 hours - COL Casper directed coordination with medical evacuation 
(MEDEVAC) personnel as well as the Pakistanis, so that aviation assets could fly to and 
from the Pakistani stadium.  COL Casper directed LTC David to have his units egress to 
the Pakistani camp in the soccer stadium upon their withdrawal.   
0228 hours - CPT Whetstone reported being on the southern objective, at the 
crash site.  At this time, all elements had reached their objectives.  CPT Whetstone then 
had to fight his way to the actual crash site while dismounted.  Company C with TF 
Ranger attachments went on to search the wreckage and the areas surrounding the 
southern crash site, and found nothing but multiple blood trails headed in several 
different directions as they called out the names of the isolated TF Ranger personnel.   
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0244 hours - CPT Meyerowich had requested more APCs to transport the 
additional 90+ TF Ranger personnel, and advised that if not provided, the overflow 
personnel would walk to Pakistani Stadium.   
0245 hours - Company C had recovered all remaining sensitive items from the 
aircraft, and placed “thermite” grenades to destroy what remained of the helicopter.  
While returning back to the APCs in order to begin the process of consolidation, 
reorganization, and establishing a better defensive position, CPT Whetstone had the idea 
of using star clusters to locate the “Lost Platoon.”  In order to determine a general 
distance from his current location, CPT Whetstone directed the platoon leader to fire a 
red star cluster signaling device (personal telephone interview, LTC Michael Whetstone, 
April 7, 2004).   
0250 hours - 2LT Hollis fired the star cluster, unintentionally illuminating some 
of CPT Whetstone’s 1st Platoon near the southern objective.  This illumination 
inadvertently silhouetted the soldiers, and resulted in the Somalis increasing their fires on 
the newly identified defensive positions (Scott Hilliard, personal telephone interview, 5 
April 2004).  CPT Whetstone then fired a green star cluster at approximately 0255 hours, 
and the two agreed that no more than 1,000 meters separated them.  CPT Whetstone then 
informed 2LT Hollis that he should remain in place, and that he would work on moving 
his company toward Hollis’ platoon (Hollis, 1998, p. 31; personal interview, MAJ Mark 
Hollis, November 17, 2003).   
0307 hours - COL Casper reported to BG Gile at the JOC, that the Terminator 
element, minus one platoon, was still on the northern objective and had recovered all 
killed (KIA) and wounded (WIA) except the trapped pilot.  COL Casper also informed 
BG Gile that LTC David instructed the Terminator element not to leave the site until the 
body was recovered, and that the Tiger element at the southern objective had no contact 
with any TF Ranger elements.   
0300 hours - CPT Whetstone directed 2LT Hollis to move north and attempt to 
link-up with Whetstone’s lead platoon, which would attempt to move south.  2LT Hollis 
immediately summoned SGT Hollis and SSG Maxwell. 
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0300-0315 hours – The Lost Platoon formulated a plan to move north.  The final 
plan was for SSG Maxwell’s engineers to lead, followed by 2LT Hollis as his M-60 
machinegun team, the Malaysians, and finally SGT Hollis’ squad.  Concurrently, CPT 
Whetstone directed that one squad from LT James K. Haynes’ 1st Platoon, the closest unit 
to 2LT Hollis, be sent out as a recon element to determine if there was an alternate route 
to reach the isolated platoon.  Upon his return, SSG Tewes’ reported that there was only 
one route to 2LT Hollis, and that if the company attempted to move along that route 
dismounted, that there would be a high number of casualties given the intense 
concentration of Somalis between their two locations.   
0315 hours - CPT Whetstone asked the Malaysian Company A Commander, 
Major Ab Aziz bin Ab Latiff, to “borrow” a couple of his APCs to affect the recovery of 
Hollis’s platoon.  After Aziz had asked for permission, which his battalion commander 
denied, he informed Whetstone that he was sorry, but that he was not authorized to offer 
any assistance (personal telephone interview, LTC Michael Whetstone, April 6, 2004; 
personal communication, LTC Michael Whetstone, April 7, 2004; Hollis, 1998, p. 32; 
personal interview, MAJ Mark Hollis, November 17, 2003). 
0325 hours - 2LT Hollis contacted CPT Meyerowich to inform him that he was 
beginning his movement north.  CPT Whetstone had explained to 2LT Hollis that he was 
having trouble moving south, and that the enemy resistance between the two units was 
too great for his dismounted company to move through without sustaining significant 
casualties.81   
0337 hours - LTC David reported to the QRF TOC that Somalis had hit three or 
possibly four APCs, and that one or more was still burning.     
0340 hours - Soon after the Lost Platoon began its movement north, the engineers 
moved past the garage where 2LT Hollis had moved to immediately following the 
ambush.  2LT Hollis positioned himself on the corner of the garage facing north.  The 
                                                 
81 Given the heavy volume of fires along the road 2LT Hollis’ APCs had initially traveled, CPT 
Whetstone assumed that 2LT Hollis would understand that he was to move north using an alternate route.  
Not understanding what CPT Whetstone intended, 2LT Hollis opted to use the known and most expedient 
route to CPT Whetstone’s position (personal communication, LTC Michael Whetstone, April 7, 2004; 
personal communication, MAJ Mark Hollis, April 19, 2004).  Arguably, this was also the most dangerous 
route given the consistent levels of Somali activity throughout the night. 
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Malaysians moved past 2LT Hollis’ position, moving closer to the engineers, when all of 
a sudden a Somali stepped out from an alley, and unloaded his weapon into the lead 
element.  SGT Hollis eventually killed the Somali, but not before the Somali shot SGT 
Cornell Houston in the chest, PFC Xiong Ly in the back, and SSG Maxwell in the knee.  
Now 2LT Hollis had two casualties who were  “litter priority,” two casualties who were 
“litter urgent,” and eight casualties who were “walking wounded” (Hollis, 1998, p. 32; 
personal interview, MAJ Mark Hollis, November 17, 2003).   
0344 hours – The TF Ranger JOC reported that bandits were starting to move out 
of Villa Somalia.  The JOC directed that all aircraft stand off so that the Pakistanis 
located at Strongpoint 1 could fire mortars.   
0348 hours - Another Somali started engaging the Lost Platoon from across an 
open lot to the north.   
0355 hours - SPC Keller contacted CPT Whetstone and informed him of the Lost 
Platoon’s status, and requested immediate transportation out. 
0400 hours – The Lost Platoon was informed that the Malaysians were in route, 
and that TF Ranger “Little Birds” were on station to support the link-up.  MAJ Aziz had 
finally grown tired of listening to his battalion commander telling them to stay put, while 
his fellow Malaysians were seriously wounded at 2LT Hollis’ location.  Just as CPT 
Whetstone had his entire company ready to move dismounted towards Hollis’ platoon, 
fully recognizing that he would certainly sustain numerous casualties along the 1,000-
meter gauntlet of Somali fires to his south, MAJ Aziz pointed to CPT Whetstone, 
signaling to him that he wanted CPT Whetstone to keep his unit in place.  MAJ Aziz then 
disobeyed a direct order from his battalion commander as he ordered his Number 3 
Platoon leader, 2LT Muhammad Juraimy bin Aripin, to prepare to move his APCs to 2LT 
Hollis’ position.82  MAJ Aziz pointed at CPT Whetstone, and then into the night sky, 
indicating that he wanted CPT Whetstone to have aircraft provide covering fires during 
his movement.  While synchronizing the recovery of Hollis’ platoon, CPT Whetstone had 
                                                 
82 There is some discrepancy as to the number of APCs that 2LT Juraimy led to 2LT Hollis’ position.  
From personal interviews, both MAJ Hollis and LTC Whetstone recall that it was two APCs.  Casper 
(2001) and the MALBATT accounts both recall that it was three APCs.  LTC Whetstone conceded  “In the 
heat of the mess at the time, getting the company back in defensive mode, I [guess I could have] missed a 
vehicle” (personal communication, LTC Michael Whetstone, May 4, 2004).   
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already requested and coordinated AH-6 support from King 56 and King 57 (two of the 
orbiting OH-58Ds attached to TF Ranger), to supplement the AH-1F “mini-gun” fires 
that he had been requesting since arriving at the southern objective (personal telephone 
interview, LTC Michael Whetstone, April 6, 2004; personal communication, LTC 
Michael Whetstone, April 7, 2004; Hollis, 1998, p. 32; personal interview, MAJ Mark 
Hollis, November 17, 2003). 
CPT Whetstone directed 2LT Hollis to use the M-203’s parachute flares to mark 
the buildings of known enemy locations surrounding the extraction point.  Shouting over 
to SGT Hollis, 2LT Hollis asked him if he could mark the building with a flare.  Getting 
an affirmative reply from SGT Hollis, 2LT Hollis directed his RTO to inform the pilots 
that he was marking the building with an M-203 flare.   
0405 hours - SGT Hollis shot a flare, but hit the wrong building.  The AH-6 made 
one pass, and destroyed the marked building with its mini-guns and rockets.  2LT Hollis 
then had his RTO inform the pilots that he would now mark the building with 5.56mm 
tracer rounds.   
0410 hours - Standing up from behind the stoop, 2LT Hollis emptied an entire 
magazine of tracers into the building he wanted destroyed.  The AH-6 approached 
perpendicular to the platoon’s location, fired the 7.62mm “gatling gun,” then the 2.75-
inch rockets, and the building disappeared (Hollis, 1998, p. 32; personal interview, MAJ 
Mark Hollis, November 17, 2003).   
0409 hours – The TF Ranger JOC reported that the Pakistanis had cleared and 
secured the egress route from the stadium to Strongpoint 207.  LTC David also reported 
multiple mortar rounds impacting within forty meters of his location at the release point. 
0410 hours - As 2LT Juraimy’s Condors began moving south towards 2LT 
Hollis’ platoon, CPT Whetstone called in eight to ten more AH-6 and AH-1F mini-gun 
and rocket runs to keep the route cleared for the APCs.  Without the 20-30 minutes of 
aerial fire-support, the recovery APCs would likely have met the same fate as the two 
APCs already destroyed at Hollis’ location; the sheer volume of Somali fires between the  
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two units was highly lethal for most of the night.  Before they departed, CPT Whetstone 
had told the MAJ Aziz to go to the chemical lights, or “chemlights,” which 2LT Hollis 
would emplace to mark the pick-up location.   
0420 hours - SGT Hollis had marked the road with green chemlights, and both 
2LT Hollis and SGT Hollis had prepared the highly concentrated (HC) smoke grenades.  
The plan was to ignite the HC smoke grenades once the APCs had moved to their 
position and turned around, allowing the cloud of thick smoke to sufficiently build so as 
to cover their movement before advancing toward the vehicles (personal telephone 
interview, LTC Michael Whetstone, April 6, 2004; personal communication, LTC 
Michael Whetstone, April 7, 2004; Hollis, 1998, pp. 32-33; personal interview, MAJ 
Mark Hollis, November 17, 2003). 
0418 hours - The TF Ranger JOC reported that the Pakistanis would fire forty 
mortar rounds into Villa Somalia in two minutes.   
0420 hours - The Pakistanis reported that the egress route was no longer clear.   
0427-0429 hours - Aircraft reported that they were continuing to work with a 
Terminator element, likely Terminator 26, to identify and engage targets. 
By 0430 hours - 2LT Juraimy’s Condors arrived at the chemlight extraction 
point.  The language became a problem once more, because 2LT Hollis had planned on 
the drivers turning their APCs around before he was to enter the vehicles.  2LT Hollis 
was concerned that the vehicles would attempt to continue moving south, back into the 
ambush site, thinking that that route was the quickest way back to the New Port.   
0435 hours - After having little luck at getting the vehicles to turn around, one of 
the Malaysians who had been with the platoon all night finally understood what 2LT 
Hollis wanted and started yelling in Malaysian to the drivers, who finally faced the 
vehicles north (Hollis, 1998, p. 32; personal interview, MAJ Mark Hollis, November 17, 
2003).  
0438 hours - CPT Meyerowich again requested more APCs to transport the 
additional 90+ TF Ranger personnel, and advised that if not provided, the overflow 
personnel would walk to Pakistani Stadium.    
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0445-0450 hours - After the Lost Platoon mounted the vehicles during the daring 
recovery with APCs, CPT Whetstone finally physically linked-up with the 2LT Hollis at 
the southern crash site.  CPT Whetstone immediately began the process of ensuring 100 
percent accountability while loading the remaining vehicles in order to withdraw.  2LT 
Hollis’ platoon did not exit their APCs at the southern crash site.   
0505 hours – The TF Ranger JOC received a report that the northern objective 
still had Wolcott’s body trapped in the aircraft.   
0515 hours - CPT Whetstone began his planned withdrawal to Strongpoint 207, 
but the Malaysians had other ideas, as they began receiving conflicting instructions from 
their chain of command en route to Strongpoint 207.   
0524 hours - MAJ Craig Nixon, the TF Ranger LNO collocated with LTC David, 
reported that the Malaysian APCs returning from the southern objective were out of CPT 
Whetstone’s control as they passed Strongpoint 207 heading for the Pakistani Stadium.  
LTC David’s planned withdrawal had all elements linking up at Strongpoint 207 in order 
to perform an orderly and covered withdrawal.  In the back of the APC, CPT Whetstone 
knew what the plan was, but was not able to control the drivers.  When he strongly 
suggested to his driver to stop, the Malaysian pointed to his earpiece, as if to suggest that 
he was only following the orders he was receiving over his radio net.  At that point, it was 
already too late—there was no turning the APCs around before they reached the stadium 
(personal telephone interview, LTC Michael Whetstone, April 6, 2004; personal 
communication, LTC Michael Whetstone, April 9, 2004; Hollis, 1998, p. 32; personal 
interview, MAJ Mark Hollis, November 17, 2003).   
0528 hours - CPT Meyerowich reported that he and the forces at his location had 
extracted the last body from the MH-60L, had set explosive charges to destroy the 
aircraft, and had consolidated all personnel for movement back to the release point on 
National Street.    
0530 hours - CPT Whetstone and 2LT Hollis’ Lost Platoon arrived at the 
Pakistani Stadium.   
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0537 hours - CPT Meyerowich finally departed the northern crash site area 
headed for Strongpoint 207.   
0550 hours - CPT Meyerowich’s company, and all TF Ranger personnel from the 
northern crash site, conducted a link-up with LTC David.   
0554 hours - CPT Meyerowich requested that CPT Whetstone’s Malaysian APCs 
return down National Street to pick up approximately fifty additional passengers.  LTC 
David then directed that overflow personnel ride on the top of the APCs (personal 
telephone interview, LTC Michael Whetstone, April 6, 2004).  Approximately fifteen TF 
Ranger personnel began would become known as the “Mogadishu Mile,” at the release 
point on National Street, since all of the APCs were fully loaded.  Fearing friendly forces 
would leave them behind, these personnel literally ran beside the vehicles.   
0604 hours - At the request of CPT Whetstone, the SWTs destroyed the APCs 
damaged on the southern objective (personal telephone interview, LTC Michael 
Whetstone, April 6, 2004). 
0608 hours - The TF Ranger JOC received a report that there was still TF Ranger 
personnel dismounted.  LTC David ordered all movement stopped until the vehicles 
picked up the personnel.  Falcon 16, probably 1LT Breen, radioed that he had two APCs 
at Strongpoint 207, and would move to assist.   
0620 hours - LTC David reported that all personnel were now with vehicles, and 
ordered the movement to resume.   
0632 hours - LTC David reported that all QRF and TF Ranger forces had closed 
on the Pakistani stadium.   
0717 hours - LTC David reported initial unit casualties to the TF 2-14 TOC as 
one KIA and fourteen WIA.  The final casualty report for TF 2-14: two KIA, 24 WIA. 
0810 hours - TF Ranger aircraft began shuttling personnel from Pakistani 
stadium to the airfield.   
0916 hours - TF Ranger had accounted for all personnel; TF Ranger personnel 
listed six personnel from crash site #2 as MIA. 
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